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THE QUARTERLY REVIEW

No. 553.—JULY, 1942.

Art. 1.—WAR TASKS OF BRITISH SHIPPING.

FOR a second time within just over a quarter of a century the two main functions of British shipping have been plainly demonstrated. Unless there is reason beyond question for believing, or rather knowing, that at the end of the present world-wide conflict there will be no more wars, it is of extreme importance that not only should these separate duties be recognised but account should be taken of their implications.

In peace-time British shipping flying the Red or Blue Ensigns carried the greater part of the seaborne commerce of this island nation. The rest was undertaken by merchant fleets owned in other countries which were permitted to participate in it on precisely the same terms as British ships. This commerce includes the transport overseas of the few bulk commodities which the United Kingdom has ordinarily to export, chief among these being coal and China clay. It also embraces the manufactures of these islands, the profit on which contributes something to the cost of importing the vast quantities of foodstuffs needed for feeding the population, and the raw materials, including iron ore, cotton, and wool, required for the normal manufactures of Great Britain. Since the internal combustion engine began to be developed for industrial purposes immense quantities of oil and spirit have needed to be brought to the ports of this country from far-distant sources of supply, and for this work special types of vessels, which are ill-suited to carry outward cargoes, have had to be employed. In peace-time British shipping was long accustomed to share in the overseas commerce of other countries (though in recent years its proportion had been declining), thus performing the services of a great maritime nation and by its earnings

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contributing in an important degree to the so-called invisible exports of the country.

British shipping has not been merely the servant of seaborne commerce. It has been a pioneer of many trades which began in a small way and developed to vast dimensions. One example alone will suffice to indicate the varied nature of this work. The first carcasses of mutton to be brought from New Zealand were frozen in the ships to which they were taken in the bays where the vessels lay loading their cargoes. These ocean-going craft brought from home their own machinery, which carried out the processes afloat before the freezing works were established ashore. Participation in a great volume of oversea commerce requires, indeed, the construction of many kinds of vessels. These embrace the fast mail and passenger liners, cargo liners, general traders or tramps, colliers, tankers, and coasting ships which carry cargoes between the large ports, where the ocean vessels call, and smaller ports around the British Isles.

Shipping customarily has experienced long periods of lean years, with intervening occasional periods of prosperity. During the bad times the construction of ordinary cargo vessels has been checked. The managements of passenger liner companies and oil tankers, however, continued to contract. The liner companies built because in the most favourable circumstances the lives of the passenger ships are strictly limited in number. The vessels depreciate through wear and tear directly they are commissioned. Passengers have learned to expect much. Fashions change, and if British owners did not maintain their fleets on the highest standards the travelling public—British among them—would be quick to support foreign lines, many of which have been in receipt of direct or indirect financial assistance from the governments of the countries to which they belong and thereby have been at an advantage in competing with British companies which enjoyed no such help. The oil tanker companies built because of the continually growing demand for the commodity and its products due to the development of the internal combustion engine for transport on the roads, in the air, and on the seas.

It was well for the British shipbuilding industry that these two enterprising types of owners were able to

contract during the years which passed between the two great wars, for while the Navy was neglected the builders had to look chiefly to them for orders to keep the yards in being. Some of the finest British passenger liners in service to-day were built in yards where previously warships, almost alone, were constructed. In the absence of orders for battleships, cruisers, and destroyers for the Royal Navy, establishments which had previously been confined mainly, if not entirely, to naval work had to compete for the construction of ships with organisations which had always concentrated on merchant vessels. This intensified the competition for merchant shipbuilding. British owners with their contracts thus helped to keep in existence the shipbuilding industry, so that when war broke out once again and warships were wanted, and needed quickly to make good the grave deficiencies of the past, there were still the yards available where, after long neglect, naval work was started again and once more was carried on at high pressure. This support of shipbuilding was one of the many services which British owners have contributed to the strength of the British nation.

The second series of functions performed by British shipping begins directly war is seen to be inevitable. These new duties are in addition to the services which British shipping must continue to render in order to maintain the life of the British peoples. It must always bring the greater part of the foodstuffs required for the feeding of the population and an increased volume of raw materials in view of the demands of an expanding munitions industry. Imposed on British shipping when war breaks out are the additional duties of helping to safeguard itself, and if oversea campaigns are conducted—and these have always been undertaken by Britain at war—of transporting overseas armies and all their supplies and of providing communications with the scenes of war operations. But we must not proceed too fast in outlining the many duties which British shipping is expected to perform successfully in war-time. When the war clouds are about to burst the Admiralty makes its choice of the merchant ships which will be needed at once to be commissioned as auxiliary merchant cruisers. In other words, merchant ships are expected to make

good the deficiencies in cruisers, of which this country in the last great wars has never possessed sufficient. Merchant ships which are picked for this work are among the largest and fastest passenger liners and refrigerated cargo liners. Speed, naturally, is an especial asset for these naval duties, which include the patrolling of the seas, sharing in the blockade of the enemy coasts, and acting as escorts for convoys. The extensive passenger accommodation of these ships is not wanted when they are commissioned as auxiliary cruisers, though it is useful if the vessels are required, as many are, to be employed as transports. However, since ordinary sea travel becomes exceedingly difficult in war-time the waste of this passenger-carrying capacity is not so serious as the loss of the cargo-carrying space.

Many, or most, of the large passenger liners have considerable refrigerated space for the transport of foodstuffs, notably meat and fruit, in cold storage. All this refrigerated space, with the accompanying machinery, is not required when the ships are diverted from their true functions to become the warships which they were not designed to be. So either the costly refrigerating machinery and equipment are torn out of the vessels, or they are left in the hulls and increase the weight to be carried many hundreds of thousands of miles in the course of the ship's new functions.

The effect of this commissioning, it will be seen, is to reduce the volume of tonnage available for carrying foodstuffs at a time when it is most needed. It is a curious fact that, at long last, when financial assistance was offered to British owners to build merchant ships, shortly before the war, refrigerated vessels were excluded from the scheme. The plan led to the building of about 100 ordinary cargo vessels, and it thus enabled a flying start to be made with the large volume of construction which became essential when the war on merchant shipping began. Refrigerated vessels were excluded from the provisions in spite of grave warnings by leaders of the shipping industry. One spokesman recalled that during the last war 2,910,000 tons of frozen meat were brought to Europe in refrigerated vessels, and he asserted that without these supplies the war could not have been successfully conducted. The Government of the day,

he remarked, seemed to expect that, in the event of another war, the losses from enemy action would be negligible, and it was to be hoped that such optimism would be justified. Unfortunately, it has not been. Both in the last and the present wars armed meat ships have fought magnificently when attacked in the course of their normal service by enemy raiders. They will always need to be armed for self-protection in war, but that necessity is quite different from being called upon to act as warships guarding slow merchant ships and ploughing the oceans hunting the enemy.

This misuse of refrigerated vessels, and indeed of other merchant ships as well, means that before an enemy submarine, surface ship or aeroplane attacks, the mercantile marine is deprived of many of its most serviceable vessels. Such restriction of the merchant fleets is one of the reasons why the rationing of meat and other food-stuffs at once becomes essential. Other countries are not confronted with the same question of the refrigerated vessels because they are not so dependent on imported food. Any layman can appreciate the unsuitability of the great liners, with their immense cargo-carrying space and their high decks, for commissioning as warships. They become large targets and they are not armoured. Their fate is sealed when they meet powerful enemy warships. If converted into aircraft carriers they cannot be as efficient as vessels designed and build for the purpose. British auxiliary cruisers have fought splendidly. Their officers and their crews have gone down fighting bravely under the White Ensign, but as warships they were only makeshifts, while under the Red Ensign they were well fitted for their service and the older ships left to their proper work did what they were planned to do with signal success.

The reason for the commissioning of these vessels is naturally that, when war is threatened, there are not sufficient real warships for the innumerable duties they are needed to undertake. The shipping industry does not blame any particular Board of Admiralty for these shortcomings of the Fleet. But when distinguished retired admirals suggest that everything is not as well as it should be with the British mercantile marine, shipowners cannot help feeling that, were they so minded, they could indulge

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in a *tu quoque* with the Navy. They have refrained from doing so. The lack of the much-needed cruisers and other escort ships at the outbreak of war may have been due to a failure of foresight and to the parsimony of past governments. Shipowners, however, long pleaded for recognition of the difficulties which they had also to face in the form of extensive financial assistance to other mercantile marines. It is an old truism that you cannot get more out of an orange than there is in it, and an industry cannot pay out more in the form of wages and the like than it earns. The inability of many shipping companies to allot even the smallest dividends to their shareholders during the long years of deep depression is an indication of how, in the face of intense foreign State-assisted competition, the earnings of the great industry were inadequate.

If in future merchant ships are to be required to act in time of war as fleet auxiliaries, then there seems to be a strong case for building merchant vessels which shall be better suited for the tasks. They should not be large refrigerated ships. When the United States undertook a few years ago a programme of building 500 merchant ships for the reconstruction of the mercantile marine some of the new vessels were designed definitely to act, if the need arose, as naval auxiliaries. Refrigeration, when mentioned at all in the particulars, is quite small judged by British standards, since the United States does not need to import refrigerated produce on an important scale. Special fleet auxiliaries, such as have been constructed lately in the United States, should be most valuable additions to British sea power.

Not long before the war many new Japanese cargo liners were built and commissioned. Some were directed to the trade between the United Kingdom and Japan. I remember visiting one of these remarkable ships in the London Docks. She had to her credit record passages and had made the voyage from Japan in less time than the British passenger and mail liners, which called at many ports. These foreign ships created new and serious competition for the British liners. The Japanese were proud of the vessels, which were powerful cargo liners of fine types. Their commercial speed was high, and it was indicated that, if required, they were capable of doing

considerably more. No secret was made of the intention of employing them as fleet auxiliaries in the event of war, and one could envisage their being quickly adapted for this purpose. It was understood that the Japanese Government stood behind the construction and operation of the vessels, which were of a class that could hardly have been expected to pay its way in ordinary commerce. None can doubt that they have proved most useful in the recent Japanese aggressive strokes.

The Italian Government likewise assisted financially the construction and operation of many liners the design of which also had war duties in view. These nations quite clearly told the world that they regarded merchant ships as the necessary complements of naval vessels in war-time. Meanwhile the employment of these and other ships of similar high types in peace-time made matters very difficult for British shipping companies. Many British travellers did not hesitate to patronise these foreign vessels or to compare them favourably, both in private and in public, with British ships. It was easy enough for the managements of foreign companies to provide additional amenities when it was immaterial whether the vessels paid their way or not. The facts, when pointed out, seemed too often to leave the travellers unconcerned. They were mainly interested in securing the utmost value for their money, and they did not think it necessary to be influenced by the considerations of whether or not a foreign government was subsidising the ships and how such help would affect British lines.

The obvious answer to this state of things was the grant of similar assistance by the British Government to British vessels. British owners made known year after year the disabilities under which they were working, but the response was very tardy. After all, governments and taxpayers who saw no danger in letting the Royal Navy decline seriously in power could hardly be expected to be disturbed by the action of foreign governments in financially promoting the building of large and efficient mercantile marines. There was always the insidious thought that if other governments were so foolish as to squander their resources in this way that was their own affair and this country could not be expected to follow

so unwise an example. During the last two years Great Britain has experienced to her heavy cost practical results of the building of foreign merchant ships with war purposes in mind.

In any future construction of British merchant vessels the possibility of war service can scarcely be left out of account. Probably the simplest and most effective measures would be for the State to meet the cost of greater strength and higher speeds than would be needed for commercial work. Since owners work during peace in keenly competitive freight markets they know, or should know, the speeds which are most economic. There is usually no hurry in ordinary times for the transport of the world's crops. It is often quite unimportant whether the time taken for a voyage is reduced by a few days or not, especially as much time is spent in loading and discharging cargoes in port. This point applies particularly to grain crops, which too often in the past have exceeded in size the demand for them. No commercial purpose can be served by building for peacetime fast ships for all trades (though in some routes, and particularly in liner services, speed is often important). High speed is expensive, and the cost at which owners are able to transport the commodities in bulk is generally the factor which decides whether or not they are successful in securing the freight.

Since the war it has been suggested that faster ships would have been more serviceable. They certainly could have been given an extra turn of speed if any government had thought it prudent to arrange for this to be done. Yet the point should not be overlooked that since the war much tramp tonnage has been built by the Government which is slow in speed. The policy of building tonnage of this type has been explained on the ground that it can be produced quicker than shipping propelled by more powerful engines. Some British owners have criticised the construction of the slow tonnage, but in doing so they have seemed to be thinking more in terms of transport in war conditions than of economical carriage by sea in time of peace.

Besides planning merchant vessels with possible war-time service in mind, in future there should be built up a reserve of merchant vessels no longer in the prime of

their lives. In the past British owners have been accustomed to dispose of their older vessels to foreign buyers and to apply the proceeds of the sales to the cost of new tonnage. It is doubtful if a full resumption of this practice could be justified, remembering how valuable even the oldest ships become in war-time. Towards the end of 1938 a leading owner devised a scheme for the creation of a national reserve of cargo tonnage by the laying-up of older ships. Such a plan was, in fact, included in the British Shipping (Assistance) Bill of 1939, which was prepared too late to be of use in helping British shipping to be ready for the present war. Anticipating the authority sought, and as a matter of urgency, the House of Commons in May of that year approved a supplementary estimate making available 2,000,000*l.* for the purchase of the vessels and 100,000*l.* for their maintenance.

In addition to relying on merchant shipping to reinforce the fleet with tonnage in war-time, the Royal Navy, being not fully manned in peace-time, draws heavily on the Royal Naval Reserve when war breaks out. The liner companies, particularly, thereby are deprived of the services of some of their best men when they are most needed. The Royal Navy also depends for mine-sweeping and patrol services on men and craft normally engaged in the fishing industries, and these drafts in turn have the effect of drying up sources of supply to which the Merchant Navy would naturally look for recruits to man its own ships. It not only has to provide men for the Royal Navy when war is threatened and to carry on without them during hostilities, but it is also expected, when fighting ceases, quickly to absorb again the men it lent. The Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association has lately recalled how the numbers of men in the Royal Navy fell sharply after the last war and when the fleet was being cut down drastically. As to the means of overcoming the difficulties in future it may be that large numbers of men who are associated in one way or another with the sea and have undergone in peace-time training with such organisations as the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve could be made available for service with the fleet in emergency. Such recruits would include those who preferred to join the Navy to serving with the Army or the

Royal Air Force. There is also a large reservoir of men who, after serving at sea for some years, have settled down ashore and might be called upon in time of need to go to sea again in ships of the Merchant Navy.

The commissioning of liners to act as fleet auxiliaries is only one of the direct war purposes for which merchant vessels are required. When oversea campaigns are conducted they are needed to act as transports and as supply ships. If the campaigns overseas are chiefly in near Continental countries small passenger vessels, including pleasure ships, can be employed for carrying troops and supplies and can be converted into hospital ships. Such vessels were largely commissioned for these services during the last war and also in the present war. The campaigns instituted during the present war in the countries bordering the Mediterranean, however, have necessitated the employment of many ocean-going vessels, and the total volume of tonnage so engaged has been very great. More shipping has been needed for the conduct of these campaigns than ever before. The mechanisation of the armies has made heavy demands on tonnage. We are told that this is a mechanised war and that one of the deciding influences are tanks. When people read of immense numbers of tanks clashing against each other in desert warfare, they do not necessarily remember that all the heavy British vehicles have had to be carried to the scene of operations in merchant ships. Besides tanks, aeroplanes, guns, and armoured cars of various kinds have also had to be transported thousands of miles in merchant vessels, encountering all kinds of weather, together with shells and other ammunition and stores of every sort, including food and fuel. Communications by sea have had to be maintained and the wounded and sick have had to be evacuated. Only when there has been talk of an expansion of operations oversea and the war has extended to the Far East has any question arisen of there being a limit to the services of merchant shipping. For a long time the needs of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force have had to be met, whatever the claims these might make on the supply of merchant shipping, which was being diminished by enemy attack. The mercantile marine has seemed to be regarded as an inexhaustible reservoir of man power and tonnage the resources of

which would never fail the most far-reaching military operations of the country.

As the development of the oversea campaigns demanded the allocation of more and more shipping, the supply available for meeting the needs of industry and the civilian population was gradually curtailed still more. The wonder is that in these conditions the rationing of food has been practicable on the scales which have permitted the population to be adequately nourished. The voyages of vessels employed for these direct war purposes have been protracted, and only ships which could carry considerable quantities of fuel were useful. Occasionally exporters might notice that liners which were loading on the berth in British ports and were to have carried outwards important cargoes of manufactures which had successfully passed the exacting tests applied to them of being valuable to the war effort were withdrawn shortly before the proposed dates of sailing. Shippers of cargo had no need to ask the reason why; they merely had to recall the war developments. It might be preparations for an offensive in the Middle East, or a determination to help Russia with large supplies, or some other urgent need, but it was always a demand of the war which had to be instantly met.

The campaigns in the Middle East had the distinction of being conducted at the farthest distance from bases in the United Kingdom of any war until that time. This unprecedented character, which was reflected in such great claims on merchant shipping, was due to the need to send most of the ships round the Cape and up the Red Sea, as the Mediterranean was closed to all convoys but those which could be specially protected and whose prompt and safe arrivals were essential. This long way round to the Mediterranean meant that the voyage to Egypt was of about the same length as the passage to Australia. The outbreak of war in the Far East has made further and serious demands on merchant shipping for war services, in consequence of which limitations on consumption had to be introduced. Reviewing the war in the House of Commons on January 27, the Prime Minister indicated that the limiting factors in the preparations which it had been open to the Government to make in Malaya and Burma, and generally in the Far

East, had not been troops or even equipment ; it had been transport, even assuming that the Government had possessed the necessary great surplus of men and material available. From the time that the present Government was formed every scrap of shipping which could be drawn away from the vital supply routes, every U-boat escort which could be diverted from the Battle of the Atlantic, he said, had been used to the utmost capacity to carry troops, tanks, and munitions from these islands to the Near East. When all the varied and widespread needs for British shipping are recalled, the achievements of a mercantile marine built entirely for peace are absolutely amazing. The ships were planned and built by owners for definite services and war uses were not among these.

Important assistance has been given to the British mercantile marine by the merchant vessels of Allied countries. Among these are Norwegian, Greek, Dutch, Belgian, American, and Free French ships. These Allied ships have worked in close cooperation with British merchant vessels. Many of the Allied ships have been employed in British lines from which the original British ships have been withdrawn for direct war purposes. It needs to be remembered, in connection with the cooperation of these Allied vessels, that they were largely engaged in British trades before the war, and had they been withdrawn after the outbreak of hostilities the gap created in the tonnage supply would have been wide. Thus in past years Greek vessels commonly brought grain cargoes from Argentina to the United Kingdom, and many Norwegian oil tankers were chartered to British oil-producing companies. The extent to which these Norwegian ships engaged in British trades had caused some uneasiness among thoughtful men who studied the shipping resources, for they could not overlook the possibility of Norwegian owners, whatever their inclinations, being prevented by Germany from carrying on their customary work for British enterprises. In the event, when Germany invaded Norway a portion of her mercantile marine was seized by the enemy. Another and important part, however, managed to escape. Many Norwegian vessels were already on charter to British firms and others were on the high seas or in ports throughout the world. So a considerable volume of Norwegian tonnage became available

for Allied services, and arrangements were made in this country for insuring the vessels against marine and war hazards. A beginning was made with the building in this country of ships to replace those lost by enemy attack, and on December 19 last the first of these ships, a motor cargo vessel of 7,000 tons gross, was launched and named King Haakon VII by Mrs. Sunde, the wife of the Royal Norwegian Minister of Supply and Shipping, in the presence of Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport, and other representatives of the Norwegian and British Governments. Tonnage has also been built for Belgium.

Although the cooperation of the Allied vessels has been of extreme help to the Allies in war-time it actually only went to counterbalance, for the United Kingdom, the substitution of long for short voyages. Great Britain was accustomed to import among raw materials vast quantities of iron ore and timber from Scandinavia and, similarly, immense consignments of dairy produce, notably butter, eggs, and bacon, from the Scandinavian and Low Countries. The cutting off of these supplies had far-reaching consequences for the United Kingdom. Commodities in substitution of those brought across the North Sea within two or three days, or only a few hours, had to be carried during voyages of many weeks, or even of months, from far distant lands. On balance it was found difficult to determine precisely where a line could be drawn between the loss of the country due to the need to bring supplies long distances, instead of short passages, and the gain from the additions to the resources of the Allies of such vessels as had not previously been employed in their service. Any comparison, or attempt to make comparison, is complicated by the consideration that the consumption of foodstuffs is less in war-time owing to the adoption of rationing.

The direction of British vessels to any route where they were wanted most could only be carried out under a system of central control. This required that the owners should be remunerated by the Government independently of the various uses to which the vessels were put. Payment needs to be made for the use of ships during periods of time, and there was ready to hand as a basis the system of time-charter which was adopted

in peace and enabled an owner, or shipper, to employ the vessels as he saw fit (subject to specified limitations) which had been chartered to him. After long discussions between the Ministry of Shipping (as the present Ministry of War Transport then was) terms were settled with the industry, represented by the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steam Ship Owners' Association. It was agreed from the outset that nothing in the shape of war profits would be permitted, even if owners contemplated these. The principles governing the terms were that the Government should allow a proper provision for working expenses and for current depreciation and a reasonable return on capital. They would not agree that any allowance should be made for past arrears of depreciation or towards building up provision for replacement in future. On the whole, the terms in practice have seemed to be fair enough, subject to the uncertainty of the costs of replacing ships at higher prices. Vessels depreciate far more rapidly in war-time than in peace, and actually the percentage allowed for depreciation in the charter terms is less than the standard approved by the Inland Revenue in the assessment of earnings for taxation.

In accepting the terms owners were influenced by the consideration that the Government promised to put on record its recognition of the need to maintain the British mercantile marine in adequate strength and in a position of full competitive efficiency. This assurance was included in a Parliamentary Paper outlining the agreement, and was accompanied by a promise that they would keep the question constantly in mind as one with which it would be necessary to ask Parliament to deal in due course.

There was the more reason for this promise since, after battling for years for some measure of recognition of the needs of the industry, shortly before the war owners had the belated satisfaction of seeing proposals introduced to Parliament in the British Shipping (Assistance) Bill, 1939. At the request of the Government they had carried out a most comprehensive investigation into the state of the many sections of the industry and had formulated imperative needs. These were taken into account in the legislation which, however, was mainly concerned with shipping as a peace-time enterprise. Before the legislation could be carried through its various

stages the war began and the Bill was set aside. It remains as a basis for a discussion of future needs. These have been amplified and extended by the war.

There seems to be no question that owners will need to be able freely to exercise all the individual initiative which built up the British mercantile marine and that they must not be handicapped and checked by the effects of competition from mercantile marines backed by powerful Government support. At the same time the duties of merchant ships in war-time will have to be considered, and if they are again to be called upon to perform duties similar to those they have had to undertake in the present war the necessary plans, including finance, should be arranged. Happily, the shipping industry is in a better position than it has been to state its needs agreed by the whole of the industry, as a result of the formation last year of the General Council of British Shipping. This body has already given thought to future commercial policy, for which it will be the spokesman, while the National Maritime Board, with a remarkable record of success behind it, will be able to continue to deal with questions of personnel. Serving on the Board are representatives of the officers and men, as well as of the ship-owners. The associations representing the officers and men of the British Merchant Navy on the National Maritime Board are zealous in caring for the interests of their constituents. The owners are members of the Shipping Federation, which has been entrusted with the duty of carrying out the work involved in the formation of reserve pools of officers and men under the scheme prepared in accordance with the Essential Work (Merchant Navy) Order, 1941. The scheme is designed to ensure that officers and seamen shall be continuously employed during the war and that adequate crews shall be available for merchant ships. Given full employment for ships after the war there should be no difficulty in guaranteeing full employment for the men and also none in assuring for them a full share of resulting prosperity.

C. MAUGHAN.

Art. 2.—BOMBING AND MORALE.

THE intensive bombing of our cities in the autumn and winter of 1940-41 had an effect which the Germans had neither expected nor desired. It served to harden, not to weaken, our national morale and to stiffen the will to win in this country. Will not our bombing of German towns have a similar effect? Is it not, therefore, a mistaken policy, which is likely to do more harm than good? That question is being asked and deserves an answer.

The glib rejoinder, 'Oh, the Germans are not as we are; *they* will crack under the strain,' simply will not do. We want something more convincing than a dogmatic and challengeable, if comforting, assertion of that kind. It is as unconvincing as is the argument, often heard in support of criticisms of our bombing policy, that our air offensive cannot do any real good because, so far as it is an assault on morale (and it must be that to a substantial extent), it strikes at the wrong people. It claims, necessarily, a large number of victims among the working people of Germany, whose morale does not matter. It is at the morale of the rulers of Germany that we should aim. The common people there do not count. They are well tamed by their own masters.

One must go a little deeper than that. One must try to analyse morale and to arrive at some idea of the real impact of air attack upon it. The question is one upon which if one is to judge by statements made in Press and Parliament, there is a certain amount of confusion of thought. It is sometimes stated or implied that attack on morale is something entirely new in the practice of war. It is not. It has long been a practice of war on land (and, to a less extent, by sea). It has not been banned by the rules, such as they are, of war. The purpose has been to induce the inhabitants of the bombarded locality to bring pressure to bear upon the military commander to give it up to the enemy. 'Destruction of private and public buildings through bombardment,' says Oppenheim,* 'has always been, and is still, considered lawful, as it is one of the means of impressing upon the authorities the advisability of surrender.' The actual practice of

* 'International Law,' 6th Edition, Vol. II, p. 328.

belligerents, he adds, admits the bombardment of a town as a whole, not of the fortifications only.

That, of course, is bombardment for the purpose of affecting morale, and the step from it to indiscriminate bombardment from the air is a short one. Given the capacity of aircraft to overleap defences, the bomber is able to strike at localities which the cannon could not reach, but otherwise there is nothing really unprecedented in the new development. Attempts have been made to restrict the bombing of populated areas. Our own Government has declared its intention, subject to reciprocity, to confine attack to military objectives. This conception of the permitted scope of air bombardment has not, however, been universally accepted. An authority on international law who is now a Minister has written: * 'The assumption . . . that in any future war aircraft will be used against large cities is a just and inevitable assumption. There is no intelligible theory of modern war by which such use can be condemned, once fighting has been permitted to begin.'

One need not waste time at present in discussing the legal question that is involved. Germany has given us ample excuse for pleading the old maxim about arms and the silence of the laws. (So has Japan.) All that we need really consider is whether the assault on morale is an effective method of warlike constraint or not. If it is, one can hardly conceive that we should hesitate to use it. Even Mr Victor Gollancz,† it seems, would subscribe to that proposition.

'To destroy morale the Germans bomb civilian populations far from any military objective. Do we do the same? I do not know whether we do, but the words must be wrung from me that, if thus alone we could win, we should, God forgive us, be right. And whether we do so or not, that is what . . . newspaper after newspaper is advocating. I do not blame them for advocating it, if they think, as I deny, that it is a militarily necessary or effective policy, for the defeat of Hitler should be our supreme consideration.'

To the question asked in this quotation it is not possible to give a straight and unqualified answer. That

* P. J. Noel Baker, 'Disarmament,' 2nd Edition, p. 219.

† 'Shall Our Children Live or Die?' p. 93.

is because the question is itself an instance of oversimplification of the issue involved. We *are* bombing to destroy morale but we are doing so by attacks on military objectives; whether they are military objectives in the sense intended in the extract is another question. We are bombing industrial areas and communications; these, in a totalitarian war, cannot be regarded as other than legitimate objectives. There is in fact no such clear-cut distinction between bombing to destroy morale and other sorts of bombing as the quotation implies. The real difference is between bombing, the primary, and possibly sole, purpose of which is to destroy morale, and bombing in which such destruction is incidental and subsidiary to another purpose. Our bombing is strategic, but it has inevitably, as a kind of by-product, a psychological effect, that is, an effect on morale. It is necessary, moreover, to distinguish between the morale of the population and the morale of the rulers of the country. The significance of this difference will appear from what is stated later.

While our own Government has been unequivocally opposed to terroristic bombing it has not been blind to the danger that the enemy might be less scrupulous in his methods. Indeed, we in this country appear to have taken a rather exaggerated view of that possible danger. Looking back now on what we did—and said—in 1939, one can see that we were in some respects over-apprehensive in regard to the air menace, and, which was hardly surprising at that time, very dubious about the public reaction to it if it should emerge as an actuality. We undoubtedly over-estimated the casualty roll which bombing would cause. We made an immense provision for hospital beds, for instance—a provision which was found in the event to be happily far in excess of the needs of the victims. There was a general tendency in this country to fear the worst. In June, 1939, the Air Raid Defence League issued a pamphlet in which the casualties likely to be caused by a single day's raiding were estimated at 35,000—a figure which would increase, it was stated, to 100,000 in a few days. Fortunately, in nearly three years of war we have hardly reached that total yet. In London alone, Professor J. B. S. Haldane * warned us,

* 'A.R.P.', 1938, p. 63.

from his experience in Spain, that a knock-out blow from the air might result in the killing of 50,000 to 100,000 people. It is hardly surprising that the catastrophic losses which were contemplated should have inspired precautions which were in some respects over-elaborate, or perhaps one should say over-solicitous for the safeguarding of life and limb. We were encouraged in the early days to seek shelter at once when the sirens sounded. It was our duty, indeed, not to expose ourselves to the risk of becoming casualties and therefore a burden on the community. Now when the alert is heard we take up our posts nonchalantly as fire-watchers or extra wardens or other active—and exposed—participants in the great civilian *levée-en-masse* enrolled behind the organised fire brigades, rescue parties, and demolition squads. And most of us have found that the possession of a tin helmet has raised our morale tremendously!

In the early days, however, we thought only of going to ground. So obsessed did we all seem to be with the idea of taking cover that some shrewd observers feared that our morale would be undermined in advance. In the House of Lords on March 15, 1939, Lord Trenchard warned the country that we were thinking far too much about defence and devoting too much energy, money, and material to the provision of dug-outs and shelters. He deprecated the 'continuous clamouring for defence measures.' In a letter to 'The Times' of March 18, 1939, Sir Henry Page-Croft (now Lord Croft) wrote: 'Nothing could more surely play the game of the enemy than to create a panic psychology which encourages flight to shelter.'

The raids came—belatedly—and our town dwellers stood up to them with amazing fortitude. Their reaction to the savage assault was a revelation to the world. Certainly, so far as the raids were psychological in intent, they were an absolute failure, for the result was a stiffening of the nation's morale. That result might have been expected in view of what had happened in Spain and in China. At Barcelona intensive bombing led to mass demonstrations demanding continuance of the war. In China, the correspondent of 'The Times' at Shanghai was able to report in that paper on July 7, 1939, that 'in spite of the terrible loss of civilian life which it has caused,

the bombing of Chinese cities has failed to shake the morale either of the leaders or of the masses.'

Yet the result might well have been different in altered circumstances. Concentrated bombing may be decisive if it coincides with defeats in the field. There is reason for holding that the brutal attack on Rotterdam on May 14, 1940, was the final stroke which broke the resistance of metropolitan Holland. This is evident from the terms of the proclamation which General Winkelman, the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, issued on that day. 'This afternoon,' it stated, 'Germany bombarded Rotterdam, while Utrecht has also been threatened with destruction. In order to spare the civil population and to prevent further bloodshed, I feel myself justified in ordering all troops to suspend operations.' Something of the same kind happened in France a month later. There is evidence that the savage bombing of the French towns and the machine-gunning of the civilian refugees who crowded the roads affected Marshal Pétain profoundly and, coming on top of the military reverses, proved to be the decisive factor in the process of the destruction of France's will to war.

These were instances in which the rot set in from the top. The leaders' nerves gave way before those of the people at large had had time to be seriously affected. In each case the assault on the morale of the country and its rulers was coincident with the impact upon them of disasters which might in any event have had the same result. The probability is that that result would have been less immediately achieved, the possibility that it might have even been staved off and the position, hopeless though it seemed to be, rectified, if the attack from the air had not come just at the time and in the manner in which it did. With devilish ingenuity the Germans used the assault on morale—the morale of the leaders via the morale of the led—at the precise moment when it was likely to have the greatest effect.

Morale is an imponderable. Actually, it is our English translation of the French word *moral*, which means the state of discipline or spirit in an army or any other body of people. The French *morale* really means ethics or morality, and for that reason some purists would condemn the use of morale in the sense here intended. It has the support, however, of H. W. Fowler in his 'Modern

English Usage.' 'Is a combination of pedantry and gallicism,' he asks, 'to bully us into abandoning the English word *morale*?' It is certainly a convenient word, and what it seeks to convey is fairly well understood. How morale will react to any given impact cannot be confidently foretold. The quality of the leadership vouchsafed to a nation in the hour of trial is of the first importance here. We were fortunate in Britain in those dark days of June 1940. We were steeled by bold and inspiring leadership to endure greatly. We were told the worst and the best—and the best was a poor best, then. We were warned that our lot for the present must be blood and sweat and tears. We were called upon to rise to the height of our finest hour, to bear our ordeal with grimness and gaiety, to fight the good fight to the end. The clarion call was heard and heeded. The nation's morale was never higher than in those days of adversity.

One can conceive a situation in which a very different tale would have had to be told. A people's morale cannot be hermetically sealed or insulated. It must be affected by events other than the trials, physical and mental, experienced by those whose fortitude is subjected to the test. The morale of a community cannot but react to the impact upon it of happenings with which it is not immediately concerned but by which, nevertheless, its ultimate destiny may be decided. It must rise or fall with the fortune of war. The glory of Tobruk or Malta, the humiliation of Singapore—each has its influence, for good or ill, upon the spirit of our townsfolk here at home in their own tribulations. Good news is a tonic. Report or rumour of disaster, coming at the moment of strain, may be a paralysing drug. Where the failure of others is due, or is believed at the time to be due, to loss of morale under air assault, the heart is likely to be taken out of a passive defence which has hitherto stood up staunchly to the worst the enemy bombers can do. 'We, the civilians, the non-combatants can take it. The Army cannot. The Army is letting us down.' That is the kind of ugly, poisonous thought that may intrude into and infect the morale of citizens subjected to intensive bombing attack. Nor is this the only way in which the devil's work of demoralisation can be done. Whispers of disloyalty in high places, hints of intrigues and political

manceuvres, rumours that vitally important Ministerial appointments have been made, not from the best men obtainable but on the principle that 'it was Buggins's turn,' widespread suspicion that the nation's war effort is still far from being fully organised because vested interests of capital or labour are standing in the way—these are the seeds from which a flourishing crop of national defeatism can easily be grown. To them, in another order of ideas, may be added the belief that, despite official professions, there is no real equality of sacrifice, that rationing notwithstanding, rich and unpatriotic people can still guzzle to their heart's content, that those who care to do so can wangle or bribe their way out of every network of restrictions, that profiteering has not been banished, that the black market is still active and profitable, that self-seeking and axe-grinding are in war as in peace the real motives inspiring the activities of some of our public men. Wishful thinking, calamity-howling, alternating moods of complacent optimism and disgruntled petulance exhibited in the utterances of those whose responsibility it is to inform and guide public opinion, cannot but have an effect upon the morale of people who have troubles enough in the shape of under-nourishment, business worries, and enemy bombs.

Dissatisfaction in a democratic country can find a vent in Press and Parliament. The Government can be changed by constitutional means. It may itself decide to give way to others if public opinion is unmistakably in favour of a change, or even, if the situation seems to be desperate, to come to terms with the enemy. It is thus, and not by any revolutionary process, that a general loss of morale is likely to be transfused into decisive action. In a book published not long after the last war a distinguished officer, then on the General Staff of the Army, predicted an early collapse of the nation's resistance as a consequence of devastating raids on London in a future war. The city for several days would be 'a vast raving Bedlam.' 'What of the Government at Westminster?' he asked. 'It will be swept by an avalanche of terror. Thus will the enemy dictate his terms. Thus may a war be won in forty-eight hours and the losses on the winning side actually be *nil*.' A sudden *débâcle* of this kind was never, perhaps, very probable in

this country. Marshal Foch's dictum that virile States cannot be awed into surrender by the destruction of their capital cities was nearer the truth. It remains possible, nevertheless, that the Government of a country may be nearer to a state of defeatism and collapse in a critical situation than are the people as a whole.

In July, 1917, Sir Henry Wilson had come to the conclusion, we are told by Sir C. E. Callwell, in his 'Life' of that soldier, that 'with the honourable exception of General Smuts, no member of the War Cabinet believed in the possibility of victory.' That may have been merely the hasty expression of the diarist's passing (but recurring) impatience with 'the frocks.' Possibly, however, there was a scintilla of truth in the remark. The Government's position is one of unenviable responsibility in the crises of a struggle for life or death. It is a trustee for the nation. It has information which, for reasons of defence, cannot always be disclosed. It may have grounds for regarding the outlook as hopeless before the general public are aware that a critical stage has been reached. Its morale may be more brittle than that of the average citizen. Collapse at the centre may precede and not follow the appearance of any serious signs of exhaustion of the general will to resist.

In a totalitarian State there is no less a possibility of defeatism emerging at the nerve-centre rather than in the limbs of the body politic. In such a State the people count, of course, for nothing in the capacity of potential Government-makers. They are disfranchised and enslaved. That is not to say that the state of their morale is a matter of indifference to the ruling clique. How much it matters is evident from the great pains which the rulers of Germany take to shield the population from the adverse winds of possibly hostile propaganda. The people are spoon-fed on wholesome news fare, on a carefully selected diet of censored information from which every dangerous element has been eliminated. They are savagely punished if they listen to enemy broadcasts or repeat rumours of reports emanating from sources regarded as unfriendly. Perhaps the people of no country know really how the war is prospering at any given date; but the people of the *Reich* know less than any other. They are stuffed with lies. They are told of heavy raids

on England when in fact there have been either none or only a few spasmodic forays in which no damage was done. It is sound psychology, of course, to let people know when they are suffering from the enemy's blows that his people are being punished in their turn. To invent raids for this purpose, however, is a dangerous experiment in propaganda. It is apt to be found out.

Why do the Nazis strive so assiduously to maintain the morale of the well-schooled people of Germany? Simply, one must assume, because a hopeless, dispirited people cannot be an efficient labour force. That force is as essential a part of the German war machine as is the combatant force. It is valuable, not because it has the vote or any power to express its will, but because it has limbs and muscles, sinews, thews, and hands; skill, too, in its task of making and moving the munitions and supplies which have to be produced and transported in enormous quantities to keep the armed forces in action. It represents, moreover, a very substantial proportion of the whole population of Germany. Depress its morale, and you depress at the same time, necessarily, the morale of the German people.

You do more than that. You depress the morale of the ruling gang and of the chiefs of the armed forces. You interfere with the rhythm of production and transportation upon the maintenance of which they must rely for the execution of their plans. You kill, in fact, at least two birds with one stone. If you bomb for the purpose of demoralisation pure and simple, you may achieve a result opposite to that which you seek. You may harden, not weaken, the determination of the people and their will to war. If you bomb for the purpose of disorganisation and interruption of industry and communication you must achieve—unless your bombing is badly directed—a positive and profitable result. You produce, moreover, a psychological result which, since it operates upon the nerve-centre, is of particular value and importance. The effect upon morale is obtained, however, only as a by-product of action taken for a strategical end.

To bomb simply to terrorise is a mistake. To bomb factories of all kinds, big warehouses, oil plants and refineries, railway centres, goods yards, canals, docks, and

other targets of the kind, is sound policy. It will produce, moreover, an effect upon morale more detrimental to the enemy than would purely terroristic bombing. That is not because mechanics, riveters, shunters, dockers, and workers of various kinds will be killed or injured—as they are bound to be. It is because you upset and disarrange the enemy's programme of construction and conveyance.

But, it will be said, we *have* been bombing such objectives as those mentioned, and we have not achieved very much as yet. Furthermore, our bomber squadrons have suffered heavy losses in some of their raids, and these may increase to such a degree as to make raiding too costly. It is the morale of our own air crews that may be affected before that of the enemy Government or people. It will be shaken if the defences, on the ground and in the air, are so much strengthened in Germany, as they have been in this country, that the cost of our offensive becomes prohibitively high. In any case, the replacement of aircraft and air screws may begin to present difficulties if the losses go on. Just before this war began, the officer who is now Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command—Air-Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas—stated (at Chichester on August 4, 1939) that a casualty rate of 10 per cent. would be a deterrent loss which, if continued, must bring raiding to an end. 'That is a rate of casualties which no Air Force could stand,' he said. Now, that rate might conceivably be reached if the active defence were developed to a greater extent than has as yet been possible. Nevertheless, there is reason to surmise that even if it were, the air offensive against Germany would not be brought to a standstill. Our own air striking force will be in 1943 the most powerful in the world. Behind it will stand the gathering might of the United States, whose military and naval air forces cannot be fully mobilised until, probably, 1944. What these tremendous assemblages of air strength will be able to accomplish can only be dimly discerned from what our own Air Force, still not at its peak, has accomplished in the past. The aerodromes in these islands will serve as the battle-stations, first, for our own air striking force, and later for the advanced air striking force of the United States. Even if the Royal Air Force should find itself unable to keep up the full pace of its onslaught there

will still be that huge mass of American machines and air crews waiting to take up the running.

That prospect can hardly be a comforting one for Hitler or for the German workers when they become aware of it. It is a long vista, a frightening vista of shattering raids impending, of wrath to come, down which no German eye can travel with indifference. Our own immense production, topped now by the still more stupendous output which the harnessing of the American motor industry to the needs of the aircraft industry will make possible, will be something the significance and effect of which we cannot grasp as yet. The morale of no nation on earth could be left unshaken by the weight of the attack to which German industries and communications are likely to be subjected in 1943-44. Whatever happens elsewhere, however far the German armies smash their way in the east or the south, however badly we may fare in the Far East, the issue of the *German* war is certain—on four conditions. The first is that these islands are successfully defended against invasion; the second, that we and the United States go on grimly, whatever happens in Russia or elsewhere; the third, that our supply line across the Atlantic is kept intact; the fourth, that our own and the American production of aircraft and training of air crews are maintained. If these conditions are fulfilled nothing on earth can save Germany. The fact that Hitler thought it advisable to ask the Reichstag on April 26 to give him still more far-reaching powers than he already possessed 'to compel every one to fulfil his duty,' and the rather complaining tone of his oration on that occasion, may perhaps be an indication of a loss of morale inside Germany of which more will be heard in the future.

The smashing of Japan's will to war will be no less certain as soon as the big American bombers are in a position to carry out a scorched earth campaign in that country. There is no country in which the bombing of war industries is calculated to affect the morale of the general population so profoundly. That is because Japan is a land of cottage workshops. The production of many classes of mechanical products is farmed out to small producers. The policy of dispersal has been adopted for three reasons, none of which is a defence reason. It makes

for cheap production, it limits the growth of a large and politically restless urban proletariat, and it spreads employment through the chronically impoverished villages.* In war the dispersal has advantages, from one point of view, but its effect is to render the drawing of a line between the war workers and the mass of the civil population practically impossible. The only way in which the war industry of Japan can be effectively attacked from the air is one which is almost indistinguishable from indiscriminate bombardment.

We may have a chorus of humanitarian expostulation and protest, in America and here, if that sort of air attack is employed. But what alternative is there? And can Japan complain if it is employed against her? After all she, more than any other nation, initiated the practice of terroristic bombing. She bombed scores of Chinese towns mercilessly before the present war began. Two cities suffered especially: Canton and Chungking. There were savage raids on Canton in September 1937, and again at the end of May 1938. 'For every hit on something which could possibly be called a legitimate target,' wrote the special correspondent of 'The Times' at Canton in that paper on June 1, 1938, 'at least ten bombs have fallen far wide and accomplished only butchery.' It was clear, he added, that 'a certain percentage of the bombs dropped had no mission to fulfil save terrorism through slaughter.' There were more heavy raids on the city in June; by the 8th of that month it was estimated that, since May 28, 3000 civilians had been killed and 5000 injured. Chungking had as terrible an ordeal at the beginning of May 1939, thousands of helpless people being slaughtered and maimed. The casualties, our ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, reported at the time, were suffered almost exclusively by the civilian element of the population. Since then, the city has been raided indiscriminately on many occasions. Assuredly Japan cannot come into any debate on this subject with clean hands. She is owed a lesson and she will have it. Her people are an emotional one. The morale of the nation will crack in a short space of time when the great American air flotillas strike home.

J. M. SPAIGHT.

* W. H. Chamberlin, 'Japan over China,' 1938, pp. 270, 272.

Art. 3.—LIFE AT DEVONSHIRE HOUSE.

THE period of history about which it became fashionable to write during the years preceding this war was the story of the Whigs at the close of the eighteenth and commencement of the nineteenth centuries ; much was published about the chief characters of this most interesting time.

Mr Belloc in his latest book says that we must always look at history through the eyes of contemporaries ; this is quite true of Lord David Cecil, whose 'Young Melbourne' gives a brilliant and fascinating picture of the manners and customs of these extraordinary people, and his opening chapter is an able essay on their general mode of life. He has certainly steeped himself in the true 'Blue and Buff' tradition (but his allusion to 'port' instead of 'port wine' would have sent a cold shiver down the backs of the Whigs who prided themselves on doing and speaking differently from the rest of the world), though his ancestress, Emily, Lady Salisbury, was the chief rival in the opposite camp and kept the Tory flag flying during the Hertfordshire, St Albans, and Westminster elections, but according to Wraxall in not nearly so successful a way as did the Whig ladies.

Several writers, however, who have followed Lord David, have not been so successful, for they do not seem sufficiently to have studied the period of which they write and have judged the eighteenth-century customs by those prevailing in our own times. They have been especially incorrect in their method of presenting the code of morals of those days, so different from the present time. We are no doubt excessively shocked at many of the things these people did, but I venture to assert that they would be infinitely more shocked at many of the happenings of to-day. The whole of the nineteenth century has elapsed since the time that Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, and her friends were the centre of this fascinating set, and there can be no greater contrast than between them and the society of the second and third decades of the nineteenth century and all the different periods of Queen Victoria's reign or of the early years of the present century. It is therefore

a world so different from that of to-day that it must be judged entirely from a contemporary point of view and not from the standpoint of one hundred and fifty years later.

After several of these books had been published, the present Lord Bessborough decided to put the matter in its proper perspective by publishing 'Lady Bessborough and her Family Circle' which contradicts the inaccuracies and refutes the false statements which had been made. It also proves that though these Whigs were great politicians and loved society, yet their home life, though often bizarre, was not unhappy and that they outwardly continued to live in the ordinary state of matrimony.

Their lives were governed by hard and fast rules and nothing mattered so long as they kept within them; it is needless to say that Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, and her sister, Harriet, Lady Duncannon (afterwards Lady Bessborough), went beyond these limits and so received much criticism from their more sedate acquaintances as well as from the newspapers. This was especially evident at the time of the general elections, for the interest taken in and the money spent on them were immense and endless scheming was necessary even in the boroughs. The climax came during the Whig débacle of 1784 when the younger Pitt became Prime Minister and the famous Westminster election returned Fox after scenes of almost unprecedented excitement. It was the wish of the Cavendish family that Georgiana and her sister should canvass for Fox; they as usual overstepped the mark and received such a volley of abuse that their mother, Georgiana, Lady Spencer, became really alarmed and found that they had actually been entering the alleys and slums of Westminster, though the famous kiss that Georgiana is supposed to have bestowed upon a butcher is a picturesque myth. Georgiana, however, excused herself by telling her brother that it was at the wish of the Duke of Portland, who had married the Duke of Devonshire's sister, and who was nominal leader of the Whigs. The letter, dated April 22, 1784, is as follows:

'You cannot conceive how vexed I am at the newspapers abuse—I never should have begun canvassing but by the D. of Portland's wish and upon finding the abuse I went to
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St Albans from which letters from the D. and Dss. of Portland and Lord John brought me back. I am sure you never believed the abuse held out against me but yet I cannot help wishing you to read the enclosed from the D. of Portland to me as it is certainly a great justification and answer for me. Lord John's and the Duchess's my mother has and they are as strong. Pray return it to me for I look upon it as a valuable manuscript.'

Lady Spencer had meanwhile approached Lord John Cavendish and his answer shows how much his family considered this canvassing necessary and how much tact he had to use in his reply dated April 14, 1784 :

'I have talked with the Duchess of Portland upon the subject on which you did me the honour to consult me this morning. She tells me that the style of canvassing at which you were so particularly alarmed is now quite laid aside, and that it was entirely to be imputed to some injudicious advisers who conducted them in an absurd and injudicious manner ; that the ladies now never quit their coaches but that there are several persons whom none of the common election persuasives will affect but who are to be influenced by the rank and engaging manners of her Grace. I entirely agree in opinion with your Ladyship that such proceedings are very unsuitable to the delicacy or the dignity of persons of their sex and situation ; but such allowance is to be made for the manners and customs of the time : it must too be considered that all the censure and abuse has been already incurred ; and that if any votes are lost for want of similar applications, it is " en pure perte." The present method of proceeding as I am informed is that the Ladies go early in the mornings to such persons as they are told are likely to be influenced by them and talk to them at their coach doors after which they go to a shop that overlooks the polling place and look out at a window to encourage their friends. . . . From this tedious story your Ladyship will collect that the Duchess's presence is thought to be of consequence and that many will complain if she does not give them her countenance again, but every caution which your good sense and prudence can suggest as to reserve and attention to propriety in her manner of acting will in my opinion be very well employed to temper a little too much vivacity in the best head and heart that ever I knew.'

This did not prevent their mother from sending for them to do the same thing in the St Albans election to

counteract the presence of Lady Salisbury, and it was agreed that their canvass and encouragement had turned the scale in Lord Spencer's favour, for his nominee won the election, though in the borough of Northampton he lost, mainly, as he said, because his wife would not canvass, his mother owing to mourning could not, and his sisters were already engaged elsewhere.

It must be remembered that at this time London society was a very small body and Whig society even smaller; some of the writers on this period seem to forget this and give the impression that the 'routs' and 'assemblies' resembled those of late Regency and Victorian times. There was nothing like these latter in George III's reign, for even the largest houses did not have the rooms to accommodate large crowds. At Devonshire House Georgiana's son, the 6th Duke, built a new staircase and removed several partitions to adapt it for the increased size of his parties; new galleries were added to Lansdowne House and to Londonderry House in the nineteenth century, and Stafford House and Bridgewater House were wholly rebuilt to a size more suited to the growing numbers of Victorian London.

Nor did the Whigs often hold large dinner-parties, for they considered that no cook could personally superintend a larger dinner than one laid for four and twenty covers, so they seldom reached that number and never exceeded it. What they preferred were 'morning visits' and 'private parties' which consisted of their special friends who had permission to drop in without invitation either before dinner or for supper; the latter must have been a movable feast, for the men used to come back to Devonshire House after the House of Commons was up, and when an important division was expected the ladies would wait up till any hour for their friends to bring them the result of the vote.

It was at these informal gatherings that the policy of the Whig party was often initiated and always discussed, and the Duchess was often deputed to persuade cautious or recalcitrant members to accept some office or to record some vote. After the Duke of Devonshire had refused the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland in 1783, as she had urged him to do as she was 'averse to it owing to the Duke's hitherto great inaptitude to business'—a very

tactful way of saying he was too lazy to accept it—Georgiana was given the difficult task of endeavouring to induce her brother to take it, but without avail.

The health of these artificial people absorbed much of their time and thoughts for they had no idea of curbing their appetites for food or drink or of keeping better hours. A vast portion of their correspondence is taken up with descriptions and details of their slightest ailments—even when they were so far from home as Naples, they describe an ordinary cold in the head which must have been long cured by the time the letter reached England. The chief illnesses from which they always seemed to be suffering, 'oppressions,' 'nervous or flying pains,' and 'agues' could have been cured by eating and drinking less, but they sent for their physician, such as Dr Warren or later Sir Walter Farquhar, in whose talents they had pathetic and explicit faith. They usually prescribed the same remedies, such as a bleeding or a 'rummage both ways' (meaning an emetic and aperient at the same time), or in more serious cases James's Powders, which seem to have been given for all complaints. These doctors, who were kind and sympathetic (though the standard of medical science was very low at the time), pocketed the guinea which was the fee for each visit.

Other illnesses with which they always seem to be afflicted were a 'decline,' 'the spitting of blood,' and a 'putrid sore throat.' Then there was the exact moment when they were 'given over' and presumably left to die, though at what stage this sentence was actually passed is impossible to tell. It is amazing, however, to find how many survived after being 'given over.'

Mourning for deceased relatives was another of the rules which was absolutely cut and dried, for the period was laid down to the day according to the closeness of kinship. For a near relation the whole family remained at home until a predetermined time when they 'put on mourning' and after that led their normal lives and went to parties though dressed in black; but for more distant relatives they wore slight mourning, one of the stages being 'black gloves.'

It is wonderful that their heads were not turned by the power these Whig magnates wielded, for it was

immense and everything seemed to depend upon them—not only in the political way but also in the arts and sciences, for no writer, poet, or artist could hope to attain any prominence without the help of one of these magnates and no clergyman could obtain a bishopric or even a living without having a patron from among them. Nearly all the literary celebrities of the eighteenth century started life in one of these large households as tutor, domestic chaplain, or in some other post.

But it was politics that really engrossed their attention, for they lived for them, and some of the most violently political parents taught their children to believe that their opponents in Parliament were wicked men and could have no good in them at all. They longed for office not only on account of being then in a position to pass the measures they sponsored through Parliament, but also to give posts and sinecures to their friends and hangers-on of whom they had many. There was no promising way of begging except by applying to these rich men for relief, so their post-bags contained a large percentage of letters asking for all kinds of charity—this applied specially to members of both houses of Parliament, for letters sent and received by them cost nothing, being marked 'Free.' They were usually generous in their replies, not always perhaps so much for the sake of helping the applicant as with an eye to the next election.

The Government's patronage with so many rich sinecures in its gift was a real source of profit to them and they did not attempt to hide the fact that part of the reason for taking office was to provide for their necessitous friends and relations.

As patrons of art the Whigs were supreme, for almost without exception the country houses of England owe their marvellous treasures to them. It is curious how the Whigs seem to have monopolised this collecting mania. They not only bought when they went on the Grand Tour but also kept agents all over the continent to pick up and sometimes to smuggle pictures, books, marbles, and gems with which to beautify their houses.

Much has been written about the Devonshire House ladies and their behaviour, and they have always been blamed for the way they broke their marriage vows. Much has been corrected by Lord Bessborough's book,

but he could perhaps have gone further and it is hoped that the following quotations will show that the fault was not all on the wife's side.

Georgiana Spencer was married to the Duke of Devonshire a few days before her seventeenth birthday. Lady Spencer announced it to Sir William Hamilton from Wimbledon Park on April 4, 1774 :

' You will already have heard of it from others but one thing you cannot hear so well from anybody as myself which is that it is really a match of inclination, very few young women have it in their power to give any proof of this, but the uncommon approbation she met with at her first appearance gave her an opportunity of doing it, for she had several considerable offers made her which she declined without the least hesitation in favour of the Duke of Devonshire. You know Lord Spencer and me well enough to be very sure we avoided saying or doing anything that could bias her in an event so material to her happiness, but it is a great addition to ours that she has made a choice that gives her so fair a prospect of it.'

Her success was immediate ; she at once became the leader of fashion in London, when she should still have been in the schoolroom. Horace Walpole soon after her marriage wrote : ' She effaces all without being a beauty ; but her youth, figure, flowing good nature, sense and lively modesty and modest familiarity make her a phenomenon.'

For the first few years all went well ; her mother was usually within call either in London or at Wimbledon so was able to keep a close watch over her. Moreover, from 1780 to 1783 Lord Spencer, who had never enjoyed good health, was more or less dying and his daughters, who were devoted to him, were never far away, especially as in 1783 the Duchess was expecting her first and Lady Duncannon her second baby. It was, however, after this that the trouble really began and vague suspicions about the continued presence of Lady Elizabeth Foster, who lived at Chatsworth, Chiswick, and Devonshire House supposed as the friend of the Duchess, began to be entertained by the latter's family. Lady Elizabeth, who was the daughter of the Earl-Bishop (Lord Bristol), when first separated from her husband was so poor that she had originally been engaged as governess to an illegitimate

daughter of the Duke. By 1786 these suspicions were verified and Lady Spencer writes to her son from Chatsworth : ' I see things here that sometimes put me out of humour and then I do not behave as I ought so that I almost wish I had not come, but it cannot be helped now.' A fortnight later she continues : ' I am far from happy here but more of that when we meet.' In subsequent years she always arranged that her visits should coincide with Lady Elizabeth's absence and henceforward alludes to her as the ' Obstacle ' and bemoans the fact that they are ' not comfortable ' but fears there is nothing she can do to help.

In these early years Georgiana's name had never been coupled with a lover, in fact her grandmother writes in 1778 that : ' She is much quieter than she was and is always at home before the Duke ; and whatever people may say, and though so much admired, she has no *cicisbeo*, which is now much *ye ton*.' Again two years later a correspondent in writing of her sister's engagement concludes with : ' I hope she will have the good sense not to fall into those giddy errors which have hurt her sister who I hope is now sensible of those errors. I believe she never meant to do wrong, but pleasure, flattery, and youthful high spirits plunged her into danger before she was aware of the bad consequences.' It is true that though she lost her head, it was never turned and she retained the charm with which this lovable girl of seventeen had taken London by storm.

But unfortunately she entered into everything she did with too much zest and was also one of those weak characters who can never say ' No ' ; with the result that her tradesmen's bills, her charities, and her gambling debts mounted up and became enormous.

The first crisis occurred in 1786 when her mother was staying at Chatsworth ; Georgiana was seized with spasms which were first attributed to ' lack of perspiration ' owing to the young men throwing the windows open after dancing ; laudanum was the only thing that could quiet her. But a few days afterwards Lady Spencer discovered that it was owing to ' money distresses.' Their mode of living must be altered ; various expedients were suggested ; it was agreed that she must be kept away from London, Chiswick was too close, Chatsworth

too large and expensive. Her brother, who was also trying to economise, suggested that she should stay with them at Althorp, but that was not possible as she and her sister-in-law had never been very friendly. Her mother thought Londesborough, which the Duke had inherited from his mother's family, the most suitable residence for her and wrote accordingly to the Duke but, as he could never make up his mind, nothing was settled except that after some months Mr Heaton, the Duke's man of business, was sent for. Lady Spencer also considered that it was very unlikely that the 'Obstacle' would allow them to remain so far from London for long.

They were abroad in 1789 when the Revolutionary troubles were beginning in France, so they went to Brussels to be out of the way, and while there the Duchess found that she 'was breeding again.' The Duke therefore refused to allow her to travel home for fear of miscarrying, so they travelled slowly back to Paris and took a house at Passy where Lady Spencer arrived with Georgiana Cavendish who was now about seven years old. Here Hartington was born in May 1790, but their return home was greatly delayed by little Georgiana having two bouts of a fever from which she nearly died. The story that the Duchess had given birth to another daughter at the same time that Lady Elizabeth had had a son and that they were changed round has no foundation, for Lady Spencer was present the whole time at Passy and was the last person to have sanctioned or allowed such an imposture to be effected.

It is after this that we hear for the first time of Georgiana having a lover, and about 1792 a daughter, who was given the names of Eliza Courtenay, was born to her and Charles Grey, afterwards the famous Reform Bill Prime Minister. The Duke and Lady Elizabeth Foster now had two children who were brought up with the Duchess's own; they were Caroline St Jules (Mrs George Lamb) and Augustus Clifford, born in 1786 and 1788 respectively.

Meanwhile her sister, Harriet, had been causing her family the gravest anxiety. She was not good-looking like her sister and her portrait by Hoppner makes her really ugly, though Reynolds who painted her a few years later softens down her features but makes her

appear rather snake-like. She too was good-natured to a fault with an hysterical and exaggerative mind, and her letters, especially those written later to Lord Granville Leveson-Gower, should not be taken too literally.

All the recent books blame her for the breaking of her marriage vows, and no doubt she should never have behaved as she did, but there are circumstances, to which none of them alludes, which show that her frailty began as the result of her husband's behaviour. It is true that both sisters were at first very fond of their husbands and might easily have remained faithful to them if the latter had not given them every opportunity of going astray.

Harriet's family seem first to have become alarmed about her owing to 'F. St J,' who can be identified as Frederick St John, son of Lord Bolingbroke, and her cousin Lady Diana Beauclerk (née Spencer). When her brother made her promise that she would not speak to him again, the Duchess thought it would be better to be less strict and wrote as follows :

'My sister is just come but she was so agitated at seeing you that she could not speak to you. She is determined to do everything you wish and not only that—though she for a great while saw it in too slight a way, she now sees it in its true light. You know how much I think it necessary that a great alteration should take place, but I think, and I find the Duke does too, that her never speaking to him would certainly make it be supposed that something had passed which had required our exertions. When I say this, it is neither my wish or opinion that some very great change should not take place and therefore at the Opera he should never come into the box nor speak to her long together at any place, but just speak to her that it may not be said it is forbid. She sees it all now as she should do and she is anxious to do everything that you can wish and the even speaking to him a little she would not do if you disapprove. I need not tell you, my dearest, dearest brother, how much especially in her present situation she requires every kindness and soothing from us. Do, dear brother, come and see her some day soon and comfort her and I am sure in everything she will do what you can wish. God bless you. Send me one word of answer. I forgot saying that my chief reason for thinking speaking should be allowed is as Lord Dun: don't know it might be informing him of it in a very unpleasant way.'

There was another crisis in the summer of 1786 when Lady Spencer was called in to attempt to make Harriet give up C.W, whoever he was. She promised that she would do so and did begin to 'live at home' which cannot have been very pleasant :

' Last night I went to Devon: Hse and supped en trio with them very comfortably ; Harriet has scarcely been out since she left you and I understand from the Dss: is determined to act perfectly as you wish her ; her sweet husband never comes home till 8, 9, 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning and that is really poor encouragement for living at home. They were at the play last night as I understand with your leave and their box was filled with other people. C.W was not there, I believe. I trust this matter will end right but when it is ended, her situation still continues a most dangerous one and requires the strictest attention on her part as well as on all ours.'

This is from Lord Spencer to his mother, but worse was to follow in February 1787 when he writes again of a real débacle :

' I left my sisters in town in great uneasiness on the subject of Lord Dun: [cannon] who lost on Thursday night a very large sum of money at faro and does not in the least know how to pay it or what to do about it. He has commissioned her to find someone who would lend it to him and she was quite at a loss (as well she might) and was very apprehensive of the consequences of his disappointment. I told her what was quite true that I myself have not the money to lend but that if I had I should not be willing to do it unless I could be convinced that he would play no more in that manner and at that game ; he had thoughts of writing to Lord Fitzwilliam for assistance and I told my sister that I should willingly join with him in giving any security that might be thought of for Lord Dun: to extricate him from this distress but I have no doubt that Lord Fitz: will not do anything of the kind without some engagement that is to be depended upon that he will play no more. I rather wonder I have not heard since from them but as he had enjoined her to keep the whole a secret from everyone who was the least likely to be of any use to him, perhaps she may not have had an opportunity of writing. His great fear is that Ld: Bessborough should know of it as it seems he has threatened very much in case of anything of the kind happening. . . . He went so far, I believe, as to propose to her to give up her settlements but gave that up on her saying that my consent was necessary to it.'

This crisis was overcome by his uncle, Lord Frederick Cavendish, accommodating him, but it will be noticed that Harriet whose good nature and generosity were always at the disposal of all was used in this case by her husband to do his dirty work for him.

Several years after this Harriet was seized with the illness, described in Lord Bessborough's book, which necessitated her going to a warmer climate; it was in Naples that she met Lord Granville Leveson-Gower. Her letters to him were published in 1916 by Castalia, Countess Granville, though the latter suppressed all allusion to their being lovers and to their four children, two of whom died young. It is curious that sixteen years later Lord Granville married Georgiana's daughter and Harriet's niece and they lived very happily together.

The above quotations from letters written by the chief actors make it obvious how great were the trials and difficulties with which these young women had to contend, and when it is realised that in 1786 Harriet had not reached her twenty-fifth birthday, it does not seem very surprising that she should turn to young men like 'F. St J,' 'C.W' and others when her husband left her so much alone.

They were participators in one of the most brilliant periods of English life; they were friends with the great brains of the political and literary world; they sat to the greatest portrait painters that this country has ever produced, and from their pictures we can see that there were probably more beautiful women in London society than ever before or since. We are able to see the beauty, but unfortunately the charm of manner and attraction in both sexes are lost for ever and cannot be reproduced to succeeding generations. Charles James Fox, who initiated the policy of the Whigs and on whose words the Devonshire House circle hung, seems to us to have been a gross, coarse, and dissolute though brilliant man, whereas his contemporaries were completely under the spell of his charm, and those who had known him in their youth were unable to hear his name mentioned even forty years later without it bringing tears to their eyes. This same charm of manner and sympathy, though in a different way, was given to Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, whose friends worshipped her and whose three children, who all

survived her by more than fifty years, never ceased to mourn her whom they considered the inspiration of their lives.

The reason, therefore, for publishing these facts has been to endeavour, while not discounting her errors and those of her sister, to mitigate the sentence which has sometimes been passed upon them and to show that others of stronger character and with fewer temptations would have transgressed as much—if not more—than did Georgiana, Duchess of Devonshire, and Harriet, Countess of Bessborough.

SPENCER.

Art. 4.—THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE AND THE FUTURE.

It is much more by intuition and by instinct than by any conscious process of reasoning that public opinion in England is formed ; and just because it is formed in this way it is the more unshakable. Experience shows that judgments formed in this way, which after all is the only way in which the collective apprehension of a nation can come to its decisions, can be just as sound and as wise as the judgments which are reached by reason ; but intuitive judgments do need to be defined and checked. When the event which occasions the judgment is a thing so prodigious as the Anglo-Soviet alliance, there is all the greater need to define what judgment it is which our intuition has formed of it, and to make some reasoned estimate of the quality and promise of the event itself.

There is, of course, no doubt at all of what the reaction of our people as a whole is towards the new alliance. To call it an enthusiastic and passionate assent is to put it altogether too mildly. One comes across it everywhere one goes, in every class and every district. The correspondence columns of every popular newspaper provide evidence. In the newsreels in the cinemas it is the Russian soldiers who get the spontaneous applause, not the Americans, or even our own. To most British people Russia is to-day a kind of Canaan, a promised, a legendary land. It is a word charged to near explosive point with the dynamite of a passionate admiration. Russia can do no wrong. To the name of Russia there is attached an almost universal emotion of admiration. It was this feeling which swept Sir Stafford Cripps so suddenly and so swiftly into the war cabinet, and his authority with the public is first due to the fact that he has consistently shared and voiced their feelings for Russia. This enthusiasm is probably the most significant fact of our present social situation, and the dominant fact of our future politics. Heaven help any politician or any party which runs counter to it or even ignores it.

This intuitive and passionate enthusiasm for the Anglo-Russian alliance is tantamount to a judgment. But what verdict does the judgment pronounce ? Or, to put the question more precisely, what is the specific

quality or promise in the fact of the cooperation of Britain and Russia which public opinion is hailing? There seem to be two possible answers. It might, for example, be virtually tantamount to a deep admiration of the Russian social achievement. Ever since the Revolution of 1917, Soviet Communism has been the cause of all causes to considerable numbers of devoted people in every country in the world. To many others, while less deeply committed to actual discipleship, it has been a portent of hope and promise. In Russia the mighty had been cast down and the poor exalted, while both land and real wealth had passed into the ownership of the people. This, the desire of the socially insecure, had happened nowhere else. But in more recent years Russian policy had made this admiration more difficult to sustain. The Treason Trials, the Russo-German pact, and the assault on Finland made many devotees wonder sadly if their loyalty had been given to the wrong system and the wrong country. But the German invasion, and the most glorious bravery of the Russian people from top to bottom, demonstrated beyond all doubt that Stalin had made of Russia a greater, stronger, and more united people than she had ever been. Hence it seemed that those who held fast to their loyalty to the soviet system had not after all been cheated, but had been right all along. The passion of their enthusiasm now is in some degree due to their relief that events have vindicated their judgment. After all, no experience can be quite so depressing as the discovery of clayfootedness in one's idol, with the consequent need of acknowledgment that loyalty had for years been given to a mere legend and a dream. To come very near to that given point and then suddenly, in defiance of every probability, to be snatched away from it, is an experience obviously charged with emotional potency. But such an interpretation of the instinctive judgment and mood of our people carries with it a rider, namely, that it involves a determination to move towards the same goal, if possible by a better road, but by the same road if every other is blocked.

There is, however, another interpretation, another possible quality or promise which people are dimly perceiving in the Anglo-Russian alliance. This is the recognition that of all the events which have come to pass

during the war, none is of such supreme importance, none so prodigious in itself, as the fact that Britain and Russia are at last in partnership. This alliance alters the whole world situation, and as long as it remains in being it alters it permanently, and in peace even more profoundly than in war. Of no other single alliance can this be said. This meeting between us is one of the terrific events of history. For the first time it brings east and west into partnership on equal terms of complete freedom on both sides. It brings the thesis of a relatively capitalist social economy into functional relationship with the antithesis of a relatively socialist industrial order. It brings into contact two very different conceptions of communal and individual liberty. This portentous event seems to many to hold out, as no other single event does, the promise of a new and a far better age. It is to be hoped that this is the more accurate because it is certainly the more free interpretation of the present glorification of all things Russian. If the real significance of this meeting in history is to be sought in the promise of the future more than in the achievements of the present or the past, then the less we hear about Europe's need to travel by either of the old roads to either of the old goals, the Russian or the British, the better. To give our minds to the stale and out-of-date conflict between capitalism and socialism will get us nowhere. This would be to put on the garments and go through the motions of an extreme bellicosity in a field from which the real fighting had long since receded. Such a division no longer interprets the real facts. It is not capitalism and socialism which have met after long years of separation. Russia is not primarily a socialist and Britain is even less a capitalist state. Each stands for something bigger and deeper and far more contemporary. They are placed on opposite sides of the real ideological conflict of to-day, the clash between Tradition and Revolution, which is even now being fought in every country in the world. By an almost miraculous accident, Russia, which ran true to ideological form at the beginning of the war and as by instinct gave her support to the revolutionary camp, has now been driven into the ranks of the traditionalists. Of course she is not in any sense a convert, but simply a consort; and it is noticeable that no evidence whatever exists to suggest that our

current enthusiasm for Russia is returned by her. But the mere fact of a partnership and alliance between the leading representatives of the traditional and the revolutionary interpretations of life in the very midst of a world conflict of which the purpose is precisely that the one should destroy the other is plainly an event of sufficient bigness to form the matrix within which a fruitful tension between them is possible, and out of which a better world could be born.

It is this interpretation which is adopted by most of those of us who are uneasily conscious of the not very glorious precedent of the Vicar of Bray whenever Anglo-Russian relations come up for discussion. The past is the past, but it is no use saying that that past is not spotty. Despotism is always ugly, and the conduct of such events as the Treason Trials is made no prettier by distance. It is hard to forget that Stalin did let us all in for the war; and if there are such things as imperishable moral principles then the German-Russian Pact was tantamount to treachery on both sides, treachery, that is, of each leader to his own people, and the assault on Finland is still the blasphemous outrage which everybody said it was at the time. There is also the deliberate hindrance offered to all kinds of religion. But there is now so much to set against all that, so much gratitude to a brave and suffering people for all that it has meant and must still mean to us, so much admiration of social unity and military skill. Above all there is in this new alliance a possibility and even a promise of righteousness among the nations and the classes of the world. Therefore those who previously denounced both the communist leaders and their false religion are not necessarily Vicars of Bray if they too welcome this new association; nor are they blindly optimistic or credulous if they see in it a situation charged with hope. In any case, if they were to worry too much about the very comparative virtue of consistency when we all owe so much to the Red Army and the Russian people, they would reveal themselves as loutish ingrates. The sensible and the creative thing for us all to do, whatever views we hold about Russian communism in the past, is to act on the assumption that the alliance between us is capable of bringing to birth the latent good which lies in its womb.

The first step of such a process still lies in the academic kingdoms of the mind, and consists in the interpretation of Russia to Britain, and vice versa, so that with a truer understanding each of us may learn to desire the right and possible contribution from the other. For this, we in Britain must first know where to look for knowledge; and the knowledge we want is a true interpretation of the eternal character of Russia herself, as history and geography have formed it. The right place to go for this knowledge is undoubtedly the writings of the great Russian artists, and, more particularly, of the Russian theologians, of whom Nicolas Berdyaev is the chief. From such a course of study as this two primary and agreed conclusions emerge.

The first is the effect of geography upon the Russian character, which, because unalterable geography dictates it, remains basically the same under any and every kind of government and social organisation. It has been put more neatly and graphically by E. Lampert, of the Russian Theological Academy in Paris, than perhaps by anyone else. Writing in 'The Christian News-Letter' of Nov. 5, 1941, he said:

'The first [feature of the Russian character] is an acute affirmation of wholeness, opposition to all separation, division, differentiation of life into categories and spheres. This is strikingly reflected in the structure of the Russian land itself, in which there are no alternating and complex mountains and valleys, no formulating boundaries. The Russian element flows over a vast plain. It always disappears into infinity, reaches out to the ultimate limit of all things.'

This straining after infinity, this continual effort to assert and to organise the wholeness of things, is the burden of nearly all Russian art, political form, and social experiment; and it gives to any people thus endowed a certain restless insatiability, because no realisable wholeness can be less than world-wide, and embrace fewer than the sum total of the human race. But it is a spirit which comes from love and not from hate, an authentic evangelism in its own sort; and therefore any non-Russian Christian should be able to understand and appreciate it, for such a spirit, though differently expressed, is also his own.

The second perennial trait of the Russian character
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to which all her artists and her theologians bear witness is suggested in the common phrase Holy Russia. No Russian ever meant to suggest by this that the Russian people were more virtuous than others, but that Russia can only be true to what lies deepest in her own nature by virtue of the completeness of her loyalty to whatever ideology it is which she accepts. It means, further, that a creed, a religion, is and always must be the backbone of Russian integrity, and this remains true even when that religion becomes the militant atheism of dialectical materialism. Holy Russia therefore denotes a nation wholly given to and dependent on a faith, so that the urge after wholeness is reinforced from the realms of spiritual apprehension and reality.

Now these two great traits, on which all the Russian theologians insist, have certain observable consequences for social and political action, which are the fields on which we have first to meet the Soviet Union as a natural consequence of the alliance, and where we must either cooperate or compete. The first of these consequences is that the Russian character can never find satisfaction in a mere nationalism, and not even in the triumph of its own nationalism over others, but must always look beyond it. Nationalism is a habit of mind with necessarily limited aims and fissiparous habits; and this remains true (or rather, becomes ten times truer than ever) when it is nationalism of the German or Japanese type which looks for its satisfaction in world conquest. No one doubts, of course, that the Russian state is now, and always was, totalitarian and despotic both in scope and method. But there is this difference between totalitarianism of the Russian and German variety, that whereas the Russian type is aimed at the freeing of all men, and all men of all races equally, precisely because in its creed men are not slaves but human beings, the German type envisages the freedom of Germans alone, made possible by the servitude of all others. Thus within the Soviet Union are citizens of many different nationalities and races, and each one of them is equally made free of the privileges and the pains of citizenship of the Union.

But this is done by virtue of exalting citizenship of the Soviet Union far above membership of the smaller

constituent race or nationality. For Russians are the uniformitarians par excellence of the world. All who are brought into their citizenship must first accept with heart and mind, and, still more important, with imagination, the ideological orthodoxy by which they are made Russian citizens first, last, and all the time; then, and only then, can they remain Tartars, Mongols, Finns, or Poles. The Russians may, and do, love their neighbours more truly than most other nations, but that does not prevent them from the most rigorous suppression of any kind of ideological nonconformity. As we are trying to understand the spirit of a nation, and not to make a moral assessment of it, praise or condemnation is beside the point. The point is that the nostalgia for wholeness in the Russian character bestows upon Russian politics a world view, and upon Russian culture a universalism. This must mean that the citizens of other nations which are taken within the Soviet Union are free within the limits of the orthodoxy, but in servitude outside of them. The possible consequences for Letts, Finns, and Lithuanians when peace comes to be made are obvious. But on the other hand the Russian thinks of his orthodoxy as constituting a practical love for human beings, and not as a means of ensuring special advantage for his own nationality; and he thinks of his instinct for cultural uniformity as the practical mould within which his love can be made manifest. Thus Dostoievsky's words, about Russia and Europe, which E. Lampert quotes, may seem exaggerated to us, and hopelessly at variance with the record of Russia's actual behaviour to the citizens of European nations, but are to a Russian mind an obvious statement of fact:

'To the Russian, Europe is as dear as Russia. Europe was our fatherland as Russia was. It is not possible to love Russia more than I do, but I never reproached myself that Venice, Rome, Paris, London, their treasures and their whole history, are dearer to me than Russia. Oh, these miracles of God's world are dear to the Russians, and even dearer than to the Europeans themselves. Russia alone does not live for herself, but solely and only for Europe.'

If for *Europe* in that threnody, we wrote the world, it would still be as true as it was before.

'Russia alone does not live for herself.' But that is hardly true either in history or in the desire of national characters. There is also Great Britain. Now it would never occur to a British writer to speak of his feeling for Europe and for the world with the perfervid phrases of a Dostoevsky as quoted above. He could not do it, for even if he did think like that, in which case he would be a most untypical British writer, he would consider it hardly decent. But it is emphatically true that Britain no less than Russia has the world view, that neither nationalism nor even imperialism constitutes a sufficient mould for her characteristic ethos. She may never have made a philosophy of it as the Russians have, and it cannot be said that she has yet tied it to the missionary sanctions of the Christian religion, but it is nevertheless there, lying at the heart of her insight into politics. Perhaps this likeness may be the reason for the often observed fact that British and Russian individuals generally seem to like each other very well when they meet on level terms.

But it is a likeness which hides an unlikeness at its heart, for Britain's world view has no totalitarianism in it and sets very little store on uniformity. Berdyaev says of Russia, 'The doctrine of Moscow the Third Rome became the basic idea on which the Muscovite state was formed,' but no one could say that of London. What the British instinct aims at is what has been called a 'Union of Dissimilars,' a federation of racial and economic minorities, each developing and cherishing its own uniqueness, and all conducting their common affairs under the loosest possible constitution. The Statute of Westminster is the most characteristic British political instrument. Within the Empire itself there are at any given moment gaps in the pattern and contradictions in the thesis, but broadly speaking the British instinct is to reach out for wholeness, for universalism, just as the Russians, but to do this by actively cherishing every sort of minority within the whole. For us the only sort of world kingdom worth making is a cooperation of minorities to seek for order, on paper hopelessly contradictory from the start, but in practice by no means unworkable.

From this analysis two things are clear. First, since

Russia and Britain share a common wholeness of view and universalism of purpose of and for the world, and since they are the only two nations of which this can be said, a real understanding and cooperation between them are not impossible. Second, because their interpretation of the rôle to be played by the constituent parts of the whole are so different as to be necessarily opposed, understanding and cooperation must be extremely difficult. Plainly, then, much must depend upon a right choice of instruments which we can use in the building of a bridge.

The possible instruments are four, and three of them do not look very promising. Is there, first of all, any real hope of a better understanding coming by way of political action? No one can say for certain, but it hardly looks likely. The first occasion when we shall meet for political as opposed to purely military action will no doubt be when the armistice terms come to be arranged and the peace terms to be discussed. There is then likely to be an immediate point of controversy about the status of the national minorities, the Finns, Letts, and Balts, on Russia's western frontier. That there must then be some exchange of populations in that part of the world seems as certain as anything can be, and it will mean that some Baltic peoples will have to be included within the new Russia. Unless the Russians utterly change their immemorial methods, these new citizens of theirs will have to become citizens of the U.S.S.R. first, and Balts second; and ruthlessness will be their lot until they do. No Englishman can possibly feel happy about this, and certainly it will not be an instrument of better understanding between us. Purely political issues, in fact, are almost inevitably much more likely to separate than to unite us.

The next two possible instruments of understanding and cooperation can be quickly dismissed. They are the instruments of social organisation and culture. It seems very optimistic to put much weight on either of them. The obvious unit of social organisation which both nations possess is the Trades Union; and yet a Trades Union in Britain is a very different thing from its counterpart in Russia. No Trades Union here is politically tied to the government. It does not exist to register but often to oppose the government's decision in matters of

industrial relationships; and so far from invariably supporting the government a Trades Union will often fight against it by means of the strike weapon, and this it will do even when the government in question is a Labour government, largely consisting of Trades Union leaders. In Russia, on the other hand, the Trades Union is a governmental instrument, regularly and automatically used as an organ of state propaganda, and the main channel through which the orders of the executive reach the workers, and are translated into action. Culture at first sight seems more promising since there is an obvious sympathy between British and Russian art. Russian music and letters have found both welcome and understanding in this country for years past, while a surprising amount of British books are widely read in Russia, and Shakespeare has always been a favourite on the Russian stage. This could hardly be unless both sets of artists spoke the same mental language, and had an affinity of depth. But this instrument has been in existence for years and years, and it has been consistently used. Yet, to all appearance, it has done nothing whatever to allay the chronic suspicion which has always poisoned British and Russian relationships. We ought plainly to make every possible use of this instrument of culture, but not to rely on it alone.

There remains the fourth instrument, their common Christianity—and at first sight this is the least hopeful of all. But at first sight only! It is the plain truth that the practice and the propagation of Christianity in Russia is officially hampered at every turn and point. In the past there is a grim and long record of religious persecution, and in the present there is no authentic and genuine religious toleration. Nor does the fact that the Russian Christians have made no effort at all to produce a Fifth Column but have behaved as brave and loyal citizens of the U.S.S.R. during this war seem to make any difference to the official dislike of Christianity. The most determined Marxists among British Christians do not deny these facts. Yet they, and many others who are not Marxist in any shape, seem unshakably convinced and indefatigably urgent in their belief that religion can still be the bridge between us. They address their exhortations, as is right, mainly to their own Church, urging that

if 'it came right out of capitalism' a good half of that bridge might be built. Nor is this, if put another way, wholly impossible. For it may well happen, and in a sense it is now happening, that capitalism may cease to have any part or lot in organised religion because less and less does it have any effective share in the conduct of our social relationships. It is quite impossible to believe that capitalism in its old form can survive this war. Its 'withering away' must plainly make a vast difference to the social structure of the English Church. It might then be the sort of Church which Russian communist Christians could understand. For on the Russian side it is clear that all the persecutions and the civil disabilities visited upon Christians have not stamped them out, and have no prospect of doing so. Nor have they thrust the Russian Church into disloyalty in the moment of trial. It is not illegitimate to hope that in the end that the Russian government will see that its Church can be brought within the uniform wholeness for which it craves.

In the meantime, there is a Russian Church and hierarchy with whom contact can be made; there is in existence, even amid the fog of war, the Œcumenical Movement, to provide a method of contact; and he who more than any living man has made and moulded that movement is now Archbishop of Canterbury. In these facts in the religious sphere lies the surest ground of hope.

ROGER LLOYD.

Art. 5.—ST PAUL'S CATHEDRAL.

At the end of 1940, British airmen made a heavy raid on Berlin. On Christmas Day Hitler's own Berlin paper, the 'Völkischer Beobachter,' complained that Berlin Cathedral had been bombed; he planned to wreak his vengeance on London's far nobler counterpart, and on the last Sunday of that year, a hail of incendiary bombs poured down towards St Paul's, and one of them actually struck the apse. But to the Cathedral the damage in relation to that designed was comparatively slight: the crowning dome was unhurt. It was the buildings around which suffered. For a second time the City of London was destroyed by a great fire, and Britain, always ready to lock the stable door when the horse was stolen, has been fire-watching ever since. The Government apparently no more anticipated a reprisal for their big raid on Berlin than they anticipated that Japan would kick brutally at Sanctions; the result has cost London some scores of millions of pounds, but it has also brought about the destruction of many mediocre, if not vulgar, buildings, and by throwing into unexpected relief the completeness of what is by far the city's noblest monument, has given it back to the sight and consciousness of London. In its new majesty of nakedness the ancient Cathedral has a fresh significance. It calls us to abjure an irresponsible commercialism and to throw out in new relief the great spiritual heritage handed down with the spirit and genius of England. As among London's buildings, St Paul's is the most striking and the most majestic, so the concepts which engendered it are an inspiring contrast to that irresponsible individualism; that haste to 'get rich quick'; that thoughtless commercialism; that surrender of a fixed moral purpose to passing individual whim; that throwing away safe restraint and national character to *laissez faire*; that smothering of leadership by a public opinion which has been as sentimental as it was misinformed: for all these are blatantly displayed in the vulgar and shapeless buildings which, until the miscarriage of Hitler's diabolic revenge destroyed them, hid the view and glory of St Paul's.

Just as the noblest and finest qualities survived in England even in her years of ineptitude, so indeed the

Dome was always there ; but it could be surveyed only from a distance, or discovered partially, as when it loomed like Mont Blanc from the narrow gorge of Paternoster Row. From the south side of the Thames, indeed, one could have watched the curving glitter of its outlines rise to share height and colour with the clouds. But no one saw the completeness of the structure, no one had more than an impression of what its east end was. Its nobleness was obscured, its significance lost. People had forgotten the objects and inspirations of its architect : for they had forgotten Britain's place in the order of Europe and of Christendom. Now, when it stands superb while the vulgarities around it are largely restored to rubble, we can learn much from recalling how and why Wren built it ; its completion takes us back two hundred and fifty years.

'In the year 1665,' says his first biographer, 'Mr Wren took a journey to Paris where at that time all Arts flourished in a higher degree than had ever before been known in France ; and where was a general Congress of the most celebrated Masters in every profession, encouraged by royal munificence, and the influence of the great Cardinal Mazarin.'* Taking a recommendation to the British Ambassador, the Earl of St Albans, he found that everything was made easy for him to pursue the study of architecture, which by now had displaced his earlier interests in both the human body and the stars.

As an architect he had given his whole genius to the Renaissance tradition which had been established in England by Inigo Jones.† It was by now almost a hundred years since the genius of Palladio had revived in Western Europe a general homage to the Roman architect Vitruvius, whose rules of perspective seemed to tell the whole secret of how buildings could be made beautiful, or why they were ugly. Eight years before Wren's birth, Sir Henry Wotton had published in his 'Elements of Architecture' his own exposition of Vitruvius. Palladio himself, however, had seen that if buildings were to be magnificent, the designer must show that he had in himself something more than obedience to rules. Swiftly

* 'Parentalia,' p. 261.

† See Loftie, 'Inigo Jones and Christopher Wren,' pp. 98-101.

the classic tradition had developed into baroque, that style which revelled in bold effects of light and shade, of mass and space and line, which was an architecture of passion, above all of passion for infinity, and which was apt to change from suave majesty to a surprise that shocked like an explosion. It was more than even the architecture of humanism: its humanism appealed to the nerves, it spoke what Geoffrey Scott in one of the modern classics of criticism called the language of the human body*; ancient architecture had satisfied a body exercised in discipline and rhythm, the new architecture was subtler; it recognised that the body felt also the pulse of passion, and how could passion be finally satisfied except by the striving of the soul?

Geoffrey Scott has shown us how the finest masters of the Renaissance accepted the order which Vitruvius and Palladio had imposed on them; they could say with Wotton: 'Well building hath three conditions: Commodity, Firmness, and Delight'; but their special delight had been in freedom. They were for ever bursting out into an expression of their own feelings; their individual impulses were wild and high. And so they were even more than the ancients at home in the world; their sense that they were not only its masters but the very reason of its existence made them free to build in it an architecture all their own.

This was not like Gothic an obeisance before the power of storm or fire; it was not haunted by the mystery of the trees. 'Theirs,' says Geoffrey Scott, 'is an architecture which by Mass, Space, and Line responds to human physical delight, and by Coherence answers to our thought. These means sufficed them. Given these, they could dispense at will with sculpture and with colour, with academic precedents and poetic fancies, with the strict logic of construction or of use. All those also they could employ; but by none of them were they bound. Architecture based on humanism became an independent art.'†

When Wren arrived there, the master of the architecture of humanism had just arrived in France. Born at Naples in 1598, Bernini was now an old man who for

* 'The Architecture of Humanism,' p. 216 (2nd edn.).

† Geoffrey Scott, *op. cit.* p. 240.

almost a generation had ruled in Rome as the master-builder of St Peter's. He had completed the terrace and the Colonnade; he had peopled it with statues of the saints; he had set his baldachino above the tomb of the apostle; he had built the Palazzo Odescalchi; he had designed the fountain of the Piazza Navona; within the bronze doors of the Vatican he had built in the Scala Regia the world's superb staircase; he had set up in St Peter's the Papal throne on clouds of black and gold and the shining marble tombs of the Popes Urban VIII and Alexander VI; he had painted striking nudes and portraits; and his statues of St Teresa and Innocent X witnessed the intensely spiritual life he could convey from the human form to stone. Everywhere alike his spirit transferred to travertine and marble a sense of violence overcome by calm, of individuality in homage to tradition, of exuberance adding a surprise to weight and grandeur, of the momentum of an immense shock throwing a mass into a more vital stability. The calm of his effects was made more impressive by a sense of movement surviving through them. He was, said Venturi, 'a giant among dwarfs.'

At the time Wren went to Paris his consummation at the Vatican aroused the greatest admiration.* He had been received by the Grand Monarque with signal honour, and when he showed the visiting Englishman his designs for the Louvre, though only for a few minutes, Wren's every faculty was strained to grasp it and remember it. 'It was something,' he wrote, 'I would have given my skin for.' *The secret of Wren then is his admiration for Bernini*; beyond Bernini he looked back to the Dome of St Peter's which mastered his imagination as it towers above the monuments of Rome. From the Villa of Hadrian across the Campagna, or from far up the valley of the Tiber, its curves and its completeness are seen when all else is hidden. It was to give something of the significance of that symbol to England's imperial capital that was to become the mastering end and passion of Bernini's new admirer. 'St Paul's,' says a great English architect, 'would not have been what it is without St Peter's.'†

* 'Parentalia,' p. 287.

† 'Sir Christopher Wren. Memorial Volume,' 1923, p. 214.

Paris, though we have no record that he said so, offered him already in 1665 some fine examples of the influence of St Peter's Dome. It is, of course, impossible that Wren could have seen even a model of the Dome des Invalides. But already Mansart had set up a cupola over his Church of Ste Marie in the Rue St Antoine. In that very year, too, Mansart completed his beautiful domed church in the Val de Grace, perhaps the finest example of a baroque church in all Paris; and there were three other domes in course of construction, that of La Salpêtrière, that of the Theatine Church of Guarrini, and the cupola of what is now called le palais de l'Institut.* This building Wren particularly admired for its 'masculine furniture,'† and it is remarkable that the Château of Vaux-le-Vicomte, which with that of Maison Laffitte he designates as 'incomparable,' has, like Longleat and other Elizabethan houses, a dome inserted into its roof, and crowned, as St Paul's was to be, by a lantern. Admiring and studying all these, he himself made a dome more graceful than any of them for a church which Hitler's incendiaries, alas! did succeed in destroying—St Stephen's, Wallbrook. 'I had only time to copy it in my fancy and memory,' wrote Wren of Bernini's design of the Louvre, but in his study of other buildings his memory received assistance from his hand. It was to feed on many a detail of the Louvre before his masterpiece was finished, and from the first he was fascinated by watching the thousand builders of the King's Palace at work, some in laying mighty foundations, some in raising the stories, columns, and entablatures with vast stones by great and useful engines, others in carving and inlaying of marbles, plastering, painting, gilding.

By the combination of largely conceived extremes, bold lines and masses, gorgeous colour, choice material and consummate craftsmanship ‡ they achieved effects which were superb. The pomp in which the central authority moved: that mastered their imaginations, but though it was generally graceful, it was gradually to be overdone. Wren was to work in England while Louis XIV lived on into his decline, and shadows began

* 'Sir Christopher Wren. Memorial Volume,' 1923, p. 206.

† 'Parentalia,' p. 261.

‡ W. H. Ward, 'Architecture of the Renaissance in France,' II, p. 356.

to fall on what Voltaire was to call 'le siècle le plus éclairé qui fût jamais.'

It is, then, perfectly plain that Wren returned to London an enthusiastic follower of the baroque tradition which Bernini had consummated. When his library was sold, with that of his son, in 1748, there were eight prints of the cupola of St Peter's as well as a collection of designs by Inigo Jones; there was Perrault's translation of Vitruvius and Fontana's 'Templo Vaticano,' as well as a book on Perrault himself by James; there was Leoni's 'Palladio,' and a French edition of Vignola.* The great baroque tradition is the material out of which the original English genius of Wren built up through thirty to forty years the gradual design of St Paul's Cathedral as we know it, and no doubt Wren was the more attracted by it because alone among English architects he had first become famous as a watcher of the skies. In his first building, the Sheldonian, he built a little dome above the lantern which lets in light from the roof. He had been attuned to a design expressing the coherence of thought when the heavens had set before him a Roman model while he surveyed the stars. And it must not be forgotten that many Tudor buildings already had their domes.

Such was the spirit in which Wren approached his task. The great commission seemed to come to him with the same inevitableness as rain descends upon earth and sea. Evelyn had presented him to Charles II; already with an ease as swift as it is mysterious, the astronomer had become an architect. At Oxford he had built his theatre for Archbishop Sheldon and advised on the design for a Chapel for Trinity College.† Then, under the title of Surveyor-General, he had become responsible to the sovereign for the maintenance of the great Gothic Cathedral of the City of London, which already, like the Church of St Mary the Virgin at Oxford, had been dignified and enriched by a Renaissance portico. In place of the Gothic steeple Wren was to build a dome.

'He had a mind to build it with a noble cupola, a form of church building not as yet known in England but of

* See Catalogue of Wren's Library in the Bodleian.

† He built the Chapel for Pembroke, Cambridge, but not, as so often said, of Trinity, Oxford.

wonderful grace.' So wrote Evelyn on Aug. 27, 1666. The week was not out when a fire, breaking out in Fish Street and leaping from house to house, and from street to street, with noise and cracking and thunder of the impetuous flames had come to Ludgate Hill and burst like a bombardment on the Gothic Cathedral. Flames devoured the architecture, numerous masses of masonry melted in the heat, the stones, said Evelyn, flew like grenados, the portico was cut in pieces, columns, friezes, capitals, and projections of massive Portland stone flew off, and at last after a scene which men thought not to see again until the globe itself is consumed in general burning, the goodly church lay as a charred ruin in a city of ashes.

Wren's task was to rebuild it.

He was to keep the ancient ground-plan. Old St Paul's had been the longest church in Christendom, and long, therefore, the new church was to remain. But Wren made no compromise with the fierceness of the old style, or with what he called the 'crinkle-crankle' of its ornament. Fresh from his encounter with Bernini, vibrating to the inspiration of the Parisian Renaissance, he went back direct to Bramante and Michelangelo, and planned to build in London what St Peter's would have been had Michelangelo's design been allowed to remain.

A single order of classic majesty, a massive portico, a dome with lantern and ball and cross, such as crowned the Escorial: this was to be the monument of the age in the centre of London. A temple more touching in its majesty has seldom been conceived. It would have given to the central shrine of England the calm, the faultlessness, the grace, the might of the noblest temples of Athens or of Rome. Its power is inherent in the Propylæa or the Parthenon. We bow before a kindred grandeur as beyond the Tiber we pass around the transepts of St Peter's and see the dome above. We can admire it, too, as we enter the great temple of the Escorial.

The concept exceeded the appreciation of Restoration England. Whether because of the influence of the Court, or from the lack of education among the clergy, the masterpiece was rejected. They would have neither dome nor coherence. The glorious unity of space, of mass, of line was changed, and a royal warrant was

signed for another design which was a nightmare of ungainliness; its central feature was an immense curve of steeple like nothing so much as a dragon's tail erected in the air.

It is yet another of the mysteries of Wren's life how this design was changed into what we see. Rapidly the frantic, comical steeple was abandoned, the reigning dome returned, with its full elegance of curve. The original design in its Roman simplicity of column and pediment had changed to another: a design elaborate, Parisian and novel; a doubling of columns, which found a model in Perrault's design for the façade of the Louvre, was adapted with great originality and with the addition of a pediment for the façade, supported as at the Louvre by pairs of light columns. It never worried Wren that the columns of the façade support nothing; that the fine proportions of the design have no relation to the needs or nature of the church inside. He wanted his effect,* and to complete it built on either side of the façade a campanile, faintly reminiscent of St Peter's, but developing through one or two stages into the unique design which combines with the façade into the picture so impressively distinct as to greet us with a style we all recognise at once, like the timbre of a voice familiar in childhood; crowning all—above a lantern as generous in streams of England's light as the windows of Santa Sophia—rose dome, lantern, orb, to the final cross of gold. The design had grown into the mind of the architect as the stones rose one upon another, and in spite of its evolution, it kept an unbroken unity. Before a single generation of Londoners, all busy in rebuilding,

Out of the earth a fabric huge
Rose like an exhalation:

this was their central temple, undisturbed, astonishing, complete.

Through all Wren combined with a consciousness that Bernini was his model an imperial originality; nevertheless, he had seized the opportunity of the Great Fire to return deliberately to the classic tradition, which as compared with the mildness and variety of Gothic spoke of

* See Lena Milman, 'Wren'; H. Goodhart-Rendel, 'Vitruvian Nights,' p. 10.

poise, of humanism, and of order. In reminding London of her heritage from Pope and Cæsar, he left an inspiration and a prophecy to that ministry of conciliation and concord which, both within an empire gradually developing and among other nations, it has been the privilege of England and Scotland to exercise. Britain ever since has played in her own way a Roman part.

For although he leaned so hard on classic memories, Wren was not less an Englishman for that. Without what has been brought to it from 'lands of palm and southern pine,'* how would Wren's island have played its part? What would its ideas have been, what would be its language, what its blood? By strengthening the Latin component in the amalgam of the British Isles, the great architect gave London a metropolitan temple which patriots have rejoiced to vindicate as more excellent because more English. And it is true that for two hundred and fifty years St Paul's has shown alike in position as in design the compromise that was wrung from Wren. He was not allowed around it an approach in a rebuilt city of which it would be the queenly ornament; he was not allowed to build around it a colonnade such as Michelangelo designed for St Peter's, or such as Bernini finally developed into the famous approach to the Basilica. Wren was not allowed to place above its high altar an adaptation of those contorted columns and that baldachino which break into the interior of St Peter's with such bizarre surprise. He might not even place the façade to confront Ludgate Hill direct. It slants aside, and from the oval of shops and warehouses of what we call the churchyard, its only defence was a meagre space of grass and a few elms. These were all that were left in London of that enshrining and wide quietness which enhances the scared dignity of Canterbury, of Salisbury, or of Lichfield. St Paul's was the compromise with one man's patience.

That patience is one with the intrinsic mildness of our island life. Like the Cathedral, the beauty of the two churches we have lately lost, St Stephen's, Walbrook, or St Lawrence Jewry (with its unrivalled vestry), fitted it and breathed it. It is born to us with climate and with

* Tennyson, 'The Daisy.'

scene. Here neither snowy crag, nor gorge, nor precipice disturbs the curve of hill or moor or down ; an ocean current softens for us the winters which freeze our closest neighbours ; even if it is disappointing weather, Britain's rain drops so gently as to suggest to our dramatist the quality of mercy, and breezes from a silver sea temper the rare offensiveness of a sun on whom we press our invitations. This tempering nearness of the ocean mingles with clouds of smoke to soften light and colour. And even when England is not covered with a canopy of vapours, tones of grey recur in the clearness of the sky. There can be sultriness or murk over the profusion of lush green shades which mingle lawn and field with lime or sycamore, with beech or walnut ; but none can complain that tones or outlines are too definite.

St Paul's is part of this English scene. The island story has been similar to the island temper. Compromise has engendered continuity. Respect has not been wanting in a society so respectable, and voters still defer to those from whom they extract the taxes. The absence of disturbance has encouraged an aptitude for commerce and thoroughness ; and in the midst of successful business, Wren raised St Paul's with the king's help of a tax on coal. His thoroughness he showed in the way he dug down for the foundations, in the strength with which he arranged and built his piers to take any thrust from walls and roof, and in the triple dome ; for, between what is seen within and what is seen without, rises a cone of brick to support the higher lantern. In architecture, mathematics must be applied with a love of line and shape. Many a curious and recondite device in building shows that Wren as an artist was not more a genius than as an engineer.

So the Cathedral stands as a triumph of balanced unity. It is therefore a reminder that the Church of Christ, as St Paul himself insisted, is corporate : 'the whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the building up of itself,' for by a natural interchange of illustration St Paul himself explained how the Christian body grows into a temple. And Wren set up his temple in honour of St Paul.

In its far-reaching significance, it now springs radiant over a desolated area. At a crucial hour of our history, it is a witness to the dignity and the meaning of what Cowper called 'Britain's magnificent and awful cause'; it is a call to arise from lethargy to a conscious, imperial purpose as Christian as St Paul's and not less skilful in construction. London would indeed lose her opportunities if she did not secure for herself, for the Empire, and for the world the great gift of space that the direness of war has thrown her to proclaim her message. We have much to rebuild in society and politics as well as in architecture, and nothing we can build will replace that which is taken away if we again smother our noblest and most significant monument with such shapeless and uninspired stuff as has been destroyed.* It is, then, an essential duty for the London and the England of to-day to see the meaning of Wren's masterpiece, and to keep the view and splendour for the permanent endowment of London. The business done in the houses destroyed can be done elsewhere; and to tell the truth, it will have to be done in a different way. For it is that shortsightedness, that irresponsibility, that lack of national and corporate purpose, that bring the Empire now to danger of disruption. Too many of our politicians thought they could do best by ignoring Europe; but unless Europe as a whole regains the Roman sense of order and of justice—so admirably translated into English in St Paul's—no part of the Empire can be safe. Every corner of it is dependent on Britain's secure relation to a stable Europe.

And as we must not disguise and smother those traditions in which our ideals live, so to keep our balance we must not reject the sacred gift of space.

ROBERT SENCOURT.

* Not all destroyed: for, as a warning, the neighbouring warehouse has been spared.

Art. 6.—THE CHALLENGE TO 'VANSITTARTISM.'

1. *Black Record*. By Lord Vansittart. Hamish Hamilton.
2. *Roots of the Trouble*. By Lord Vansittart. Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.
3. *Thus Spake Germany*. Edited by W. W. Coote and M. F. Potter. Foreword by Lord Vansittart. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.
4. *Shall Our Children Live or Die?* By Victor Gollancz. Victor Gollancz, Ltd.
5. *Guilty Germans?* By Aubrey Douglas Smith. Victor Gollancz, Ltd.
6. *Appeasement, Before, During and After the War*. By Dr Paul Einzig. Macmillan & Co., Ltd.
7. *The War Against the West*. By Aurel Kolnai. Victor Gollancz, Ltd.
8. *I Paid Hitler*. By Fritz Thyssen. Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd.

THE publication of Lord Vansittart's 'Black Record' acted as an irritant upon the friends and appeasers of Germany and stirred them into invidious action. Among the various challenges and counter-attacks, perhaps Mr Gollancz's new book merits the chief attention on more than one ground. If we apply Lord Acton's maxim for historians, to 'judge talent at its best and character at its worst,' Mr Gollancz comes well out of the test in the scales both of ability and of a sincere idealism; and he goes so far as to describe his book in a sub-title as 'A Reply to Lord Vansittart on the German Problem.' He cannot mean that there is any difference between them in the desire that our children shall live, that we shall win the war, and that we shall avert another war. But beyond these elementary points Mr Gollancz intends a complete rejection of what is called 'Vansittartism.' He also prescribes a remedy for present discontents which looks much further afield; for his book is an able piece of propaganda for international socialism, and indeed at certain points it might even be said to rise to greatness. But unless by some strange process of reasoning an argument for universal socialism could be shown to be the true answer to Lord Vansittart's realism, the sub-title of Mr Gollancz's book indicates an essay in cross

purposes. To clear the field for the larger issues it will be well to devote a paragraph to some preliminary comparisons and contrasts.

In brief epitome, Lord Vansittart's contribution may be stated as, first, a diagnosis of the Germans and the German aggressive spirit, of which Hitler is the current manifestation; secondly, a castigation of the general democratic failure to understand the Germans and to be prepared, in spite of warning, for the assaults of mechanised evil; and thirdly, the conclusion that if in this Second World War we do not destroy German militarism, the Germans will launch the Third World War for the promised destruction of England and the English-speaking world. Mr Gollancz abhors the evils of Nazism and militarism, but holds that neither truly represents the German nation; and further maintains that the conditions and influences of civilisation as a whole, rather than the Germans in particular, were responsible for the War. It might seem to be a question merely of what proportion of the German population supports Hitler and the War, and what proportion opposes them; but the difference is greater than that. Or it might seem to be the degree in which the Germans are responsible, or more responsible, if at all, than any other nation or nations for the succession of two world wars. Both parties are agreed, on different grounds, that these wars were in part the fault of other countries than Germany. Both parties see in the aftermath of Versailles a cause of the present war, but each from a different aspect; the one because we were too trustful of the Germans—'the whining bully must be picked up and dusted down, and put on his feet again . . . his victims had contributed to put him there by all the means, including loans, in their charitable power' ('Black Record'); the other because we were too severe upon the Germans—and this in spite of our beginning 'to side with Germany against France' ('Shall Our Children Live or Die?'), and not supporting the France of M. Poincaré who would have broken the industrialism of Germany. Lord Vansittart would emphasise the general blindness in failing to see the way the German wind was blowing and the stupidity of waiting to be 'slaughtered again.' Mr Gollancz would point rather to the system of international capitalism, and to the present

form and prevailing influence of the sovereign State; but although in that light he holds Germany to be no more responsible than anybody else, he seems to imply that, even if the capitalisms of Britain and America remain, the destruction of German capitalism is urgent.

Thus while Lord Vansittart's thesis concerns the necessity of such an understanding of the Germans, their record in history and their determination to repeat their crimes on a superlative scale, and such consequential measures that we shall not be gulled again, Mr Gollancz envisages the German problem and the German malaise as expressions of the world's problem and the world's malaise. To the one the talk of 'revolution' is too indefinite to be pertinent to the task of winning the War, exorcising the German evil spirit, and destroying the Power of Darkness; for, as he says, the so-called German revolution after the last war was not a revolution but a revolt, and even so it was not a revolt against war but against those who had lost the war. To the other the revolution offers the hope of the establishment of a socialist and pacific State which will express the truly peaceable temper of the German people, or at least of the great majority of the German people. While both parties wish to win the War and to prevent the next war, the issue may be seen coming to a head in a phrase. Mr Gollancz shares with the 'National (King-Hall) News-Letter' the interpretation of the War as an 'international civil war.' This is no doubt an attractive idea to some minds. Indeed it might attract those of us who regard the War as one not only for survival and security but for the triumph of the eternal values; except that we do not regard these values as being a monopoly of either the Right or the Left. But exponents of the idea of civil war do seem seriously to mean a cleavage in every country (except the U.S.S.R.) such that the cause of the War may be stated as the Left versus the Right; and the Left at the end of the War is to join forces with its German comrades. We may doubt if, as bed-fellows, the German comrades would prove to be agreeable or even safe! But what *is*, and what *ought to be*, are not to be confounded. The vision of the universal brotherhood which the revolution is to achieve by the overthrow of capitalism does not affect the fact, which has the minor

merit of being a true fact, that the Second World War is a war between sovereign States ; one alliance of sovereign States fighting for Freedom, Justice, and Truth, against another alliance of sovereign States which is fighting for the domination and enslavement of the rest of the world. This is a distinction not between ' Right ' and ' Left,' but between Right and Wrong.

Mr Gollancz seems to assume that the restoration of sovereign rights to the despoiled countries after the War—as provided in the Atlantic Charter—promises that the restored sovereign States shall be of the Right ; capitalist, militarist, counter-revolutionary. But this does not follow ; nor does it follow with the assurance of Mr Gollancz's party that a Left-wing sovereign State must needs be pacific. Russia, of course, is not aggressive ; but Russia is so vast that there could be but little incentive to expand except by way of reprisal for invasion ; and we recognise the Russian advance, in contrast with the German reactionary barbarism, in the ways of civilisation. But a smaller sovereign State of the Left might prove aggressive on various grounds. At least the assumption that the Left will always be pacific seems to be unwarranted. It is not only private capitalism which is greedy ; and the German Left, if uncontrolled, is likely, for reasons which we shall shortly note, to exhibit the expansionist aspirations of historic Germanism. The reply to Lord Vansittart would suggest that he had committed himself to the Right. Indeed some of Mr Gollancz's allusions to Vansittartism would best be described as caricatures. For actually the terms in which Lord Vansittart has written of the German Right are so strong that his critics accuse him of fostering hatred and vengeance. They cannot have it both ways. As he says very truly in ' Roots of the Trouble,'

' Truth and hate are unknown to each other, save that hate of evil without which all love of good is futile, all affection for one's fellows—the foundation of policy—a sham.'

Mr Gollancz absolves Lord Vansittart from the charge of harbouring hatred himself, although some other critics wrongly assume this quality in the personal object of their attacks, but he holds that Lord Vansittart's whole thesis can do nothing but promote hatred of the Germans

in his readers. Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. We do not doubt, as we said at the outset, the genuine idealism of Mr Gollancz, but his book may be trusted to promote in some of its readers an equal hatred of Lord Vansittart, and to encourage all those ill-conditioned persons who are ready to love any country rather than their own. The perusal of a copy of the 'Left News,' containing a sheaf of extracts from letters to Mr Gollancz, shows plainly the effect of his book. The confusion between the attacks on Lord Vansittart and the argument for international socialism is reproduced in the attitude of these disciples, who inveigh against Vansittartism and express their anxiety to help the revolution. Perhaps Mr Gollancz is innocent of subversive intent, but his book, so far from promoting unity of purpose in winning the war and the peace, is so unpromising in its attitude that it cannot fail to inoculate many of its readers, and those the least qualified in knowledge and understanding, with the passion and the poison of the class war.

Mr Gollancz can write as though the Vansittart thesis provided for the restoration of the evil of which it urges the destruction:

'If, but only if, Vansittartism is prevented from getting a great and increasing grip on the British public, and from inducing a mood of hatred and suspicion of the whole German people, Britain and America, however capitalist their structures, will not be allowed to strike down and destroy the German revolution, and to set up a counter-revolutionary government in its place.'

This is all very fine. But who raised the question of revolution in Germany? Not Lord Vansittart, but Mr Gollancz and others of his persuasion. And who suggests that Britain and America, after defeating a German Government of the Right, wish to set up another? Not Lord Vansittart, but Mr Gollancz; because, as seems to be the case, he is really a liberal who dislikes the idea of the Germans being held in tutelage by the Allied Nations, and desires a German revolution, as a *pis aller*, for the overthrow of the present German regime by Germans. He thinks the German Right is bad, but that the German Left is good, or relatively good. Another view is that

they are equally bad. This is no ground of hatred of the Germans; but it is a product of the conviction (from evidence in past and recent history), which the English and American peoples have conspicuously lacked, that the Germans cannot be trusted to live at peace if they are permitted to possess the implements of war.

It is no answer at all to speak of the fact of German disarmament in the first decade since 1918. Mr Gollancz evidently has this fact fixed in his mind when he dismisses as 'war-time propaganda' the statement of Mr Winston Churchill that 'Germany had been preparing for a war of aggression for the best part of twenty years' for he countered it by quoting Mr Noel Baker who in turn had cited Marshal Foch :

'it was no diplomatic courtesy, but a statement of accomplished fact, when Marshal Foch on behalf of the Allies declared the disarmament of Germany to be "effective" in 1927.'

There is no reason for doubting the truth of this statement, but it does not touch the issue. The issue is one not of armaments but of intent. We have only to recall the words of Lord Birkenhead written before his death in 1930 :

'Not long ago naval circles in all Europe had a distinct thrill when there were published the details of the designs of the four German "pocket" battleships of the *Ersatz Preussen* types. These ships of a limited displacement are avowedly meant to secure to Germany command of the Baltic in the next war.'

The intent had never been absent. The Weimar Republic, plausibly pacific to the outside world, had made terms with the militarists and was nursing the militarist baby until it should grow to the stature of the fighting man. To be disarmed of course means that you cannot make war of the martial variety; it does not mean that you do not intend to do so at the first opportunity, or that you are not already engaged in the war of propaganda and preparation. Although the victorious Allies of the last war defeated and disarmed the Germans, they allowed the Germans to win the peace and therefore failed to cure the disease of militarism. Those who maintain with Mr Gollancz that the Allies were too severe upon

the defeated Germans have their answer *inter alia* on the lips of the German, Dr Ley, during the present war: 'Our enemies did not use their victory of 1918.' We certainly did not use it as the Germans would have used it, but we used it all too early as an occasion for shaking hands as after a sporting event. The Weimar Republic was a snare and a delusion and offers no reliable precedent for those who count on a German pacific Government of the Left. Sir Eric Phipps, sometime British Ambassador at Berlin, has thus exposed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Weimar Government:

'Dr Stresemann was generally regarded as a representative of the "good" Germany, and Sir Austen Chamberlain and M. Briand certainly did their best to give him every chance. After Dr Stresemann's death, however, his memoirs showed that his apparent moderation was a mere cloak under which to prepare an eventual policy of force.'

But Stresemann himself had given evidence of intent, as in a public speech in 1924: 'It is the policy of force which will always triumph. But when one has not yet got the force, one can also combat by the idea.' And still earlier, in a speech to the National Assembly in 1919, he had anticipated the later and more violent policy of active repudiation of Versailles: 'The Government must not insist too much on the fact that Germany will integrally fulfil the conditions of the peace treaty. For all parties have been unanimous in considering that the treaty is unfulfilable.' There is indeed ample evidence to give authority to the statement: 'The foundation of the Hitler Reich was built during the days of the Weimar Republic.' Mr Gollancz seems still to be deluded by the professed pacificism of Weimar. A German liberal government might be peaceable, but the German liberals are too small a body. The sham 'pacific' Weimar Government encouraged the degradation of liberals, and freely permitted their assassination. Germans generally are not liberal, nor do they appreciate liberty.

Mr Gollancz's dominating desire for international socialism is patent almost from the outset of his book, where, as he puts it, 'the cat is out of the bag.' His complicated but coherent argument drives like a plough, or perhaps like a tank, through the present system, and

challenges it at every point—as in his analysis of the Atlantic Charter—where it does not presuppose the socialist solution. It may be conceded that the international traffic in armaments is an abuse and an obvious engine of war, and that the sovereign State contains the seeds of war. But in answer to the current spate of destructive criticism of the British Empire from within, while it suffers the bludgeoning of the barbarians from without, it should be said that British imperialism has been on the whole beneficent—which is more than can be said of German colonising—and that our fault lies not in our imperialism, but in our neglect of it. Whether the socialist argument is right or wrong is not the matter in issue, and it is no answer to Lord Vansittart, who does not write about these particular discontents, but warns the world of the present peril which it has been too slow to realise, and against any repetition of the blunders of the Teutophiles. And when Mr Gollancz postulates for argument a Russian rule of Europe, his reference to Vansittartism seems to be both illogical and irrelevant: 'The occupation and ruling—for that is what it would amount to—of Europe by the Soviet Union has not been considered in this book for a sufficient reason. If it happens, the problem we have been discussing disappears, and another takes its place. The issue would be, not Vansittartism but "Stalinisation."' He explains that he does not himself desire Stalinisation; but even if he supposes this to be antithetic to Vansittartism, that would not exclude the attribute common to both, viz. the prevention of further aggression by the Germans.

Writers in the pro-German (not pro-Hitler or pro-Nazi) interest seem to practise a studied economy of reference to Russia. In another book, 'Guilty Germans?' written in evident sympathy with the Gollancz thesis and appealing to history to dismiss the case of Lord Vansittart, the author, Mr A. D. Smith, expresses satisfaction that he need not treat of Russia:

'To discuss the Soviet Union is entirely outside the scope of this book, which is fortunate since—in the writer's experience—the mildest reference to what may be called the ultimate topic of our times retains, even since June 22, 1941, all the old quality of exploding into the most astonishing and unreasonable controversy. The new Ally has been welcomed

with cordial admiration by some ; the violent prejudices of the past have not, I fear, abated in others.'

This writer does not conceal his sympathy ; but since he seeks to exonerate Germany of guilt and so to establish the German claims upon our charity, we should not forget that one of the factors in the discredited policy of appeasement was the support of Germany as a bulwark against Bolshevism. Such was the play of German propaganda upon English prejudice and gullibility ; as in Lord Vansittart's phrase, 'one of the most brazen legends ever successfully launched by the Brazen Horde.'

If the intervening history shows that we were backing the wrong horse—there, as in our support of Germany against France—the conclusion is unfavourable to the pro-Germans, and disproves their intelligence and foresight ; for it means that whereas Anglo-German amity only invited German aggression, a strong alliance of Great Britain, France, and Russia might have withheld financial aid from Germany and would certainly have contained the Germans within their own borders. On the view of the school of writers which seeks to persuade us of the pacific desires of the Germans, that measure of German continence would have been no hardship, unless, for example, Mr Heinrich Fraenkel's picture of the peaceable German population of the tenements means no more than a secret rejection of Nazism. But Dr Einzig is of opinion that the German workers are thoroughly Nazified :

'The fact is that the reactionary Junkers and big industrialists in Germany are at present practically the only anti-Nazis left. Needless to say, they are in no way less aggressive and imperialistic than the Nazis themselves, and they support Hitler because he satisfies their imperialist ambitions.'

It is, of course, possible and probable that some of the workers have been coerced by fear of the Gestapo and the terrors of the Concentration Camp, and are not necessarily convinced. Yet it was the considered judgment of Ambassador Dodd, as recorded in his diary even in 1935, that, although, according to report, there were thousands of Germans who would kill the Führer if they had the chance and pay the penalty with their lives, what Dr Goebbels 'said about Hitler represents, however,

almost exactly what 80 per cent. of the Germans think. In one part of his address Goebbels indicated what a calamity it would be if any one of the three "immortals," Hitler, Göring and Goebbels, were to be killed.' And in conversation with the Italian Ambassador, who in the same year expressed the belief that 'Germany begins to worship Hitler,' he agreed to the extent of 40 per cent. of the people. If 40 per cent. went to the extreme of 'worship,' it is quite intelligible that twice that number would be of one mind in support; and if that were true in peace, how much more in the days of aggressive war!

It may be noted that Ambassador Dodd's estimate of 80 per cent. of the Germans in support of the present régime almost precisely agrees with that of Lord Vansittart, who found it necessary last year to inform his pro-German controversialists that when he writes of the Germans he does not mean 100 per cent., but that he does mean over 75 per cent. But any rejection of Nazism by the Germans is so far good. For Nazism, as Herr Thyssen tells us, pretends to be a philosophy, *Blut und Boden* (known in comedy as 'blubo'), or 'blood and soil,' which repudiates the whole contribution of liberal Christendom to Western thought. As M. Kolnai states in his great book, 'The War Against the West,' 'National Socialism is at bottom incomparably more anti-Western than Bolshevism'; and Dr Borkenau described Nazism as anti-everything. Even the 'blood-sodden system of Moscow' in the days of the Revolution—although this had been floated and fostered in great measure by the foul minds of Germans who assumed Russian names—was not worse than the barbarous reign of Hitler and his retinue of ruffians, whom the British and Americans favoured with finance just at the time when alliance with the new civilisation of Russia would have saved the peace of Europe.

But now the voice of Premier Stalin commands the attention of all who realise the measure of our dependence on the success of Russia, and the speech in which he denied that the Russian Army aimed at the destruction of the German people gave an unfounded encouragement to the detractors of Lord Vansittart. Premier Stalin said that 'it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique

with the German people and the German State. Hitlers come and Hitlers go, but the German people and the German State remain.' That is true enough; but we are not aware that anyone seriously has suggested the 'destruction' of the seventy millions of the German people. Dr Einzig is of opinion that Germany would be safer for Europe if its population were halved, and as an alternative he has devised the most drastic scheme for the dismemberment of Germany which probably has yet appeared in print; but even that is not destruction. And who has 'identified' Hitler's clique and the German people? What we should maintain is that the German people, past and present, as a whole, responds to the warmongers with its heart beating to the tune of German militarism, of which Hitler and his clique are now the head and front: to go back no further than the nineteenth century, the militarist doctrines of von Treitschke and the emotional influence of Wagner's operas were not wasted on the German nation. Either, then, Premier Stalin meant what we mean, viz. that Hitler and his clique are the current figures in a long line, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, all of whom have come and gone, all of whom have enjoyed the response of most of the German nation, and all of whom have been at various times representative of the German nation, but not 'identified' with it; * or else Premier Stalin's words were mere propaganda for the simple-minded. The 'National News-Letter' used this declaration to buttress its own position, to invoke the Archbishop, and to discredit Lord Vansittart, and describes Vansittartism as 'morally unsound and politically bankrupt.' † But, one may ask, where and when has Lord Vansittart rejected the aim of 'a better world from whose peaceful benefits Germans will not be excluded'? There are differences of view in the matter of time and probation, for whereas Messieurs Gollancz and Company's

* Since this was written, Lord Vansittart in the House of Lords said that he did not 'identify' the huntsmen with the hounds, but that he did identify his own attitude with that of Premier Stalin; and so he proved his critics to have been woolly.

† After Lord Vansittart's speech in the House of Lords, Commander King-Hall's organ declaimed against his 'racial nonsense'; but Lord Vansittart repudiates 'racialism' and is concerned with the German nation, not the German 'race.'

vision of the German revolution suggests that the German Left will at once be fit for peaceful international intercourse, Lord Vansittart holds in 'Roots of the Trouble' that the German problem is primarily not economic but spiritual, and in a recent speech desiderated a period of spiritual regeneration of the Germans. This, no less than any proposed military occupation of Germany, presupposes that there will be Germans surviving defeat and the mooted administration of penal justice. The 'destruction' of Germany properly refers to Germany as a militarist Power, but not to Germany as an economic entity with which in due time the rest of the world will be able to live and trade in peace. If on the analogy of Criminal Law, Bentham's definition of the purpose of punishment as a 'deterrent' is the most applicable to reprisals *during* war, that which is the most appropriate (of its various definitions) to the process *after* the War is Kant's 'moral atonement.' Without the promise of some drastic discipline, it is difficult to feel any confidence in future peace for the world or for Germany itself. In other words, the good of Germany is one of the aims of the War. In spite of all their gifts and cleverness, few of the Germans have ever assimilated the European culture from Greece and Rome, and as von Goethe said of his own nation 115 years ago, 'A few more centuries may pass before it can be said about the Germans that it is a long time since they were barbarians.' But while the understanding of the Germans as a spiritual, or perhaps a pathological case, is even charitable in comparison, for example, with Dr Einzig's view that the ideal punishment of Germany would be a Polish occupation, it is very far removed from that of the inheritors of the old English, and particularly Victorian, fallacy of Germanophilia. For these persons resent realism, jib at the truth about themselves and their friends, and explode in fits of moral indignation at the plain language of a candid friend. Vansittartism is becoming a term of gratuitous abuse which commonly fails to indicate what Lord Vansittart says, and then is no more than a figment in the pro-German minds of his critics.

When Lord Vansittart gave this piece of advice to the English people: 'Trust *no* Germany till this one is gone for ever,' he added:

"No one would have said this," observed a leading politician to me, "if he had a career to make." Ponder that saying. It explains a good deal more than the hostility that I have encountered. It explains why you were twice nearly extinguished by the Power of Darkness. It explains our obstinate, innocent generations — Conservative, Liberal, Labour—stretched patiently into the English fog of Germanophilia, always cheated and always persuaded to "forget it" and be slaughtered again. The tried German hands, with the tried rods and baits, have played our people like fish. This time it is enough.'

This indictment of both German cunning and English political opportunism and gullibility does indeed divide the responsibility for two world wars, though not as the parties of appeasement would apportion it. But while we are agreed that no nation can escape some guilt of one kind or another, we have constructive warning for the future to which we may hope that our generation will not be so blind and deaf as its predecessors. When at the surrender of the German Fleet Lord Beatty lamented our failure to carry the last war to a better finish and foresaw the breakers which lay ahead, he saw the situation as Lord Vansittart has seen it from his knowledge as a specialist in Foreign Affairs. For history, which preserves the records of imperial glory (theft!) and international strategy (deceit!), and experience which is fresh to the latest posterity, both point to the Germans as the chief offenders. Both give evidence of more flagrant exhibitions of acquisitive vice, of deceitful strategy, of premeditated aggression, of vindictive intent, and of gratuitous cruelty, on the part of the Germans than of any other nation in modern history until the Japanese descent on China. The friends of Germany have made their position plain, and some have stated a case for international socialism without equivocation, but they have not extinguished or even modified our gratitude to Lord Vansittart for his public-spirited exposure of the Peril and the Power which threaten with destruction, and not for the first time, our own land and people and the whole commonwealth of man.

J. W. B. WORSLEY.

Art. 7.—BUSHIDO: ITS RISE AND EFFACEMENT.

THE circumstances in which she began to wage war against Great Britain and the United States have revealed to the world how utterly Japan has departed from that unwritten code of 'Bushido' which, until some years ago, exercised so powerful an influence upon the thought and behaviour of her people. This beneficent system of courtesy and good feeling, which has frequently been compared with the tenets of mediæval chivalry in Western Europe, has, since the beginning of this century, been known to the Occidental world as 'Bushido,' a term which has been translated by one of its chief exponents, the late Dr Inazo Nitobé of Tokyo, as 'the Way of the Fighting Knights.' Before Dr Nitobé gave this term currency—and it seems as though he may actually have invented it—the moral code to which it refers appears to have been known both to Europeans and Japanese in the Far East as either 'Shido' or 'Budo.'

Indeed, when Dr Nitobé first began to lecture on the subject in the early years of this century, more than one authority on Japanese life and custom confessed his total ignorance not only of the name 'Bushido,' but of the existence of any such system. Bushido has indeed so intimately penetrated the entire structure of Japanese life and sentiment as to appear inseparable from them, and by no means as a code distinct from ordinary conduct. It was much as though a British publicist had assured us that, unsuspected of ourselves, the tradition and practice of Norman *politesse* had flourished in this island since the advent of the Conqueror, and that though its principles remained unwritten, they were still capable of being digested into a coherent system. Indeed, might not a shrewd foreign observer surprise us with the theory that we actually possessed a social code more visible to strangers than to ourselves in what our humorists have called the 'Sahib' tradition, or that of 'the old school tie,' which is, perhaps, a modern resultant of Norman 'bienséance.'

At the beginning of this century its Japanese exponents appear to have found some difficulty in explaining this ancient and generally accepted code of thought and behaviourism even to their fellow-countrymen. 'Bushido,' wrote one eminent authority, 'is the totality of the moral

instincts of the Japanese race, and, therefore, of our religion of Shintoism'—which it most certainly is not. For, in reality, it is no more rooted in religious sentiment than were the courtesies of the feudal period in Europe, which were unquestionably a legacy of Roman and Byzantine culture.

However the principles of Bushido first originated, research has shown that they were certainly first put into actual practice by the Samurai, or professional warrior caste of old Japan, although they have, from one period to another, been notably affected by native as well as Chinese and Indian philosophical and moral precepts. But, generally speaking, they compose a strictly ethical and practical system of behaviour, a moral attitude which has accepted only such religious ideals as seemed to be conformable with the exercise of an enlightened canon of military honour. That in the course of time this tradition penetrated the sentiment and behaviour of nearly all classes in Japan was, in reality, due to its inevitable acceptance by royal authority, which, through edict, example, and propaganda, sought to instil its principles throughout the whole mass of the Japanese people, always piously inclined to follow the dictates of their emperors, whom they hold to be of divine origin. Thus, although its sources had been forgotten by the people, and to some extent even by the aristocracy, Bushido, as we must continue to call it, has certainly exercised an immense influence upon the mental attitude and manners of the folk of Japan as a whole, more, perhaps, than any similar body of non-religious precept in any country, or at any period in the world's history. Nowhere, in short, has a system of what might roughly be described as 'mere good manners' found such whole-hearted acceptance by an entire people. The vast pity is that a code so excellent and so productive of national good feeling and courtesy should of late years have been invaded and rendered almost nugatory by alien doctrines of barbarous tendency, similar, indeed, to those which it was designed to extirpate. After a thousand years of knightly usage and behaviour, Japan has, indeed, retrograded to that very condition of churlish and inhumane sentiment and practice which, in her early days, her best and bravest hated and contemned.

The early history of Japan, like that of Scotland and

the Balkans, is very much that of a warring aristocracy, where daimyos, or great barons, ruling over 'clans,' or septs, waged relentless strife one upon the other. Their retainers, or Samurai, came in time to compose a large military class of professional swordsmen, and it was from the recognised but unwritten custom and usage of these that what is now known as Bushido had its inception. Out of the rough fair-play employed in the field, and recognised as the fighting code of this class, there gradually developed a finer and more spiritual sense of honour. In time these sentiments became more or less codified in proverbial statement, and there came to be associated with them an idealistic tradition of valour and the desire to excel in martial exploits, along with conceptions of self-denial, self-mastery, and generosity to one's adversaries. So far, indeed, the history of Japanese chivalry is scarcely to be distinguished from that of its European analogue.

Baron Suematsu, one of the outstanding authorities upon early Japanese history, has indicated that in the instructions of Yoritomo, the first shogun, or chief of the Japanese forces in feudal times, who flourished in the twelfth century, the essential features of Bushido already make their appearance. These include the sedulous practice of the military arts; abstention from base or discourteous conduct, and from cowardly or effeminate acts; simplicity and frugality; mutual respect between officers and men; the solemn observance of pacts and promises. Historically speaking, it is difficult to trace the connection between this, the earliest statement of its principles, and the Bushido code when it arrived at its maturity, although the one is essentially the product of the other. But at a somewhat later stage we certainly find the code in full operation, exercising its ethical and moral force apart altogether from religious sanction, yet strikingly effective in the daily life and conduct of the warrior as apart from his functions as a soldier. It was thus the result of centuries of recognition by a military caste of the necessity for decent and generous conduct on the part of the fighting-man, a moral brake upon the natural barbarism of the early warrior, essential if social chaos and the utter destruction of decent standards were to be avoided in the long and continuous civil strife which marked the history of primitive Japan.

To outline a little more fully the principles of Bushido, it may be said to embrace few of those elements which the European usually associates with Asiatic belief or morality. It contains nothing of the subtle or the secret ; in short, its tenets are as open as the day. It is, indeed, based on that sense of rectitude and decency which in all times has inspired the generous soldier who gave and expected fair-play. But here 'rectitude' must not be construed in its European sense, but rather as an unswerving preference for the appropriate, the inevitable act of propriety ; 'to die when it is right to die, to strike when to strike is right.' 'Rectitude,' in the Japanese sense, has indeed been likened to the bones of a man, which give him firmness and without which he cannot stand upright. In feudal times the name 'Gishi,' or upright man, was considered as superior to any other title. Only so far as courage was employed in the cause of uprightness or virtue was it exalted by the followers of Bushido. The courage of the battle-field was but little esteemed, and might be displayed by any clown. Moral courage was extolled above physical bravery, which was indeed taken for granted by the Samurai class.

The sentiment of benevolence was from the first the most venerated among the ideals of Bushido. 'Love, magnanimity, sympathy, and mercy,' writes Mr Alfred Stead, 'were always recognised by the Samurai as the supreme virtues.' The *bushi no nasake*, 'the tenderness of the warrior,' was extolled even in the rough and early fighting days of the caste. 'What Christianity had done in Europe towards arousing compassion in the midst of belligerent horrors,' wrote Dr Nitobé, 'love of music and letters had done in Japan.'

Just as courage was recognised as an inevitable part of Bushido, so was courtesy, which was regarded as a by-product of benevolence, and not as a virtue in itself. The same may be said of stoicism and serenity of mind, which were not considered the concomitants of mental discipline but rather as the fine flowers of spiritual steadfastness. It may be stressed, however, that a fantastic politeness was looked upon as highly distasteful and insincere. Mendacity was thought to be a sign of cowardice, and the breaking of faith as a most serious infringement of the code of honour, resulting in what the Chinese call 'loss of

face.' Even to-day the Japanese shopkeeper who cannot recover a debt from a customer does not seek to reclaim it in the Courts, but exposes the debtor's meanness by advertisement in the public prints. It was when the Samurai was self-convicted of disgrace that he adopted the last course of honour through which to justify himself, the appeal to self-destruction, *seppuku*, or *hara-kiri* as it is more frequently called by Europeans, the ritual of which is too familiar to require explanation. As Nitobé has it, the attitude of the defaulting Samurai was: 'I have done wrong, I am ashamed before my own conscience. I punish myself with my own hand for I judge myself.' A mortal affront from a superior, however, might cause the Samurai to commit *seppuka*, as a punishment inflicted not upon himself, but as an indelible disgrace to the unjust person who had insulted him.

For nearly two centuries and a half, the feudal period in Japan enjoyed comparative peace under the Tokugawa dynasty, that is from the early seventeenth century to the first abolition of the old system in 1872. Even so, the status of what might be called 'knighthood' was rigidly upheld during this long interval, and it was regarded as the duty of every Samurai to accomplish some adventure which might heighten his personal reputation and keep his memory green after death. The most esteemed method of acquiring honour was through meritorious acts performed in secret and unknown to others, and, if honour did not invariably receive its deserts owing to the secrecy in which these were involved, it was still held that a truly noble Samurai remained satisfied with the approval of his conscience.

But in considering the origin of Bushido one must take into account those outward influences which certainly affected it, and which were at least three-fold—the ethical teachings of Confucius, the national official nature-worship of Shintoism and the code of Buddhism, or rather the ethical ideas to be found in these faiths. That the first of these was considerably modified in its precepts upon its introduction into Japan does not imply that it had not powerful repercussions upon Bushido, which, however, transformed or adapted its spirit in consonance with its own ideals. Thus while in China Confucianism laid particular emphasis upon those 'conditions of life' which

Chinese philosophy regards as the chief causes of human failure, in Japan the individual rather than his circumstances was held to be blameworthy should he fail in his standard of conduct.

Nor did Buddhism, which had such wide acceptance in Japan, escape a similar transformation as regards its ethical precepts. It became, indeed, a Buddhism of compromise. Its gods were identified in some measure with those of Nippon, yet it remained alien in spirit as in letter, its gospel being read and expounded in Chinese or Hindustani. The Japanese phrase associated with this reading in an alien tongue, and which may be translated 'the reading of Sutras,' may be regarded as signifying much the same as our expression 'hocus pocus,' a muttering of nonsense unintelligible to native ears. It was indeed the spirit rather than the gospel of Buddhism which wrought such a marvel of quietist influence upon Japanese popular thought, sentiment, and behaviour, its lofty tendency to avoid and disdain the world of everyday. It was this vein of impersonal detachment in Buddhism which seems to have given to Bushido its almost contemptuous view of the exigencies and pressures of existence, holding them lightly so long as the immaculate conduct of the complete man was honourably maintained. In a word, Bushido transmuted the unworldly quest of the Buddhist, with its nescience of human perplexities, into the unruffled calm of the knightly Samurai, who at least appeared nobly unconscious of mundane embarrassments.

The indigenous faith of Shinto, with its loyalty to the past and the dead ancestor, had at least an equal influence upon Bushido. Its abiding tenet of the divinity of man made for a tradition of human dignity. Man, when he joined his ancestors, would himself partake of a species of divinity, and while still a denizen of this sphere, he must bear this steadily in mind. The human state would be exchanged at death for one which has been described as 'something between super-man and the super-human.' The Shinto creed indeed has no room for a doctrine of original sin. 'Evil is identified,' wrote Dr Nitobé, 'with defilement or excess, something foreign to the soul, something to be "washed off" like a stain. It is not inherent in man, it is of the nature of an extraordinary influence, like illness, something merely to be avoided.' The vile

body, itself material, naturally attracts like vileness. It is only because man dwells in the body that he is evil. Once he is freed from it, the possibility of harbouring evil vanishes. Until then he must do his utmost to avoid it as a nuisance, typical of the material condition.

All these contributory ideals, none of which is actually antipathetic one to the other, came in time to form a definite philosophy of mingled origin but of unified purpose, a way of life in which a lofty serenity and benevolence were the chief desiderata, accompanied by a perfect courtesy and the suppression of self for the general good. Moreover, all this was in consonance with the native genius, which was in reality pacific and generous, if self-contained, naturally rejoicing in the beauties of nature and in quiet contemplation. Through Bushido, Japan had indeed achieved that quest of the Grail for which European knighthood still vainly sought.

As has been said, Bushido survived the feudal age. As behoved a soldier's testament, its ideals were most carefully preserved in the military profession. Still, it interpenetrated Japanese romance and poetry in much the same manner as the spirit of Chivalry influenced European art and literature. Through these, chiefly, it found its way into the circles of trade and commerce, and became at last a part of the national tradition, and almost of the national folklore. During the seventeenth century a host of writers arose who dealt enthusiastically with the oldest tales and poetry of Japan, and their works preserved much of the spirit of the older doctrine of Bushido. Especially did they lay stress upon the virtues of simplicity and frugality which it inculcated, and these were regarded as ennobling decent poverty, inducing what might be called a plain fineness even in the most humble. It was the bane of this gracious and kindly national philosophy, however, that it appears to have fostered a hermit-like nervousness of contact with foreigners, a sentiment which for a time induced an ingrown nationalism, the attitude of which to the outside world was contemptuous and anti-social in the extreme.

Still, as we know, this broke down to some extent, though it never quite disappeared. It is a strange reflection that the adoption of Western Science by Japan was due chiefly to a sense of national inferiority in view of the

material achievements of Europe and America. The 'Sons of the Gods' realised that the 'Barbarians' of the West had surpassed them in the mastery and adaptation of matter, an odd jealousy invaded them, and they resolved to show the Occident that they, too, could wield and possibly improve upon its energies, while still retaining those spiritual and æsthetic qualities which made them a nation of prospective demi-gods. For Bushido did not exist for the upbuilding of character alone. In a country whose people were so naturally devoted to the concerns of Art and the cultivation of the beautiful, it was readily recognised that the exalted mind of the Samurai must pay its tribute to the ideals of Art, both fictile and ceramic. Beauty and fineness must walk hand in hand. If the Samurai would honour himself and be respected, he must be knowledgeable as regards the material products and inventions of spiritual fineness. By the close of the sixteenth century, the dawn of an artistic renaissance in Japan, a knowledge of the canons of Art came to be recognised as a necessary adjunct in the education of a man of the Samurai class.

The realisation that Japan had fallen centuries behind in the race for progress came as a blow to the somewhat self-centred caste who were the chief upholders of Bushido. The probability is that, as was the case in mediæval Europe, they regarded invention and scientific achievement as of the nature of Art, and it was therefore with the feelings of the connoisseur confronted with the spectacle of a vast and complex technique of which he is ignorant that they contemplated the wonders of European Science. But they did not condemn them as did the Chinese, who pretended to have discovered and cast them aside centuries before as adjuncts unsuited to the requirements of a truly civilised and philosophical folk. The existence of a strong centralised Government in Japan in the 'Sixties of last century made it a simple matter to adopt the new code of Western progress.

That this step had any immediate repercussion upon the spirit of Bushido seems improbable. Indeed, the contact with European things and manners appears to have, if anything, strengthened its traditions at first. As time proceeded, however, a more or less morbid change became visible, though it was not until quite recent times

that anything resembling a breakdown of the system might be definitely observed. Since the official acceptance of the New Way by Japan, until a few years ago the propaganda of Bushido was abundant and direct, for the frequent dignified exhortations to follow its exalted dictates and principles which emanated from the Throne itself were most piously accepted by all classes. But with the advance of European political power in the Far East, and the resultant counter-claim of Japan to the leadership of the East Asian peoples, the Bushido code came to be identified with crude nationalism and racialism, alien to its original spirit and intention.

More than one influence has contributed to the virtual destruction of Bushido as a moral force. The earliest of these was assuredly the commercial depravity which appears to have invaded Japanese trading circles about the beginning of the present century. 'Trade and industry,' says one authority, 'began to scorn it.' Certain Japanese writers blame the introduction of transatlantic methods for the change, but Japanese traders had a reputation sufficiently dubious long anterior to their more modern associations with the West. As long ago as 1905, Mr H. Satoh, Director of the Commercial Museum of Tokyo, scouted the notion that commercial morality in Japan was at a lower ebb than elsewhere, but Baron Shibusawa, a nobleman who had adopted a mercantile career, 'hesitated to say in spite of himself' that Japan had as high a morality in commerce as Great Britain, America, or Germany, adding that this rendered futile her efforts to attract capital from abroad. Indeed, by the period of her war with Russia in 1904, the commercial dishonesty of Japan had become a byword, and her trading circles had cast aside the tradition of Bushido with a cynicism which augured ill for the future of her business life, and which was notoriously reflected in negotiations with European commercial establishments.

But influences greatly more dangerous and subtle were at work for the disintegration of this national tradition of chivalry and fair-play. By skilful propaganda, the sources of which are not in doubt, Japan was given to believe that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were not only derogatory to her interests and contemptuous of her position as a great power, but definitely destructive of her

imperial aims in the Pacific and as a leader of the East Asiatic races. Great Britain, France, and the United States, she was assured, were in concert and conspiracy to destroy her authority in the Far East and stultify her commercial endeavours, with the intention of bringing about her national bankruptcy. The emissaries of Dr Alfred Rosenberg, Minister for Foreign Affairs for the German Reich, the sworn foe of Bolshevik Russia, succeeded in influencing Japanese opinion against Japan's former allies, and the presence of large numbers of young Japanese officers in German military seminaries greatly encouraged his propaganda.

It was, indeed, the return of many of these military cadets to Japan, ardent young men who had imbibed the racial ideals of Nazi Germany, and who had been encouraged to translate them into a Japanese code of similar intention, which may truly be said to have been responsible for the rise of the Military Party, the shocking assassination of statesmen, and similar acts of terrorism which have defaced Japanese public life in these latter years, as well as for the cruel and barbarous mass massacres of many thousands of Chinese civilians during the war with China, and the 'frightfulness' meted out to British and American citizens in the Chinese Treaty Ports during their occupation by the Japanese forces in 1937 and the following year. The Teutonic inspiration of this Nipponese Nazism may also be discovered in the treacherous suddenness with which Japan broke off pacific relations with Great Britain and the United States without due declaration of war, and the barbarous massacre or maltreatment of British prisoners of war and civilians subsequent to the fall of Hong Kong.

The history of German propaganda in Japan within recent years remains to be written, and this is scarcely the place or time to discuss it. But when the whole chronicle of its tortuous dealings is at last divulged, few of the facts associated with it will appear so amazing as the almost magical manner in which it succeeded in replacing a system of lofty personal virtue and propriety by a variant of the crudest Nazism so transformed as to appeal to Japanese national ambitions—inspired indeed by that very spirit of brutal aggressiveness for the suppression of which the code of Bushido was originally designed.

LEWIS SPENCE.

Art. 8.—BRITAIN AT WAR.

IN every great drama—and this world war is the greatest the human race has ever witnessed—there are rises and falls of tension ; and we see some of these fairly clearly when we turn our memories back. We began quietly, too quietly : there was the spectacle of the swift and tremendous murder of Poland, followed by that curious semi-somnolent stage which induced our impatient friends and cousins across the Atlantic to speak of ‘ a phoney war ’ : as spectators they were not getting good value for their seats well away from the ring-side and loudly they said so, forgetting that at that time they had not paid for those seats. How far away all that now sounds ! That stage was shattered, bluntly and characteristically, by Hitler’s seizure of Denmark and his onslaught on Norway, of which latter we now remember that it shattered also Mr Neville Chamberlain’s opinion, just previously expressed, that Hitler had ‘ missed the bus,’ since when it has rather falsified Mr Churchill’s opinion, expressed only a short while after the onslaught, that Hitler had made a grievous blunder and presented us with great strategic and military advantages. The shattering of all somnolence continued : few—in Europe at all events—slept again that tremendous year of 1940.

With the winning of the Battle of Britain a new lowering of tension, however, began ; began, that is, in the military field (omitting the vast defensive courage of the dwellers in the bombed cities, towns, villages, and homesteads of this island), though the former mentality which will now for ever be associated with the memory of the late M. Maginot had evaporated : Libya proved that. But hardly had we recognised the extraordinary achievements which first brought General Wavell into the full glare of the public limelight than Hitler struck again, and we were engaged desperately first in Greece and then in Crete. We were driven out, as we know ; but it is still by no means clear that we were defeated. We gained Syria, we secured Irak, the Suez Canal we had already safeguarded. And so to the opening, on June 22, 1941, of the prodigious blow by Germany against Russia—and for months we saw her advance. Tension as great, though different, as the tension in the previous year : if the

Battle of Britain was the first peak of the mighty drama, the Battle of Russia, Act I, was the second. And since the advance right up to the precincts of Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov the gigantic struggle in the snows—a conflict such as the world has never known. If only the Germans were not such brutes, it would be permissible to praise, or at least admire, them: for assuredly, if no armies have ever before been pressed back and back as were the Russians and have maintained their cohesion, their moral, and their essential supplies, and still—even more—at the very end of their long retreat their power to change over instantly to the offensive, so too no armies, advancing under the impetus of their infallibility and halted before achieving any single one of their vital objectives, have held together, ill-clad in frightful frost, and, baffled and beaten, still, dog-like, obeyed their inhuman master. A struggle of Titans—but with the ultimate issue, we are sure, resting upon those who, like Cromwell's russet-coated captain, 'know what they fight for and love what they know.'

And into the midst of this the treachery, the power, and the skill of Japan. On that page of the mighty history there is, as yet (apart from the naval battle off the Solomon Islands the first phase of which is concluding even as I write) nothing but black marks, black marks, I hasten to add, as related to national success—heroism there has been in plenty. Parallel to the hopes and the sympathy and the admiration and also the material aid concentrated upon the Russian armies, all eyes and the thoughts of most onlookers have been on the succession of defeats and withdrawals in the Far East. And many a hard, and unjustified, criticism has been passed. When I last wrote (on February 16) we had just lost Singapore; I was enabled to add a postscript in proof on March 10, by which date we had lost Java (and the 'we' is a mighty one, comprising not only the United States but also the very gallant Dutch). Now we have lost Burma (I write on May 11) and at long last Corregidor has yielded, after a brilliantly stubborn defence. The indefatigable prongs of the Japanese attackers may be freed to stretch out, the one towards India and the other—temporarily blunted after Java—again to Australia. Meanwhile the Libyan seesaw has remained in suspense, and the hush over man-

kind before the curtain rises on what must inevitably be something that will indeed deserve the adjective historic becomes in very truth an audible tensivity. There is no one who does not know that the world is on the eve of desperate and gigantic events, that long before these words see the light of print something is going to break somewhere, either Russia is going to leap upon the thawing hordes of Hitler or they are going to make one further supreme attempt both to disintegrate their terrible opponents and to get to the oil of which (presumably) they are soon to be so urgently in need.

All through these months of winter and early spring—apart from the wonders of the terrific wear and tear on German strength in the depths of the ice and frost and from the still unstemmed torrent of what one of those typical old London women who overcame the *blitz* calls 'those nasty little rats,' namely, our erstwhile allies, the Japanese—it has almost seemed as though very little was going on. It has been obvious that this appearance was deceptive, as deceptive, let us hope, as the apparent sleepfulness of Germany in the winter of 1939-40. Then, as the world has had occasion to know, she was preparing tirelessly, ceaselessly for her frightful blows, in April, May, and June: now, as we may believe, whilst she has been preparing, no doubt, as far as ever she has been allowed by Russia, our air-raids, and the march of events to do so, we may say, as the heroine of the child's story remarked to her husband returned from the Crusades to find his nursery newly and unexpectedly stocked with offspring, 'we too have not been idle.'

There have been bubbleings as of water on the boil: Bruneval, St. Nazaire leap to the mind; and the seizure of Diego Suarez is not exactly passivity. It is clear, thank Heaven, that the days when our enemies could infiltrate, unopposed by the Allies except with words, have passed. And that is, I think, the greatest change which has come about in the mentality of the combatants since I last wrote. The Germans have always believed in making war with offensiveness, even audacity; the Russians have shown that they have nothing to learn from the Germans—and the Japanese have, as all can realise, understood that only by the utmost dash can they conceivably hope to delay the day of doom. But

we have never been warlike, except under dire compulsion : and it takes time for the application of that to have full effect. For a year and a half we have been holding the fort, conscious that that was the supreme service to be rendered to the forces of freedom. It is much in any struggle to avoid defeat, but that alone does not bring, and still less breed, victory. These months have seen the steady and colossal swing over—and now (in mid-May be it noted) there is everywhere a changed conception, namely, that the tide has turned and that it is for us to take advantage of it.

I remember long ago talking to a distinguished journalist who said that when he retired and had leisure he thought he would write a book to be entitled 'The Northcliffe myth.' As he offered no explanation of his intriguing title I asked for one and he told me he meant it to cover Lord Northcliffe's peculiar flair for knowing what was about in any event to happen. Whenever something both of novelty and magnitude was in that hatching state, Lord Northcliffe, so my interlocutor averred, divining this, would direct one of his numerous myrmidons to write what Mr Horatio Bottomley would have described as 'one of his powerful articles' calling loudly for it to be done : then, when shortly afterwards it was done, Lord Northcliffe could claim, and others could claim for him, that it had been this article in one of his publications which had brought about the salutary reform. The circumstances are admittedly not parallel, but they have just a sufficiency of similarity for this conversation, of many years ago, to return to my mind when we were confronted late in April with Lord Beaverbrook's speech in New York in advocacy of what is now generally known as the Second Front.

In my last article I devoted some space to the outstanding labours of that singular, even spectacular man who has come to be called fairly widely 'the Beaver.' He had then just been made Minister of Production and had accordingly to be accounted as having risen to a position in the direction of our war effort second only to that of Mr Churchill. As will be remembered, however, he held that position only for a fortnight, and then, to the Prime Minister's regret, was compelled by ill-health to retire. Captain Oliver Lyttelton succeeded him in

the appointment which had up to the moment of its creation been stubbornly resisted by Mr Churchill, and Lord Beaverbrook went to the United States on very important production duties, but without Cabinet status and with what precise authority it has been difficult to ascertain. His speech in New York at all events has given rise to much curious speculation, all the more so because it is so difficult accurately to appraise the merits and services of any one whose career has so often received the indiscriminating plaudits of a section of the journalistic world. Lord Beaverbrook, as a matter of truth, is quite sufficiently remarkable for the intensity of his work and his great abilities to be handicapped, rather than assisted, by the comments of some of his admirers. For example, here is a reference to the speech quoted in the *Daily Express*: it was made, we are told, by Mr Richard Eaton, an American radio news analyst (which sounds an important sort of profession); 'Lord Beaverbrook, now a simple British citizen but one of the greatest British statesmen of all time, made a vibrant appeal for a Second Front which will make it possible to decide the war in 1942.' As to that it is at least permissible to point out that Lord Beaverbrook is not now, nor has he ever been, simple—that is an inappropriate description of his exceedingly energetic, complex mind—and that it is perhaps a trifle early in the day to attempt to estimate his niche on the pinnacles of British statecraft. Alternatively, there is the commentary of Mr Fletcher Pratt, military expert for the *New York Post*, 'there are in the military sense few more dangerous doctrines than that which Lord Beaverbrook is preaching.'

When all is said and done, appeals for the opening of a Second Front are just a little bit hard on Mr Churchill, than whom, I suppose, we have seldom had a more pugnacious and determined fire-eater. If and when a Second Front can be opened with a reasonable assurance of success—and to open it with anything less could hardly be urged with seriousness—it can unhesitatingly be believed that no one will open it more whole-heartedly than our Prime Minister, and to him alone, many people felt, should fittingly have fallen responsibility for such a speech—and this without denying that in its general argument and spirit Lord Beaverbrook was in complete

accord with the general desire. By the date this article appears in print, all this, doubtless, will seem to belong to the long ago, and yet it is pre-eminently symptomatic of the period of the war through which as I write in mid-May we are passing. We all of us, of every Allied Nation, long for the day when we can and do take the offensive: we many of us dread above all things our leaders being pushed beyond wisdom into a premature attempt which could only have a disheartening, if not a disastrous, repercussion.

The reports of, and the commentaries upon, this speech by Lord Beaverbrook and the subsequent articles in many periodicals directing our leaders what to do and even how to do it have brought into much prominence the whole question of government by journalism, the right to which some journalists, unconsciously no doubt but persistently, confuse with a much less equivocal right, that of the freedom of the Press. True and unrestricted freedom of the Press, as I imagine every dispassionate citizen will admit, is impossible in war: some degree of censorship there must be, though there have been Members of Parliament who in calling vociferously for a debate in the House of Commons on our war strategy and for a public statement in the course of it by the Government seemed to doubt that. The question, in democracies, must always be, how much censorship.

Few Ministers of democracy in war are to be envied; and most in turn have needed sympathy. Lord Woolton, Lord Leathers, Mr Bevin have had some excessively difficult problems to tackle: during the spring of 1942 it has seemed to be Mr Herbert Morrison's turn to be the central target for snipers and even bomb-throwers. With the merits and demerits of his controversy with, and dismissal of, Sir Warren Fisher it is perhaps unnecessary now to say more than that the correspondence interchanged between them showed a clash of two very dissimilar temperaments and, perhaps, faults on both sides. But over Mr. Morrison's conflict with the *Daily Mirror* it is really difficult to see what other course any responsible Minister could have taken: if there be grounds for criticism, they are, surely, that he has passed by in silence much other commentary in periodicals which has hardly been directed towards the enhancement of this

country's prestige. For some writers any stick will do to beat a dog they dislike, as, for instance, Mr Hannen Swaffer's causticism on the announcement (very well received by the whole Allied world) of General MacArthur's appointment as G.O.C. in Australia: 'Whitehall has received from Canberra the worst rebuff in Imperial history.' Surely a trifle unduly severe.

The *Daily Mirror*, it may be remembered, was accused of holding the War Office and its works up to scorn; it is doubtful whether its sarcasm was more biting or less justified than this, from a well-known Sunday paper: after saying that 'babies born to baronial families, so dull as to be under the mental average, were found secure jobs . . . and it often happened that the job selected was that of an Army officer' the anonymous writer gleefully proceeded, 'do not take it that commissioned rank was filled by a solid block of inanity. There must have been a proportion of keen minds who irked against the dead weight of established custom.' Let me commend him, as he puts his amusing diatribe in the past, to Turenne, whose words were, 'I do not know how it is with the English soldiers, they are so often magnificent in their youth—they are brave, enterprising, enthusiastic, they make better young officers than those of any other nation up to the rank of captain': it is true that Turenne, being a Frenchman, could not resist his riposte, adding, 'But after that they are apt to become rigid, stupid—they are seldom good in higher command.' An argument, indeed, in favour of young generals.

In this connection a novelty is to be noticed. Once when a new appointment was announced what readers were principally given to understand were the qualifications, that is, the previous experiences, of the new-comer: now the first, and the main, fact we are told is his age. This is now never omitted—and yet it remains true that many a man was never young and some never grow old: the years of a man's life are no doubt interesting and relevant, but they are never conclusive, and yet now-a-days they are always so accounted. Clemenceau (not to mention Pétain!) would have stood no chance to-day, and as for Selous, who outmarched men forty years his juniors, his country would assuredly now have given him no commission as a subaltern. It is, doubtless, all to the

good that the fossilised should be eliminated, and it is indubitably true that the warfare of to-day is to the swift: the middle-aged can barely, and the old can in no degree, cope with its necessities—and yet the sweepings of new brooms are sometimes almost needlessly ruthless.

Presumably, however, that is what new brooms are for; and Sir James Grigg has got to work in his new appointment as Secretary of State for War with the energy and determination that were generally held to be characteristic of him. And yet—not on personal grounds at all but on general principle—there is scope for legitimate criticism of his elevation to ministerial rank. A man may indeed retain his immense admiration for the services rendered to the nation in its darkest hour by Mr Churchill, may continue to believe that he is our War Prime Minister *par excellence*, and still withhold admiration from some of his latest appointments. It is to be doubted whether the elevation of a civil servant to a ministerial post has ever been truly successful: to promote a civil servant to the political headship of the Ministry in which he has been serving is open to obvious objection. A little to be questioned also is another translation, made at approximately the same time. There was, perhaps, good reason for the conferring of a peerage upon Archbishop Davidson: it could hardly be held to have added lustre to his high distinction; but he had sat in the seat of St Augustine an unusually long time and he was by temperament little likely to participate as a lay peer in debates. However natural it was that it should have been desired equally to honour Dr Lang for his great past, to confer a peerage also upon him may well be thought to have created a precedent, and it may be submitted, with no personal disrespect to him, very much the reverse, that it is one which may hereafter be less welcome. Maybe, however, nothing that happens in these abnormal times will ever be quoted successfully as a precedent and that in both these two changes there will not be imitations when the happy days of peace return.

Mr Churchill has not, so far, been under fire in respect of any of his changes, recommendations, or appointments; but in that he owes his immunity to his extraordinary personal prestige—and his Government has not escaped the defeat of more than one candidate. It may, perhaps,

be noted as a sign of the abnormality of the times that more and more Ministers are being appointed who derive none of their authority from recognised bodies of followers. It is no doubt well that the party system should be in abeyance and the best men chosen, quite irrespective of their politics or public past ; but there is a danger, nonetheless, one from which Mr Lloyd George's Government in the last war did not wholly escape, which it is possible may reappear ; the power of parties did at least secure that Ministers were not solely the creations of the Prime Minister, removable at his will. Already there have been a great many changes, too many, it may reasonably be held ; a continuous stream of War Ministers, for example, and it can hardly have been argued that the supersession of Colonel Moore-Brabazon was essential. He was doing well, as was generally agreed, at the Ministry of Aircraft Production, for the headship of which he had special qualifications, as was Captain Margesson at the War Office—and the grant of peerages to both is but a dubious consolation. In the recent debate in the House of Lords on Colonial administration it was urged with emphasis and generally accepted as a principle that Governors should (except for quite special reasons) be given a tenure of office for at least five years : under that period, it was argued, no man could hope to learn his job and make his mark. It is an argument that applies also to Ministerial office. Continuity, in war especially, has merit, and change for the sake of change has none. But so immense is the standing of, and faith in, our Prime Minister that, so far, he has been able to make changes at will. It seems, at the moment of writing, however, doubtful if he will be able to resist the appointment of a Chief of a Combined Staff any more than he could that of a Minister of Production : we remain a democracy, and even with a Winston Churchill as Prime Minister the pressure of public opinion is decisive—and on this, as on the other, he is now heavily outweighed.

This change must—and assuredly will—be made : and it would seem inevitable that Sir Archibald Wavell will be the man ; he alone has sufficient prestige as well as ability to enable him to stand up, as and when needful, to the dominating personality and fiery genius of our present Commander-in-Chief. And as to the trinity of

the Services, though a great and irresistible clamour has arisen for the creation of a combined General Staff, so far no one has followed up authoritatively my proposal that the time has come for the creation of the King's Service, combining in one Army, Navy, and Air Force—and yet I am fortified by the opinion of the man who has probably the most experience and the least prejudice of any one in such matters that that proposal is based upon the true principle which should prevail. And I repeat not only is its execution by no means as difficult as it might seem, but also it can only be done under the centrifugal pressure of events in the midst of a mighty war: and it alone can end what Lord Simon has oddly called the 'myth' of friction between the Services.

Change, change in all things: as is written at the conclusion of the 'Report of the Committee of Industrialists and Economists with Theologians' under the title 'Malvern and After':—'A change is taking place in our social life so great as to deserve the name of a revolution.' Much, in spite of the excessive violence and dimensions of this world-war, has come upon us gradually, so that it is only by looking back that we can estimate the length of the road we have already trodden: one by one our luxuries and our pleasures have been curtailed or abolished and, later, one by one our necessities have been rationed. Cuts everywhere, and always received with equanimity, if not enthusiasm, as long as the basis seemed just and the method reasonable: the outcry against Sir William Beveridge's fuel proposals, however, has proved that there remains undiminished in our British democracy the power and the will to kick good and hard when the case does not appear to it adequately made out. It is probably the restrictions upon petrol, both here and in the United States, which will mean, especially in life across the Atlantic which has so largely been built up upon the automobile, the biggest changes of all.

In this hectic stage of the world's history, months and years which historians for ages to come will dwell upon as marking a watershed for mankind, there are inevitably both losses and gains, losses and gains I mean not in the realm of life and death, miseries and destructions—those inherent hordes of war—but in that of the mind, of custom, and of the future. For losses, let me take two

instances, each of which may seem trivial in itself, yet each of which seems to me to have within it some real significance. For the first, whenever I travel in the Underground in London I am invited to contemplate fixed before my eyes one of those egregiously silly rhymes which under the general caption 'Billy Brown of London Town' are proudly labelled 'printed for London Transport': they make me sigh again for the passing of Frank Pick who was so deeply interested in Art and Industry. The worst of these bits of doggerel runs as follows:

'Face the driver, raise your hand;
You'll find that he will understand.'

If one must have this sort of thing, why, oh, why not let the second line run 'You will find he'll understand'? Meaning just the same; and does no one on the London Transport have any grasp of the rudiments of prosody? What does it matter, may be asked: nothing, nothing at all, I know; but to parade such scorn of the very simplest of technique! A sign of the times: once these things did matter deeply—now no one cares a jot.

My second instance of what is truly a blunting of our susceptibilities I take from a recent review in which a novel is thus described, 'An excellent house-party murder story. Two decapitated women and very amusing.' I remember, after that last war which was, so we fondly believed—or at least hoped—to end war, the episode of the ex-sergeant then back in civil life; becoming vexed with some noisy fellow in the street below, he eased his vexation by throwing a live Mills bomb, a war souvenir, at him. The sense of values, upset by the teachings of war, had not in the ex-sergeant's case undergone the necessary re-adjustment. So may it be in this greater and even more savage conflict. In war men, millions of them, must be trained to kill, that is an undeniable sadness; and in this war, with its raids, its droppings from the sky and the like, some of the training must needs be to kill in stealth and silence, in deadliness and ferocity. What the effect will be hereafter on the mentalities of the trained, all of them young, it sears the spirit to think—and yet we know that without such training the murderer and the thug will reign unchecked, unended through-

out the world. But is it necessary, I wonder, to have wireless blares of 'hate'? That may be doubted; it must be regretted, it makes one feel ashamed—and, which matters more, it is certain that such is based upon a wholly false reading of British psychology.

In feeling this, there is no need to plunge to the other extreme. Mr Herbert Morrison, who seems to have developed a facility for arousing controversy, has very recently said, 'I want justice for the German people. I am against that foolish and purposeless vindictiveness which was set up and imposed on the German people after the last war.' That is treading highly dangerous ground: that is exactly what for years before 1939 Hitler was trying by every art in his propaganda to induce English politicians to say: it is strange that any one should fall for it in the spring of 1942. I wonder what Mr Morrison's opinion is of the terms imposed upon the Russian people by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 'Justice for the German people?' That is, all things considered, a tolerably harsh demand: for if one thing more than another is certain it is that no people in history have ever so unifiedly consented to the perpetration of innumerable and nameless brutalities as long as those seemed to be a part of their victorious march against mankind.

Let us turn to the gains, some of which are now beginning like peaks arising out of the mist in a dim dawn to be visible above the wastes and vapours of the war. If there be, in some respects, increased class bitterness, which is loss, there are many encouraging aspects of increased understanding, which is gain—and increased understanding not only among individuals and groups of individuals but also among the wider aggregations of the human race. The first and foremost amongst these in importance and extent is obviously derived from the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India: that is indeed the only event since September, 1939, which, whilst not being specifically and directly concerned with the war (however greatly conditioned by the Japanese approach to India), has riveted the general attention.

How strange has been the national attitude towards Sir Stafford Cripps! It is difficult to think of any one in all our long history who has had so singular a rise—not so very long ago a left-winger, isolated and extreme,

unfavoured by Labour and at odds indeed with Conservatism, then Ambassador with a job requiring first the greatest tact and patience and afterwards acquiring exceptional significance, then called by general acclaim to high prominence in the War Cabinet, and fourthly (though obviously not finally) the bearer of the offer of self-government to India. The mission failed, as indeed it was quite obvious to those who know best that marvellous, historic, romantic, and disunited sub-continent that it was bound, in all the prevailing conditions, to fail—but there are failures which do more than many successes. Crete and Corregidor are military cases in point: this, politically and psychologically, achieved more than most thought possible. I quote as singularly apposite these words from an article in *The Times* entitled 'St Mark. Unfinished Tasks': 'Often what actually has been done, incomplete though it be, proves to have far greater value than its doer would believe, and encourages others to take up and carry through what has been bravely begun. But beneath such considerations lies the deeper truth that it is aim and effort, not achievement, which count in the sight of God.' In the sight of men also, in this case, as American comments have proved: if it has done no more, Sir Stafford Cripps's mission must rank among the great educative labours of our history; and that it will bear good fruit in due season admits of no real doubt. How amusing to read, after his return, the vexed silliness of the *Münchener Zeitung*, 'By taking Cripps into the Cabinet, England loses her identity.'

I would rank also among the great gains of the past few months the general advance towards the ultimate unities of the earth: deep as are the divisions, some of course so deep in the bitternesses and brutalities of this terrible conflict that they seem to us at present almost ineradicable, on the other side of the balance are the comings together, some of national and Imperial significance, some of international and universal. Mr Casey of Australia in the British War Cabinet, with his office in Egypt, General MacArthur of the United States (Mr Hannen Swaffer notwithstanding) in command in Australia, the new interchange and vastly increased knowledge and understanding between the British and the Russians,

the intermingling of forces, brains, and blood, British, American, Dutch, and Chinese, in the struggles in the Far East, the lessons, too, of the lack of cohesion in Malaya—everywhere, wherever the eye comes to rest on any part of the vast panorama of the war, can be discerned the signs of the real 'new order,' the breaking down of so many of the old barriers of prejudice, race, colour, and class: under the terrific and terrifying pressure of this conflict a fresh conception of the rights and duties of Man is slowly but surely arising throughout the Allied world—and of one thing there has never been any doubt, even in the very darkest of our days, and that is that it is the conception of the Allied world and not that of the Axis powers which will lead onward the march of the human race: not to the abysses, mental and spiritual, of the Gestapo and the oppressions of the scourge, but to the heights and the lights of freedom and justice, toleration and opportunity.

One of the most remarkable things about this country at war is also one of the least remarked: it is taken for granted, there is no one who, standing back a space, views it dispassionately. There is not time, there is too much to do, to plan, to work for; and the British have never been distinguished for abstract thought, their genius (in the main) is practical—which has not prevented them from having a wealth of poets to which the little land of old Greece alone affords any comparison. But the commentator, at all events if he has ever tried his hand at poetry, may be allowed a moment of abstraction. Even if unremarked, even if taken so entirely for granted, it is, in truth, remarkable that, one and all, the British in all their private conversations and in all their public discussions never contemplate any ending to this war but one. Indomitably, imperturbably we discuss, we plan: in the famous words of Queen Victoria, 'we are not interested in the possibilities of defeat: they do not exist'—that, if it is prevented from degenerating into ostrich-like complacency, is the very essence of invincibility. It came out strongly in that debate on Colonial administration and our Colonial future to which I have referred: throughout a long series of speeches there was no mention, explicit or implicit, of any future for the Colonies but that in a world returned to peace and

sanity as decided by British planners for British people. Similarly, all of us privately see the world 'after the war'; and 'there'll always be an England' is the sunlit back-ground of our every thought.

But not the old England—quite, or indeed at all. Much, much that was inequitable or for any reason unjust or undesirable will go—on that there is an extraordinarily strong general unspoken resolve. Even now I see in a leading article in *The Times* of May 9 one sentence, 'The war has destroyed much that cannot be, and ought not to be, rebuilt.' Perhaps it is because this feeling is so uncontested that the words of the Duke of Norfolk, speaking officially on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture, attracted so much less attention than intrinsically they deserve, 'The Government are determined,' he said, 'that after the war the land shall not be despoiled as it was after the last one. Never again will the towns be allowed to sprawl over good agricultural land.'

It is in that spirit, unconquerably steadfast for all the dark challenge to our existence, in spite of all the ragings of the tempest, that optimism may find its proper home: it is because of the strength of its reality that the great democracy across the Atlantic can confidently declare in the words of the broadcaster, Mr Edward Murrow, on the eve of his return to it from this island, 'we will be with you to the end—and beyond.'

And, finally, last night (May 10), 'the voice of victory,' as it has at once been called, Mr Churchill's latest address to the listening world. Its most pregnant passage was obviously the solemn warning to Hitler as to the consequences that would befall the German people if he ordered the use of poison gas against our Russian allies, whilst in general Mr Churchill said to the British race, to quote the words of Thomas à Kempis, 'Thou oughtest to have a good hope that thou wilt come to the palm of victory, but thou must not be secure, lest thou wax either slothful or proud.'

GORELL.

Art. 9.—SCIENCE AND THE AVERAGE FARMER.

EXACTLY twenty years ago in addressing the British Association, as President of its Agricultural Section, I used the following words :

‘ It is not sufficient for agricultural scientists to preach only to the converted. Whether in the realm of animal husbandry or in that of arable cultivation, the pursuit of scientific method must not be confined to the favoured few possessing abnormal wealth or an exceptional combination of intellectual zeal with business aptitude, but must for its full justification result in an improved general standard of farming and a largely increased output of agricultural produce at a reasonable margin of profit, in which the whole rural community participates. Considering the wealth of discovery in almost every branch of agricultural research during the last quarter of a century and the greatly enlarged scope of scientific investigation as applied to agricultural problems during the last few years, the absorption into ordinary British farm practice of the results of such investigation is far from being commensurate with the labour, or indeed, the expense of scientific effort. There is far too wide a gap between the most enlightened and commercially successful farm practice and that of the average farmer in this country.’

If this was true in 1922 it is still more true to-day. Whereas in the interim fresh scientific discovery of high economic value to the farming community has accumulated (notably in regard to the high protein content of immature herbage plants, the making of silage of comparable value with that of concentrated cattle cakes, the assimilative and protective properties of vitamins, heritable characteristics of farm animals, the artificial drying of grass, lime as a factor in inducing soil productivity, ‘ley’ farming, the prevention and cure of animal disease, and, above all, the labour- and time-saving efficacy of modern farm implements and machinery), the gap between Britain’s competent and incompetent farmers has widened materially, land fertility has declined and concurrently the average level of British agricultural achievement. The standard of our national husbandry and husbandmen is apt to be judged—quite incorrectly—by the more prominent personnel of the Royal Agricultural Society, the Farmers’ Club, the British Dairy Farmers’

Association, the Highland and Agricultural Society, and other leading agricultural organisations. These outstanding agriculturists are not, in the matter of knowledge and achievement, typical of more than one-sixth of those who occupy agricultural holdings in this country. It is this wide lacuna in knowledge, skill, and profit-earning capacity which renders so difficult the equitable war-time subsidisation of agricultural production.

Speaking as a lifelong farmer, who has travelled on tours of agricultural investigation in many countries of the world since he was a student at our premier Agricultural College more than half a century ago and who (*inter alia*) has presided over the governing body of our leading agricultural research station of Rothamsted, as well as over the Imperial Agricultural Research Conference of 1927, I unhesitatingly assert that there is no civilised country in the world where more valuable agricultural research work of every description (much of it grossly ill-paid) is carried on than that conducted in Great Britain, and none in which the *average* farmer is so profoundly ignorant of its economically valuable results or indeed of science generally as applied to our most vital industry. In these agricultural wanderings abroad I have been deeply impressed by the striking contrast that most other countries present in this respect. Indeed, I have invariably found that my close personal connection with Rothamsted has always furnished a passport to a farmer's welcome and confidence in every part of the world and more especially in New Zealand, where five years' residence as Governor-General among its world-famous and enlightened pastoralists brought me the happiest and most stimulating experiences of my life. What has struck me most forcibly has been that, whereas the *average* working farmer (the 'dirty boot farmer') and small holder of England and Wales know little or nothing of the research work of Rothamsted, Reading, Cambridge, Oxford, Aberystwyth, Harper Adams, East Malling or Long Ashton, a majority of those similarly employed whom at various times I have encountered in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Sweden, Bohemia (Czecho-Slovakia), New Zealand, Australia, and our other Dominions were acquainted with the main discoveries and lessons of Great Britain's chief agricultural research stations, as well as with the valuable

research work of Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., and were keen to discuss them as applied, or potentially applicable, to their own productive efforts. What I desire to stress in this article, in view of the belated but growing realisation of our urban-minded home population of the peril to them of the deterioration and decay of our nation's husbandry, and of no small proportion of its husbandmen, is not so much the need for expansion of the field of agricultural research (profitable national investment though this would be) or even, in the main, of the educational activities of our Agricultural Colleges, the Agricultural Departments of our Universities, or our Farm Institutes, but the vital importance of bringing up-to-date scientific and technical knowledge on to the farms and small holdings of this country and into the heads and the practice of their occupiers, *whether the latter spontaneously seek for it or not*, and as part of a normal and continuous Government plan and not merely as a hectic and alarmist flare-up in time of war. Nor indeed should this knowledge be conveyed mainly through semi-scientific leaflets and other literary material, but through personal contacts, demonstrations, and advice, given in simple language, free from all technical jargon. We have much to learn from other countries in this respect.

Our own scheme of farmer enlightenment may be briefly summarised as follows :

(1) If asked for by the occupier of land, information and advice are provided by the County Agricultural Organiser (appointed by the County Council) and his staff, which may include instructors in different branches of agricultural and horticultural practice. Leaflets on a wide range of subjects can also be supplied, if desired.

(2) For specialised instruction and advice (such as is obtainable only from expert chemists, entomologists, mycologists, veterinarians, bacteriologists or economists) England and Wales are divided into thirteen 'provinces,' each served by an Advisory Centre, which may be either a University (or University College) or an Agricultural College. These are responsible for providing experts, to whom more difficult problems may be referred by the County Agricultural Organiser.

(3) In the background are twenty-one National Agricultural Research Institutes, each of which conducts specialised

research, such as the investigation of soil problems, plant breeding, pathology and nutrition, fruit growing, animal pathology and nutrition, parasitology, dairying, poultry husbandry, economics or engineering, and publishes reports and bulletins for the information of those requiring it and also conducts investigation into problems submitted by the Advisory Centres or County Agricultural Organisers.

(4) There are moreover on the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture live-stock officers (to give advice on questions relating to the breeding and grading of live stock) and other high-grade technical advisers.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that, unless the process of inquiry is initiated by the farmer or small holder himself, any fresh scientific knowledge, or acquaintance with improved technique, percolates through to the agricultural practitioner or comes to be incorporated into his vocational operations, however ignorant or inexperienced he may be. The consequences to the nation, its food supply, and the fertility of its soil are rendered all the more serious by the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Acts of 1908 and 1923, which gave the farmer complete freedom as to the cropping of his arable land, as well as the right to sell his crops (including hay and straw) off his holding, regardless of the maintenance of its fertility. Such supervisory powers (to prevent land deterioration) as the landowner retained prior to 1919 were transferred by an Act of that year to the pre-war County Agricultural Committees, but the Act became in most counties a dead letter. The Committee hardly ever issued certificates of bad cultivation, however disgraceful the farming might be. Since the outbreak of the present war, special County War Agricultural Executive Committees have been set up by the Ministry of Agriculture with drastic war-time powers to ensure better and more productive husbandry in order to meet emergency food requirements. These include the power to dispossess from their holdings farmers who are grossly negligent or inefficient. It is certain that bodies of this character (not necessarily of the same personnel) will need to be maintained as part of the post-war national organisation for preventing agricultural recidivism.

As regards the better instruction of farmers generally in scientific knowledge and new technique, a definite movement along the right lines was made last summer by the inauguration by the Minister of Agriculture (to meet war-time needs) of the Agricultural Improvement Council, the terms of reference to which were :

'To devise methods for seeing that promising results of research are applied as rapidly as possible to the problems of agriculture *and are incorporated in ordinary farming practice* : and to advise from time to time concerning agricultural problems which appear to require scientific investigation.'

The functions of the Council are on the one hand to accelerate the practical application of the results of economically valuable agricultural research and on the other hand to call attention to farm problems requiring for their solution scientific investigation. The pre-existing hiatus between science and farm practice is emphasised by an inaugural statement of the new Council's Chairman, describing its work as complementary to that of the Agricultural Research Council, which latter he says 'will not be concerned to get the results applied in practice : this will be the job of the new Improvement Council.' One of the first results of the activities of this new body was the setting up in January last by the Minister of Agriculture and the Secretary for Scotland of an Agricultural Machinery Development Board for Great Britain, composed of farmers, farm workers, scientists, and engineers, to effect the testing of agricultural implements and machinery, the standardisation of their types, and the promotion of knowledge of their use, by advice, demonstration or otherwise. Another salutary and specifically war-time innovation is the establishment by the Ministry of Agriculture of a Technical Development Committee, to promote, through the medium of the County War Agricultural Executive Committees, educational campaigns for the enlightenment of the farming community on certain features of the food production programme deemed to be of special importance or urgency, coupled with a concurrent appeal to these Committees to form Demonstration Sub-Committees, 'on which all available help of a technical or propagandist character would be assembled.' The 'national silage campaign,' heretofore

admirably conducted, at the Ministry's request, by the agricultural organisation of Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., becomes in future the responsibility of the County War Agricultural Executive Committees. Among the specific activities of these new Demonstration Sub-Committees, stressed by the Technical Development Committee, are improvements in grassland husbandry and methods of publicity for educational campaigns in relation to various phases of farm practice. Under the former head emphasis is placed on herbage improvement by 'ley' farming (i.e. the replacement of poor permanent pastures by high quality temporary grass and clover crops) and the methods by which it can best be effected, the amelioration of the remaining old pastures, and the optimum utilisation of the resulting herbage.

In countries like New Zealand, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Holland (not to mention Scotland) the average farmer and farm worker are much better educated than their 'opposite numbers' in England and Wales. This renders them easier of approach and more receptive of new scientific knowledge and improved processes of husbandry. In Belgium and Northern France, the peasant, although perhaps less well educated, is easily approachable and keen to learn, if only technical jargon be avoided. In all these countries local associations of farmers and cooperative societies—under strong Government encouragement—are invaluable media for transmitting the teachings of science, giving advice and exercising control, with a view to maintaining credit for a high and uniform standard of local farm products. In Scotland there is instructional organisation for farmers on a 'provincial' basis (under Colleges) similar to that of England and Wales, but possessing more (peace-time) vitality and efficacy owing to their higher standard of education with greater mental receptivity and initiative, and indeed a tendency to *ask* for specialised information direct from Research Stations and experts beyond what the County Organisers can furnish. There is in Scotland a greater personal contact of farmers (including crofters) with the sources of scientific knowledge than there is in England and Wales. Over 100 *local* Demonstration Farms are now being established in Scotland for the guidance of farmers in the districts surrounding them.

The following particulars afford illustrations of modes of approach of other countries to the problem of keeping their farming communities up to date in the practice of their husbandry.

In Canada continuous demonstrations take place on 34 *local* experimental farms and 217 'illustration stations' established on the farms of working farmers. Linked with these are periodical 'Field Days' which were attended last year by 42,000 farmers. Especially valuable is the Government scheme of 'Scientific Service News' which is operated through all organs of the press as well as the radio. Agricultural publications distributed to farmers in 1941 totalled 5,476,000 and these were reviewed in every medium of the press and in the Agricultural Department's *daily* nation-wide farm radio programme. There are 3000 Boys' and Girls' Farm Clubs with a membership of 40,000.

In the United States the most notable feature of its very active, well-equipped, and practically-minded Department of Agriculture is its 'Extension Service,' which, with its numerous resident County Agents, familiar with local conditions, reaches 6,000,000 farming families and keeps them *au courant* with up-to-date scientific and technical knowledge. These agents give personal advice to farmers and organise the distribution of excellent pamphlets and leaflets expressed in popular and easily intelligible language. This is a type of literature which, while, in its homely colloquial phraseology, possibly repugnant to the cultured literary purist of this country, might prove invaluable to many of our humbler land cultivators and stockowners, at least until they are provided with a sounder and more appropriate education in their early youth.

In Denmark educational zeal and cooperation combine to stimulate the dissemination of the teachings of Science. Actually, research is carried on partly by the Government and partly by the farmers' own organisations. The various Sectional Committees which disseminate its teachings on different branches of husbandry are appointed by the Government *after nomination* by the *farmers' societies*. There are 138 local Agricultural Societies, with 111,500 members, and 1281 Small Holders' Societies with 92,650 members. These deal only with

technical—not political—questions and employ agricultural advisers who are at the same time College graduates and practical farmers. They are in close personal contact with all land occupiers and explain in simple language the results of experiments and give winter lectures in the village halls.

Of all European countries Belgium is in many respects most like Great Britain. It is the most densely populated country in Europe and one of the most highly industrialised. Its husbandry is, in the main, intensive and the holdings relatively small. Of its active population (3,750,000), 17 per cent. under normal conditions are engaged in agriculture, of whom 48 per cent. (chiefly small holders) own their own farms. Nine-tenths of the permanent agricultural workers are members of the farmers' families. The chief media for the continuous modernisation of agricultural practice are the State 'Agronomes' who were established 78 years ago. They form a constant link between Gembloux and Louvain Research Stations and the farmers. These are scientific agriculturists. They comprise 29 Regular Organisers, together with expert assistants for every branch of agricultural science and technique. Their functions are officially described as follows :

(1) To popularise knowledge and methods of agricultural science ; (2) to teach farmers the advantages that they can derive from mutual association and to give them full details of the various organisations of which they may become members ; (3) to enlighten the State Administration on the work of Agricultural Associations in their districts and advise on appropriate 'stimuli' to their efforts ; and (4) to organise and *direct* adult agricultural courses of instruction in their various districts. They hold free public consultations in the principal markets of their respective circuits, which are announced beforehand in the agricultural press. They organise every sort of demonstration, experiment, and test. They and their experts pay periodical visits to the farmers in their circuits. Every Saturday these officials are obliged to send to Brussels a list of the names and addresses of the farmers whom they propose to visit during the following week, together with a statement of the purpose of their visit.

In probably no European country have its land cultivators shown their faith in scientific research and its application to intensive husbandry more conspicuously than in Holland, and the Government has in its own rural policy reflected their enthusiasm and progressive mentality. This has induced a confidence and a feeling of security among agricultural and horticultural producers in the Netherlands in marked contrast to the sense of instability and insecurity prevailing in rural Britain. Capital seems to be forthcoming there for up-to-date equipment, however expensive it may be. Such processes as external soil heating (in order to advance the maturation of their garden produce), the use of movable glass houses, and irrigation by pipe systems, have advanced the standard of intensive plant cultivators to a pinnacle of achievement that few of Britain's corresponding producers can rival. Their workmen too are adepts at their tasks, especially in the matter of precautions against disease. The centre of the Dutch scientific work is the College and Research Station at Wageningen near Arnhem. This, besides catering for home requirements, has a colonial side, whence came the eminent breeders of the 'Noble Canes' which have revolutionised the cane-sugar industry of the world. There has been in fact a constant and close liaison between the workers in Java and the colonial section in Wageningen, while the Wageningen establishment is a great all-round teaching and research station. This establishment issues every year an excellent booklet specifying for each crop (including the main vegetables) the varieties recommended, with a few brief notes about their special characteristics and their cultivation. Dairy farmers and bulb growers are similarly kept in close contact with technical information, radiating respectively from Greetingen and Lisse. Those engaged in scientific work in Holland have displayed considerable genius in maintaining close and helpful association alike with the peasants and with the large-scale business farmers. Adaptation of its methods to our own crying rural needs might put new life and hope into the British countryside. Dissemination of scientific knowledge among farmers is mainly a concern of the Government. The service is centralised in the Department of Agriculture at The Hague, under a

Director-General. With him work several Controllers who conduct the Service of the Government Advisers, including separate advisers for Agriculture, Poultry Keeping, Dairying, and Horticulture. All of them have adapted themselves to the special conditions obtaining in their districts and are linked up with the institutions providing agricultural education. They are helped by a number of assistants (ex-pupils of Agricultural Winter Schools) who travel round the districts in order to keep the advisers fully informed. All advisers give public lectures as well as individual advice. They are in close touch with the agricultural organisations. Secretaries of these organisations are mostly in possession of a certificate from the Agricultural University College at Wageningen and are the editors of provincial agricultural weeklies, published by the organisations. Agriculture and horticulture are highly organised. Practically every farmer is a member of one of the provincial organisations and receives the provincial journal of his organisation free of charge, the subscription fee being included in the annual contribution. In horticulture the same system is run on national lines, but some provincial organisations comprise both farmers and horticulturists. All information of importance to farmers in every district is published in these provincial journals, articles being written by the Organisation Secretary and the Government Advisers. The cooperative departments of these organisations see to it that rations for live stock of the right composition, as also information regarding the prices of their component feeding stuffs, are available for farmers at the local depots. This is done in consultation with the livestock advisers. Several provincial organisations have their own experimental farms, where feeding experiments are carried out by the agricultural advisers, and improvement of agricultural crops, by selection or otherwise, is aimed at in cooperation with the advisers or in some cases under the supervision of a specialised official of the organisation, a man who holds the certificate of Wageningen. The results are published in the press. As far as control of plant diseases is concerned, most valuable work is being done by the plant pathological service. This service undertakes advisory work and keeps farmers and growers usefully informed by issuing cheap literature,

sometimes even free of charge. The Veterinary Service works on different lines. Veterinary surgeons are not Government officials. They are established all over the country. The Veterinary Service is responsible for seeing that Statutory Orders and Laws relating to live stock are duly observed, and Controllers keep the Director at The Hague informed of the conditions of health of the live stock in different parts of the country. Courses of instruction are given in winter to make the breeders acquainted with elementary knowledge regarding the hygiene of live stock.

In New Zealand assistance is given to farmers by the Department of Agriculture through its Field Instructors, Dairy Instructors, Veterinary Officers, and experts on every branch of its extremely efficient husbandry. In New Zealand the average farmer not merely tolerates State instructional assistance of every description, but welcomes it. He takes it as a matter of course, having already received *free* elementary agricultural instruction in his youth through the medium of the State Schools and Young Farmers' Clubs. Grading for export enables defective produce to be traced back to its producer, who is shown by the District Instructor how to remedy the defects. No charge for such assistance is ever made. For the improvement of dairy herds highly experienced officers of the Department of Agriculture periodically visit selected areas in their respective districts, address meetings of farmers on herd improvement, and assist in forming Herd Testing Associations. One result of this has been that, whereas in 1910 New Zealand milch cattle yielded annually an average of 148 lbs. of butter fat, last year's average was 232 lbs.—an increase of over 60 per cent. The Dairy Officer in the course of his instructional duties is faced with problems such as soil deficiencies, bovine contagious abortion, mastitis and the like, which evoke immediate cooperation with the resident officer of the Fields Division, or the Veterinary Officer of the Live-stock Division or of the Animal Research Division, with no resulting charge to the farmer. Of all instructional work that of the Fields Division Officer is the most valuable. He makes personal first-hand contact with the farmer himself, bringing to his door the results of experimental work carried out by

the various Research Stations. In order to demonstrate the results of centralised research, and to gain further experience of local conditions, small State experimental farms are established at various centres throughout all the provinces in both North and South Islands. Periodically the local branch of the Farmers' Union arrange for a Field Day at the experimental farm. The Fields Officer will be present to explain the nature of the experiments. District Fields Officers—with locomotion provided by the State—visit, at request, any farmers in their areas, to give advice on crop rotation, types of seeds, methods of grazing, manure dressings, choice of fodder crops and other like problems. Similarly, officers of the Live-stock Division, as well as of the Poultry, Apiary, and Horticultural Departments, are available, free of charge, to give helpful advice and encouragement on all matters within their specialised ambit.

In Russia several different methods are adopted for bringing to the notice of farmers any results obtained by scientific workers that are likely to be helpful to them. The scientific workers at the large institutes deal with general problems, such as the production of new varieties of crops suited to different conditions in the region, and the evolution of new systems of agriculture, either more productive or better calculated to conserve fertility. These are then demonstrated to a staff of instructors, who, while centred at the Research Institutes, spend their time on the Collective Farms, at each of which they have a cottage or 'hut laboratory' where they keep samples, diagrams, and other material likely to help them in their demonstrations. They deal simply and solely with the problems presented by farm practice, and are thus enabled to ensure close contacts between farms and the Experimental Stations. The numerous Machine Tractor Stations which hire out large implements to the Collective Farms also have their staff of expert advisers, who go round their respective areas with machines, demonstrating how best to use them and introducing any modifications of the existing practice that seem desirable. In addition, numerous lectures in every locality are arranged by 'the Party,' and, as the Russian peasants are very fond of listening to lectures, these are well attended. They deal commonly with subjects of general interest, but agri-

cultural topics can be included. Much use is also made of the wireless for the purpose of guidance and instruction to the farming community. The progress in recent years of science as applied to Russian husbandry, and the recognition by the farmers of its worth to them, may be gauged by the fact that, whereas in 1913 Russia possessed 200 scientific workers and 122 Agricultural Scientific Institutions, including 44 experimental stations and 78 experimental fields, with an annual appropriation in the State Budget of less than $2\frac{1}{2}$ million roubles, the number of scientific workers had by 1941 increased to 8,500, with a corresponding increase of research and experimental stations and other Agricultural Institutions, and an annual State allocation for agricultural research of 350 million roubles. Not only is the training of scientific workers free; they receive a salary while under instruction.

Some lessons on the subject under review could be learnt from the peace-time practice of both Germany and Italy, the latter especially in connection with the science of land drainage. '*Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*' The time, however, is not opportune to discuss them, and in any case Germany's system of 'dragooning' her farmers, even under peace conditions, would not be tolerated in Great Britain.

While, in seeking to apply to our own rural ailments remedies which have proved efficacious in other countries, it is right to give due weight to differences in local conditions and environment, and especially peculiarities in our national temperament (we are not, for instance, readily amenable to Government dictation in what we deem to be our private affairs), these differences may easily be exaggerated, to the national detriment. In the following respects at least, it might be worth while to imitate, or extend our imitation of, some of the above-mentioned countries, viz :

(1) The provision of *free* agricultural education to all intending farmers during their adolescence; (2) the institution and maintenance of local Demonstration Farms in *every* part of England and Wales; (3) definite and emphatic Government stimulation (as in Denmark and Belgium) of cooperative organisations of farmers, and insistence upon their formation and membership in the case of all small holders or of farmers inadequately

equipped with capital, as a basic condition of their State recognition; (4) the establishment of 'Agronomes,' or Regional Scientific Advisers, on the Belgian model, or of Controllers, assisted with Government Advisers, on that of Holland, or of 'Scientific Workers,' on that of Russia; (5) the extension of Young Farmers' Clubs to every part of the country and the conduct of organised lectures and demonstrations for their benefit.

To these I would add two other desiderata suggested by the example of other countries, although not strictly educative in their character. One is the organised district collection (as in Denmark) of farm produce for centralised sale, in order to obviate the waste of time and money expended in visiting periodically the nearest market town (no feature of our English farm regime is more criticised in Scandinavian countries than this), and the other is the provision of a *free* and efficient Veterinary Service. Except for the treatment of the simplest animal ailments veterinary practice is clearly outside the scope of a farmer's normal education, and yet the health of the nation (especially in regard to milk and meat) is largely conditioned by its comprehensive and efficient conduct. If carried out at the public expense, it would be a profitable national investment. The same applies to the testing of cattle and their certification as yielders of pure and wholesome 'graded' milk.

Not only is there needed among farmers a wider personal knowledge of science and scientific methods, but also a greater tendency to seek from trained scientists professional advice and assistance. In no branch of farm economy does the lack of scientific bias on the part of the average farmer involve more serious loss both to the nation and to himself than in that of animal therapeutics. It is calculated by veterinary experts that (without taking into account tuberculosis) there is in Great Britain an avoidable under-production of milk through four diseases alone (viz. sterility, mastitis, Johne's disease, and contagious abortion) amounting to over 200,000,000 gallons a year, with an annual loss to the producers (calculated on a pre-war basis) of 28,000,000*l.* It is estimated that by artificial insemination alone the low average annual yield of 500 gallons per cow could be raised in a few years to 750 gallons.

Although the aim of this article is to explore the best means of modernising our British husbandry as conducted by its present practitioners, and increasing its efficiency and operational economy in the light of scientific discovery and technical improvement, it cannot be overlooked that proper educational equipment is a condition precedent to the effective assimilation of new knowledge and its discriminating and prudent application in farm practice. In this respect Britain is sadly unprogressive, so far as the vocational equipment of all classes of the rural population is concerned. Suffice it to state here : (1) that there is scope for the inauguration throughout the country of Agricultural High Schools corresponding to the Junior Technical or Trades Schools available for pupils studying for skilled urban occupation, their best scholars completing their specialised education at an Agricultural College ; (2) that fully equipped Agricultural Colleges should be provided by the Government in every large county (or group of smaller counties), which will cater, at the age of 16 or 17, for students contemplating farming as a career, after preliminary grounding at a secondary or central school or at a Technical High School of Agriculture in respect of its most promising pupils ; (3) that more unified departmental control of rural education would aid materially the development of efficiency in agricultural training. The fact that numerous local education authorities, guided by the Board of Education, administer secondary, central, and elementary schools (many of the latter not reorganised in accordance with the Hadow Report of 1926), while the Agricultural Colleges and the Agricultural Departments of the Universities are under the control of the Ministry of Agriculture, does not conduce to easy transference from one institution to another in the process of climbing the ladder of a sound agricultural education. The administrative bridging of this unfortunate gap is long overdue. We have much to learn from nearly all other civilised countries in regard to rural vocational education. Our progress in this respect has been lamentably slow and the administrative machine cumbrous, complicated, and lacking in cohesion.

Finally, let it not be contended that we are too proud, self-satisfied, or myopic in this twentieth century to learn

such useful lessons from abroad in the sphere of our rural economy as our ancestors imbibed to our national advantage towards the end of the eighteenth, and in the early part of the nineteenth, century. It is worth remembering that our modern agricultural science is based largely upon foundations laid by foreign scientists. For instance, it was Wallarius, the Swede, who in 1760 demonstrated the value of humus in promoting soil fertility. It was De Saussure, the Swiss, who towards the end of that century was explaining to the world the nutrition of plants and their absorption of carbon from the air. It was Thaer, the German (the Hanoverian physician of George III), who founded the first agricultural college in Europe and pointed the way to Liebig in his discoveries of the ash constituents of plants. It was finally Boussingault, the Frenchman, who, about 1820, was covering the whole range of agricultural chemistry and testing his theories on his estate at Béchalbronn in Alsace. He thus directly influenced the agriculture of both France and England and afforded the chief inspiration of Lawes and Gilbert in the successful conduct of their long and beneficent partnership at Rothamsted, where our first artificial fertiliser (super-phosphate of lime) was evolved, and the statistical method of calculating the effect of fertilisers upon plant growth was initiated. Sir Humphry Davy, with his great authority as a chemist, clinched, as it were, the two converging lines of scientific discovery and agricultural practice, and justified in the eyes of all enlightened agriculturists the motto of the Royal Agricultural Society of England ('Practice with Science') selected on its foundation in 1839.*

But, quite apart from this, it was due to observant travel in continental countries that our chief pioneers of agricultural progress (mostly, it must be admitted, empirical) in days gone by, initiated their agricultural improvements—Archbishop Morton (1420–1500), the

* The R.A.S.E., while staging an annual show of live stock and other farm products of ever-increasing merit and attractiveness (but decreasingly representative of the output of our ordinary commercial farmers), gradually drifted away from strict adherence to its motto, until twenty-one years ago, when, with the inauguration of the Research Committee of its Council, its interest in agricultural science markedly revived and has since been steadily maintained by a succession of valuable *ad hoc* experiments financed by the society.

pioneer of the drainage of the Fens, and Samuel Hartlib (1599-1670), the Anglo-Polish agriculturist, in Flanders; Jethro Tull (1674-1744), the originator of the horse hoe and the wheat drill, in France and Flanders; the 2nd Viscount Townshend (1674-1739), the pioneer of turnip and clover cultivation, in Hanover and Holland; and Arthur Young (1741-1820), the eminent agricultural annalist, on extensive tours of comparative observation in France as well as in Great Britain and Ireland. From the improvements that men of this calibre advocated, the whole agricultural community (dependent for its livelihood on farming), and derivatively the nation, obtained untold benefit. The wise adaptation of science and technique, born in other lands, to the needs of British husbandry raised the latter a century ago to the pinnacle of its fame and to world pre-eminence. Surely we still have in our ranks men of authority, vision, initiative, and courage prepared, in the light of modern knowledge and clamant national needs, to raise once more the general standard of British husbandry to a level comparable with that built up by the wisdom and the patriotism of our forefathers.

BLEDISLOE.

SOME RECENT BOOKS.

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| Deedes Bey. John Presland. | An Ulster Woman in England |
| Middle East Window. Humphrey | 1924-41. Nesca A. Robb. |
| Bowman. | Insanity . . . Abounding. Francis |
| Essays in Criticism and Research. | Weiss |
| Geoffrey Tillotson. | The British Colonial Empire. |
| Air Power and Civilisation. | W. E. Simnett. |
| M. J. B. Davy. | Fighting for What? Sir John Orr. |

It is refreshing in these seemingly cynical days to come across an example of frank hero worship in biography. That is a fair description of 'Deedes Bey,' by John Presland (Macmillans). The book was well worth the writing, for the subject of it is a most remarkable man, but how Mr Presland ever succeeded in persuading him to permit the writing and the use of his private papers and letters is puzzling. We are told that he 'has all the ordinary Englishman's dislike of publicity, feeling perhaps (though he would most strenuously deny the phraseology) that it is "bad form." And apart from an inherent modesty which persuades him that no record of his doings can be of special interest, he is of a peculiar reserve' and 'nothing but an overwhelming sense of duty will bring him under the glare of publicity,' or again, 'by instinct though neither by upbringing nor by circumstance he belongs to that order of men who find their fullest self-expression in self-abnegation, who by surrendering all wealth, position, home, family, even life itself, find a richness of existence denied to those of us who follow the more trodden way. He would have been happiest if he had lived in one of the great ages of the Christian faith and could as a follower of St Francis have espoused Poverty as his bride' and 'he is one of the followers of the Holy Grail and to those ardent spirits there is no respite while life endures.' Those are high-sounding ideals for any living subject of a book to read about himself, and yet it would be hard to say that they are not fully justified. From a background of traditional 'Landed Gentry,' through Eton, the Army, the South African War, A.D.C.-ship at Malta, the Turkish Gendarmerie, Intelligence Staff work in Gallipoli and Palestine, to high political office and acting High Commissionership in Jerusalem, Sir Wyndham has reached not an exalted Government House but of his own choice a back street in Bethnal Green

and devoted and unceasing labour to improve the lot of the poor and oppressed. It is a remarkable story, even though Sir Wyndham is made to appear almost superhuman in his entire lack of any faults or shortcomings, and yet he would be the first to acknowledge that there are some.

Another Englishman, who has had an interesting and distinguished career in Egypt and neighbouring countries, is Mr Humphrey Bowman, and he has written about it in 'Middle East Window' (Longmans). After happy years at Eton and Oxford Mr Bowman joined the Egyptian Civil Service and became a member of the Department of Public Instruction. After a few years of teaching he was promoted to the Inspectorate Staff, which led to very interesting work in the Sudan. Then, after serving as a soldier in the last war, he was appointed Director of Education in Iraq in 1918, to start the new system in that country. In 1920, after a short period again in Egypt, he was made Director of Education in Palestine, and there he remained for sixteen years. His work brought him into touch with many interesting people: Cromer, Kitchener, Allenby, Sir Percy Cox, Sir Arnold Wilson, Miss Gertrude Bell, T. E. Lawrence, Sir Reginald Wingate, successive High Commissioners of Palestine, Slatin Pasha, Arab and Jewish leaders and agitators, officials, landowners, and peasants. Turkish rule had cast an overwhelming blight over educational effort in the bad old days—all the more credit therefore to Mr Bowman and those who helped him to develop on such good and successful lines the new educational organisation. There were inevitable set-backs at times, but the seed was well sown, and in spite of Palestinian and Iraqi unrest has borne good fruit. Mr Bowman's narrative is embellished with many good stories and records of curious personal experiences and is very well worth reading.

Anything from the pen of Mr Geoffrey Tillotson, one of our sanest literary critics, is sure of a warm welcome. His latest volume 'Essays in Criticism and Research' (Cambridge University Press), is aptly entitled because the critic always maintains a just balance between the two, neither stuffing us with criticism nor starving us with research. Although Mr Tillotson is of course mainly concerned with the eighteenth century, in one of his first five chapters he leads up to his favourite period by brief

but attractive and informative essays on the 'Fables' of Robert Henryson, Elizabethan Decoration, the prose of Lyly's comedies, Bacon's Essays, 'Othello' and 'The Alchemist' at Oxford in 1610, and Two Productions of Elizabethan Plays in which—taking a long jump—he deals with the work of Mr Robert Atkins as a producer. Lovers of Pope will probably turn first to Chapter VII on Eighteenth-century Poetic Diction, and Chapter VIII on Alexander Pope, the longest and most important in the book. These are followed by brief and illuminating sidelights on William Shenstone, 'Rasselas' and the 'Persian Tales,' Gray's Letters, Gray the Scholar-Poet, William Collins, the 'New Lady's Magazine' of 1786, William Morris and Ernest Dowson. The paper on Housman's Comic Poems not only contains new matter, but throws a very penetrating beam on Housman's enigmatic personality. The young critic who made the notes on which it is founded had without question the root of the matter in him. This diverse and stimulating volume contains both flowers and fruit.

Mr M. J. B. Davy had a capital notion when he decided to write '**Air Power and Civilisation**' (George Allen and Unwin). In eight brief chapters he traces the history of the idea of flight from antiquity to the present day. Although the idea of flight goes back in China to Emperor Shan of the third millennium B.C., and in Egypt to Rameses III in the second millennium B.C., in spite of Daedalus and Icarus it was not until the Middle Ages that the problem was approached in anything like a scientific spirit. No one interested in the subject can fail to be moved by the work of Leonardo da Vinci or ignore his memorable essay 'On the Flight of Birds.' Napoleon, like Hitler, had a project for invading England from the clouds by means of enormous hot-air balloons, each of which was intended to carry three thousand troops! From the Wright Brothers until to-day Mr Davy traces chronologically the development of the aeroplane, both as an agent of civilisation and as an 'Instrument of Destruction' (Chapter V). He ends in the two valuable chapters: 'Social Consequences of the New Invention' and 'Control or Abolition?' This last question must be faced and answered, and Mr Davy is a sound and well-informed guide.

Miss Nesca A. Robb's 'An Ulster Woman in England, 1924-41' (Cambridge University Press), deserves a warm welcome. The experiences, comments, and reactions of a highly educated and intelligent woman conscientiously and industriously carrying out such war work as falls to her lot in ordinary circumstances and well out of the limelight of high public office are well worth recording. To most readers, however, the chief interest of the book will lie in the comparison of, and comment on, English and Ulster characteristics. It may be a shock to find that a discerning Ulster friend of the author dislikes the English because they gush! Do we plead guilty to that? Does our natural desire to say what is agreeable really only amount to woolly-minded gush, in the eyes of the more dour Ulster people, in whom what may be called the Covenanter strain persists in spite of all the emollients and distractions of modern life? Miss Robb examines carefully the unsatisfactory years after the last war and the largely negative and unballasted inclinations of youth mentally and often materially adrift in an uneasy world. 'To the Old had not succeeded Youth, but the Hollow Men. Still humanity cannot subsist wholly on negation and despair. If there seemed to be little faith in God or man or anything else, there were plenty of fads. You got behaviourism or solipsism or Freudian psychology and for a while explained everything in terms of that single formula'—and so on. Much has happened since then and in the crucible of the present war such fads are perhaps going to melt, not to be solidified again. Miss Robb is by no means altogether critical. She has genuine affection for England in which she has now lived so long, and she pays generous tribute.

Mr Francis Weiss set out to write a reply to various well-known books by Mr Douglas Reed. This reply has grown into a book 'Insanity . . . Abounding' (Blandford Press), which gives an interesting point of view. Mr Weiss was a Hungarian, brought up in Buda Pesth, and an officer in the Austrian Army during the last war. After the war he returned home to endure the chaos of the Communist revolution, followed by the merciless cruelty of the earlier years of the 'White' Horthy regime. Finding conditions so bad in Hungary, he migrated to Germany, then a tolerant country. His business took him

travelling about Europe and more and more his interests and desires centred on England. In due course he and his family settled here and became naturalised. His business prospered and he continued travelling about Europe for a portion of each year and noting the steady deterioration of political conditions. Then came the present war, and with all his love of this country and desire to serve, he found himself still only 'a foreigner with a British passport.' In no way was he allowed to help those whom he had come to think of as his fellow Englishmen. In the bitterness of his disappointment he writes perhaps more harshly than circumstances warrant, but readers cannot but sympathise. His experiences since the last war are markedly interesting, but the most interesting part of the book is his consideration of this refugee question. Persecution of a race or class in one country causes emigration to another. This causes disturbing problems for the reception country. The inhabitants say that the new-comers are taking away their jobs and lowering the standard of life. Even co-religionists or co-racialists do not like the new-comer as the troubles which they create boil over, so to speak, on those who were comfortably settled before. The Governments begin to get more intolerant, conditions get worse, and the refugee crowd, enlarged and multiplied, moves on to still another country—and the trouble begins afresh. Mr Weiss perhaps underestimates the difficulties even of kindly countries receiving large numbers of refugees, but he writes with real feeling and his views command respect.

In 'The British Colonial Empire' (George Allen and Unwin), Mr W. E. Simnett, for many years editor of the 'British Colonial Empire Journal,' gives us a graphic and complete survey of what the Colonial Empire is, how it grew, and how it is governed. In a somewhat elementary manner it briefly sets forth facts of which we have no small reason to be proud, and warns and prepares us for the many Colonial problems that we shall have to unite in solving in the near future.

If after this war we and our allies make a mess of the peace it certainly will not be for want of advice in books, newspapers, magazines, speeches, and broadcasting. This multiple advice is often contradictory, as there are many ways of approaching that better world for which we hope,

and some planners will always think that other planners' ways will never reach their goal at all. Sir John Orr has made a very useful contribution with his '**Fighting for What?**' (Macmillans). The basis of his argument is, 'the primary material necessities of life are (1) food, (2) shelter which includes a house, furniture, clothing, and warmth, and (3) "a job" which is a psychological necessity.' Few can disagree with this, or with the further argument that to get (1) and (2) automatically means getting (3) to a very large extent, because, as President Roosevelt has stated, the provision of the necessities of life for everybody will provide employment for all men willing to work. Sir John deals chiefly with the food side, as is only natural with one of his wide experience and specialised knowledge of that subject, but he also deals in a clear and balanced way with the other aims. If sometimes he seems to go rather far along the path that leads to government control and Socialism he still recognises that Capitalism well managed has a good deal to be said for it and 'Nationalisation is not so much a question of ownership as a question of management. We cannot be sure that management by a new branch of the Civil Service would be any more efficient than under private ownership.

H. R. L. Sheppard

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